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Abstract 
 
Ecuador was ‘refounded’ at the turn of the 21st century, with the articulation of 
progressive and inclusive ideals in a new Constitution. Social movements and leftist 
intellectuals in Ecuador have expressed that president Rafael Correa has failed to uphold 
the 2008 Constitution’s goals and values. President Correa and his Alianza PAIS 
government have utilized the rhetoric of the revolutionary ideals articulated in the 
Constitution, but in practice, they have continued to implement the status quo Western 
development model, and a large part of their development strategy involves ‘neo-
extractive’ activities. Hydroelectric energy production is contributing to the ‘neo-
extractive’ development model in Ecuador, and its implementation has often violated 
Constitutional rights. This thesis is an analysis of natural resource extraction in Ecuador 
and its social repercussions, with a focus on hydroelectric energy production. It is shown 
that the hydroelectric industry in Ecuador is not as “clean,” sustainable, or non-extractive 
as it is purported to be, through a case study of the San José del Tambo hydroelectric 
project and the exploration of an international support for hydroelectric extractivism, the 
United Nations Clean Development Mechanism, and its misleading framing of extractive 
projects as “sustainable development.” Social movements in Ecuador are acting to 
reverse the perversion of their originally revolutionary ideals, and to implement a post-
extractive model informed by those revolutionary ideals. 
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Introduction 
 
“As Ecuadorians, we can feel proud to have the greenest Constitution in the history of 
humanity. We are the first to grant rights to Pachamama.1 We also have environmental 
policies that are exemplary at the national level. But, while I am president, I will not 
allow, in the name of false environmental causes…I will not permit the sacrifice of the 
most important part of Pachamama: the human being…mining, together with our other 
non-renewable resources like gas and petroleum, can and should be used to rapidly 
overcome poverty…We will not be beggars sitting on sacks of gold!”  
 
--President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, 2012 
 
Despite its small size, Ecuador is a highly diverse equatorial country, in its plants 
and wildlife, and in its peoples and their histories. Outside of the country’s urban 
population centers, one can transition from the deep green tropical flora and vast rivers of 
the humid and flat Amazonian Basin to the subtropical foliage on the Andean slopes, or 
from the humid coastal plains to the cool spring-like climate of the inter-Andean central 
highlands, and then up to the cold páramo meadows of shrubs, herbs, and rosette plants 
above the timberline, surrounded by snow-capped volcanoes. I am fortunate to have spent 
seven months studying, interning, and traveling in diverse regions of Ecuador.  Its rural 
lands have been the home of indigenous, campesino,2 and montubio3 peoples for 
hundreds of years -- thousands in the case of indigenous peoples. Throughout those years, 
parts of their land have been despoiled, and vast portions have been taken from their 
rightful inhabitants.  
To begin to address a long history of natural resource extraction and repression of 
indigenous and Afro-descendant peoples starting in the Spanish colonial era, Ecuadorians                                                         
1 A Goddess revered by the indigenous people of the Andes; Mother World or Mother Earth; Nature 
2 Literally a person from the countryside (campo), usually indicating someone who works the land for a 
living. Campesino is sometimes translated to English as “peasant.” Definition from Indians and Leftists 
and the Making of Ecuador’s Modern Indigenous Movement, by Marc Becker.   
3 Poor mestizo (mixed European and indigenous) peasants on the coast who tend to be mobile, migrating 
among export-oriented plantations during harvests and to urban areas in search of employment. 
Montubios are recognized as a nationality in Ecuador, with distinctive and unique cultural practices. 
Definition from Marc Becker (see above). 
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voted to recognize ethnic and cultural diversity in their country’s 2008 Constitution, 
along with the Rights of Nature (Pachamama) and the Right to Sumak Kawsay, or the 
Good Way of Life, an Andean indigenous concept of living well rather than living better, 
of “living in harmony and balance; in harmony with the cycles of Mother Earth, of the 
cosmos, of life and of history, and in balance with all forms of existence.”4 They also 
voted to include in their Constitution other progressive and pluralistic rights and 
protections that allow for environmental sustainability and the protection of previously 
marginalized peoples. During my travels, I began to wonder, “…to what extent has 
constitutional recognition and protection of marginalized peoples and their environments 
translated to concrete changes in land use and respect for the rightful inhabitants of 
historically plundered lands?” The answers provided by my experiences were troubling. 
On three different occasions, I visited the Intag region in Ecuador’s Imbabura 
province. I sat outside my host family’s two-room home in the cloud forest, and looked 
out across a deep green Andean valley, brimming with primary forest interspersed with 
small campesino homes and an amazing diversity of crops growing alongside montane 
foliage on almost vertical hillsides. I learned from locals and from my professors about 
the high number of endemic species in the Intag region. I hiked by countless waterfalls, 
streams, and rivers on my way to and from my host family’s home. 
 After a day-long hike, we arrived at the towering Hidden Waterfalls of Junín. 
What looked like light green pebbles that lined the bottom of a crystal clear pool at the 
foot of the waterfalls was actually copper. We passed an abandoned mining camp on our 
way downhill, which was barely recognizable as the forest had begun to close in on it.                                                           
4 Huanacuni Mamani, F. “Buen Vivir / Vivir Bien Filosofía, políticas, estrategias y 
experiencias regionales andinas,” (Coordinadora Andina de Organizaciones Indígenas, Lima, Peru: 2010). 
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          Figure 1: Copper at the Hidden Waterfalls of Junín, photo by Rachel Conrad 
I learned how this beautiful green shimmer in the water concealed a complex and 
disturbing story.  With my fellow ecology students, we met with a women’s group who 
told us a long and saddening, yet inspiring story about copper mining that is threatening 
the water, biodiversity, and residents’ livelihoods in Intag. Communities in the Intag 
Valley have resisted the incursion of transnational mining operations for 18 years. The 
incursion of a Japanese corporation, Bishimetals in the early 1990s prompted residents to 
educate themselves about the effects of open pit copper mining on water, human health, 
and biodiversity. Intag communities founded a grassroots organization to resist mining, 
and have successfully utilized protest, direct action, political advocacy and legal means to 
fight off Bishimetals and two other transnational mining companies. After years of death 
threats, aggravated assaults by paramilitaries on the company dime, and a slow poisoning 
of their water, community members burned a Canadian mining camp to the ground in 
desperation—the one I had passed on the waterfall hike. As a sustainable alternative to 
mining development, Intag’s grassroots organization, DECOIN, has supported the 
creation of dozens of community-run production cooperatives, where coffee, aloe vera-
based soaps, woven cabulla bags, and much more, are made from local plants and sold 
throughout Ecuador.  
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At the time of my first visit, no mining company had gone beyond initial 
exploration, and they had all left the region. But when I returned to Junín in January of 
2013, I heard somber news. President Correa was slated to win the upcoming elections, 
and he had announced his wholehearted support for a “new era of mining.”5 A Chilean 
mining company, CODELCO, has set its sights on the beautiful valley of Intag, and the 
president is likely to ease their entrance into the region with military or police support. I 
walked through an almost silent town square where an elderly man explained that many 
of the region’s youth had left to live in the city because they do not see promise in this 
threatened region.  
 
Figure 2: “Welcome to Junin community: agriculture, cattle raising, tourism. Here we do not permit 
mining.” Photo by Rachel Conrad 
I was fortunate to also spend a couple of weeks in the Amazonian province of 
Orellana along the Napo and Tiputini Rivers, studying the ecology, history and politics of 
the region. Never have I felt so mercurial as I did in the rainforest. At one moment I felt 
joy as loud choruses of birds made the air above me vibrate with life as I hiked lands with 
the most biodiversity I will surely ever see. The next moment I experienced shock as my 
fellow students and I passed by dozens of natural gas flares (figure 3) along the Napo 
River, a byproduct of petroleum extraction. The shock deepened as I learned from local                                                         
5 “Ecuador apuesta su crecimiento a la minería a gran escala,” (El País Internacional, 12 de enero, 2012), 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/01/12/actualidad/1326385590_917311.html 
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Haorani indigenous people of the poisoning of their waters and deforestation of their 
home by petroleum operations. Inspiration took over when I learned from an indigenous 
leader who is originally from the Amazonian province of Pastaza of successful organized 
resistance against foreign oil drilling companies in his home province. A chilling feeling 
came over me as I passed through a military checkpoint in order to access a section of the 
Amazon under concession by the Spanish multinational Repsol. Wonder completed the 
cycle as I jumped into the Napo River to swim with playful pink river dolphins and 
watched excitedly as two tapirs forded the Tiputini River. 
  
  
Figure 3: The petroleum extraction industry in the Amazon, photos by Rachel Conrad  
Following an eye-opening lecture on oil drilling in the Amazon by the founder of 
an environmental justice-focused NGO in Quito called Acción Ecológica, I looked up 
their office address, and knocked on the door to see if they had any desire for an intern. I 
was directed to work with the director of their water and energy campaign, David Reyes. 
I spent an afternoon, and then a year, learning about the San José del Tambo 
hydroelectric project in Bolívar, and the immense injustices related to this project. 
 The San José del Tambo hydroelectric project has been described by David Reyes 
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as “the most violent project in Ecuador.”6 A private multinational company, Hidrotambo 
S.A., has acquired a concession to much of the waters of the Dulcepamba River 
watershed in Bolívar province, where over 40,000 campesinos live. Hidrotambo plans to 
use this privatized water to move the turbines of a hydroelectric project located at the 
base of the watershed. In order to ensure maximum electricity production, they will not 
allow farmers, almost all of whom live at higher elevations than the dam site and draw 
water from tributaries that feed the Dulcepamba River, to divert water for daily use, for 
their livestock, or for irrigation—all essential to their survival as farmers. In order to 
forward their project in the face of peaceful protest from local farmers, the company has 
used the Armed Forces of Ecuador and the National Police to repress the locals—with 
tear gas, rubber bullets, surprise invasions of community leaders’ homes, and 
intimidation of children and the elderly. 
Based on a request from affected farmers, I began to work on a film documentary 
about the issue. I pored over legal documents, watched hours of footage taken over the 
years of struggle, and traveled to Bolívar to stay with community members and listen to 
their stories. Through the filmmaking experience, I learned more of the political 
background behind these stories of extractive activities. I also learned that these are not 
isolated stories. I learned from campesinos in Intag and Bolívar, indigenous peoples in 
Orellana, in lectures by scholars and activists as part of an ecology and conservation 
program, and from a political economy course in Quito’s Catholic University, that 
Ecuador has a long way to go to overcome a history of extractive practices and to realize 
the progressive ideals included in their Constitution. 
                                                        
6 Interview with engineer David Reyes, Audio recorded, Rachel Conrad, Quito, Ecuador, January 2013. 
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After repeated exposure to all-too-familiar stories of government, military, and 
police-backed incursions by private extraction companies into rural, biodiverse areas that 
are home to campesinos and indigenous peoples, I wanted to go beyond the research done 
for the documentary, and further investigate the institutions, models, trends, and politics 
that are legitimizing such harmful extractivism despite progressive laws and rhetoric. As 
part of continued efforts to support community members in their struggle for land, water, 
and wellbeing in the Dulcepamba watershed, I wanted to further investigate how the 
small-scale San José del Tambo “clean energy” hydroelectric project has become a 
menace and a disgrace to the progressive and inclusive ideals adopted by the Ecuadorian 
state at the turn of the century. I also wanted to explore president Correa’s claim that 
increased natural resource extraction is necessary for the greater good of Ecuador’s 
development. Is Western development what Ecuadorians voted for in their Constitution? 
Is extraction really necessary for Ecuadorian well being, or can a more sustainable 
economy be built? 
I will define extractivism as the taking or utilizing of natural resources for 
industrial purposes, in a way that irrecoverably harms the natural and social environment. 
While there is extensive scholarship on the extractive nature of mining and petroleum 
drilling in Ecuador, and on the country’s strong constitutional rejection of the western 
extractivist development model, there is a dearth in analyses of the extractivist nature of 
hydroelectric generation. I hope to partially fill this gap in the analysis here. 
I present here an analysis of natural resource extraction in Ecuador and its social 
repercussions, with a focus on hydroelectric energy production. I aim to show that the 
hydroelectric industry in Ecuador is not as “clean,” sustainable, or non-extractive as it is 
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purported to be. I use a post-development lens to demonstrate the negative repercussions 
of “neo-extractivism” in Ecuador. I expand upon “neo-extractive” hydroelectricity 
production through a case study of the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project. I also 
explore international support for hydroelectric extractivism in Ecuador with an analysis 
of the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism and its misleading framing of 
extractive projects as “sustainable development.” 
I will begin by exploring the extractive character of the western development 
model. I will then examine the marginalizing effects of this model in Ecuador, focusing 
on the extractive industries. I will present the history of struggle surrounding the San José 
del Tambo hydroelectric project and connect this case to the forces at work behind 
extractive river-basin engineering at the expense of local communities and food 
sovereignty across Ecuador. I will delve into the international support of the United 
Nations Clean Development Mechanism for often-extractive “clean” development 
projects, including the San José del Tambo project. A narrative of this injustice, with 
information gathered from interviews and research, will hopefully be a valuable tool for 
understanding and action in the San José del Tambo struggle and future struggles. I plan 
to share my thesis with those who have the willingness and tools to join in solidarity with 
the struggle of the communities of the Dulcepamba River watershed. 
Methods 
I carried out interviews during two trips to Ecuador-the first for six months, 
between January and June of 2012, and the second for one month, between December 
2012 and January 2013. I visited the Dulcepamba watershed in Bolívar province where 
the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project is being built on both trips to Ecuador. I 
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stayed with two different families, who shared with me their homes, their delicious 
harvests, and their stories. Interviews in the Dulcepamba watershed in 2012 were 
originally for the above-mentioned documentary, but they also have been utilized in this 
thesis. I was given 14 hours of footage that covers important moments over three years of 
the San José del Tambo hydroelectric conflict, which I draw on in this work. Interviews 
during my second visit were specifically for this thesis. I traveled to the Dulcepamba 
watershed with Sr. David Reyes of Acción Ecológica on both occasions, and he 
introduced me to many inspiring people, some of whom I interviewed. He also gave me 
important background information and guidance on these trips, throughout my internship 
with him, and over email to this very day. 
During both visits to Ecuador, I interviewed the mayor of Chillanes, one of two 
cantones (similar to counties) that encompass the Dulcepamba watershed. In Quito, I 
interviewed Hidrotambo’s technical manager, government officials associated with the 
project, and a political economist. I asked questions specifically about the San José del 
Tambo hydroelectric project and about the political economy surrounding the project and 
others like it in Ecuador.  
I found out that the San José del Tambo project has been registered as a United 
Nations Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project, and wanted to investigate the 
CDM in Ecuador and the activities it funds. I therefore interviewed the National 
Coordinator of the CDM in Ecuador, a third party auditor involved in registering the San 
José del Tambo project with the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism, and an 
expert from a California-based NGO who has researched the Clean Development 
Mechanism. I also interviewed an Ecuadorian water lawyer, who helped me to clear up 
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confusion about water law, past and present. Finally, I interviewed an economist from the 
United States who has studied copper mining in the Intag region of Ecuador, and who 
advised the Ecuadorian Constitutional Assembly on the writing of the 2008 Constitution.   
In total, I carried out 17 interviews and talked more informally to many other 
people. I wove what I learned from these interviews in with research on the legal and 
social history of the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project, the hydroelectric sector in 
Ecuador, extractivism, post-development and post-extractivist theories, and Ecuadorian 
constitutional rights. From interviews, conversations, and research, I was able to place the 
San José del Tambo project in the political economic context of extractivism and Western 
development. 
Literature Review 
Development theory has informed extractive activities in Ecuador for half of a 
century. According to Michel Foucalt and numerous other scholars, the Western 
development model originated after World War Two. With the end to direct colonialism, 
the rise of the United States as a world hegemon, and the resulting formation of a new 
model of North-South global relations, the world was divided between “developed” and 
“underdeveloped” countries, and the “underdeveloped” term was almost exclusively 
reserved for former colonies. Development was to have been “a post-colonial project, a 
choice for accepting a model of progress in which the entire world remade itself on the 
model of the colonizing modern West, without having to undergo the subjugation and 
exploitation that colonialism entailed.”7  
                                                        
7 Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Survival in India, 1st Edition, (New Delhi: Kali for 
Women, 1988) p.1, http://www.arvindguptatoys.com/arvindgupta/stayingalive.pdf 
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The assumption was that the Western style of progress was possible for everyone. 
Vandana Shiva, Indian eco-feminist and anti-globalization author explains that, 
“Concepts and categories about economic development and natural resource utilisation 
that had emerged in the specific context of industrialisation and capitalist growth in 
centers of colonial power were raised to the level of universal assumptions.”8 
Development was viewed as a natural and inevitable civilizational path, and it was 
assumed that this path should and could apply to the newly independent Third World 
countries. These countries were set on a path towards development, which was assumed 
to mean high efficiency and productivity, where unlimited material growth could be 
achieved. The notion of development continues to inform policy and political agendas 
across the globe. 
Since the 1950s, important criticisms of Western development agendas have been 
formulated. Post-development theorists like Arturo Escobar and Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos emphasize that economic development is a power device. According to these 
authors, development activities give rise to internal colonialism. Vandana Shiva explains,  
Development as capital accumulation and the commercialization of the economy 
for the generation of “surplus” and profits thus involved the reproduction not 
merely of a particular form of creation of wealth, but also of the associated 
creation of poverty and dispossession. A replication of economic development 
based on commercialization of resource use for commodity production in the 
newly independent countries created internal colonies.9 
 
The development framework allows foreign or multinational corporations to continue to 
profit from former colonies, while low-impact economic activity generally does not.  
Development theorists also hold that development as a power device perpetuates 
the devaluation of multiple modes of life, ways of social relation, and types of knowledge                                                         
8 Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Survival in India, p. 1 
9 Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Survival in India, p. 2 
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that exist in the global South, which are relegated to a position of “backwardness” in 
comparison with the single, unquestionable way forward that has been established. The 
United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs published a report  on the 
“Measures of Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries” in 1951, which 
recognized this exclusionary characteristic. It said, 
 
There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful 
adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to 
disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed, and race have to burst; and large numbers of 
persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a 
comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of 
economic progress.10 
 
Western development legitimizes support of any project that will increase economic 
production. Governments, companies, and NGOs act in the name of development while 
they destroy nature and threaten the life of entire cultures and communities.  
 
Figure 4: “Without bombs, without jails, without beggars, without poverty, without contamination, 
without foreign debt, without junk food, and they call me primitive.” Ecuador, Photo by Rachel Conrad 
The realization of western development necessitates over-extraction of natural 
resources. Post-development theorist Alberto Acosta wrote, “These practices [of                                                         
10 Quoted in Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.1 
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extracting natural resources] turn out to be essential to sustain a certain way of 
‘developed’ life that has been formed by the imaginary of success and happiness laid out 
by the global North for humanity, and that is unarguably hegemonic.”11 Underlying 
development objectives is the idea that, “…nature is an absolutely inexhaustible 
resource,”12 an infinite supply for development aspirations. Successful development 
necessitates a continuation or increase in the current rhythm of production and 
consumption, which, as thousands of scientists have warned the world, will lead to an 
environmental catastrophe of unimaginable consequences. 
 
 
Figure 5: “Consume, consume, die.” Graffiti in Quito, Ecuador, photo by Rachel Conrad 
For an “underdeveloped” society to move beyond policies oriented towards 
achieving a Western form of industrialization and economic activity, a model unique to 
the history and culture of that society must be presented as an alternative. An important 
addition to post-development theory is the articulation of a societal model informed by 
the indigenous cosmovision Sumak Kawsay, the Andean indigenous concept of living 
well rather than living better described above. According to the Permanent Working 
                                                        
11 Acosta, Alberto, et al, “Más Allá del Desarrollo,” Grupo Permanente Sobre Alternativas al Desarrollo, 
(Quito: Fundación Rosa Luxembourg/Abya Yala: Noviembre, 2011) http://rio20.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/mas-alla-del-desarrollo_30.pdf  
12 Entrevista con Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Economía verde: la conciencia máxima del capitalismo,” 
(America Latina en Movimiento: 2012) http://alainet.org/active/50095&lang=es 
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Group on Alternatives to Development,13 a horizon of thought is emerging in Latin 
America that is “outside of the developmentalist, modernist, economist, and linear 
device.”14 This line of thought is reflected in the rhetoric and goals of social movements 
in Ecuador, in Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, and in the writings of leftist scholars in 
Ecuador and throughout Latin America. Scholars and activists who contribute to this 
‘horizon of thought’ come from ideological bases in Marxism, Third Worldism, Anti-
Globalization, Post-Developmentalism, Post-Extractivism, and Social Ecology. 
While these authors are not confined to one field of thought, they all explore the 
notion of Sumak Kawsay as an alternative to the Western development model. Many of 
them address shortcomings of the Western development model implemented by president 
Rafael Correa. They also address both problems with extractive practices that accompany 
the development model, and pathways to a post-extractivist reality that are informed by 
indigenous ways of knowing. None of the authors focus their writings on hydroelectric 
energy production, but many of them include the current mode of hydroelectric 
production under the banner of extractivist development practices that they critique.      
This thesis draws heavily on the writings of Alberto Acosta, Ecuadorian leftist 
politician and economist who identifies with the above-described line of thought. Acosta 
is the former minister of energy and mines in Ecuador, was the president of the 2008 
Constitutional Assembly, and was one of the principal ideologues of president Correa’s 
Citizen’s Revolution in the beginning years of the president’s governance. Acosta has 
since become an outspoken critic of the Correa regime, accusing the president of failing 
to implement the post-extractivist and inclusive ideals that he campaigned with in 2006.                                                         
13 An ongoing journal of socio-economic thought on issues with Western development in Latin America 
(see footnote #11)  
14 “Más allá del Desarrollo,” 2011 
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Acosta is currently a leader of a leftist opposition political coalition called the 
Plurinational Unity of the Lefts, and he ran for president in 2013 on a Plurinational Unity 
ticket. Acosta has written books like “the Curse of Abundance” and others in which he 
presents his anti-extractivist and post-developmentalist positionality.  
Acosta has collaborated with several of the other authors that I draw upon, 
including Eduardo Gudynas, senior researcher at the Latin American Center of Social 
Ecology (CLAES) and expert on alternatives to development, and Esperanza Martinez, 
founder of Acción Ecológica and co-founder of Oilwatch, an international network to 
defend delicate ecosystems and the ancient rights of indigenous peoples against the 
ravages caused by petroleum extraction.  
President Correa has advocated for the increase of extractive activities in Ecuador 
to achieve Western-style development. These activities are adversely affecting certain 
populations, which have historically been excluded politically and expelled from their 
lands. In Chapter 1, I will go into depth about these extractive activities and contextualize 
them within the current political trends and new constitutional framework in Ecuador. I 
will also outline alternatives for a post-development, post-extractivist future proposed by 
social movements and Ecuadorian leftist intellectuals. 
In Chapter, 2, I will present extensive field-based research on the San José del 
Tambo project, an extractive small-scale private hydroelectric project supported by the 
Ecuadorian government and an international market-based development mechanism. I 
will detail the direct challenge that this project poses to the progressive, inclusive, post-
extractive and post-developmentalist ideals held in the 2008 Constitution. Primary 
sources provide opinions on the extractive nature, and the supposedly beneficial nature, 
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of the San José del Tambo project. The history of struggle and repression informed by 
trips to the region, interviews, and research provides a window into the state-sponsored 
violence, criminalization, and censorship that President Correa’s Alianza PAIS party’s 
government has increasingly utilized to forward their extractivist development agenda.  
In Chapter 3, I will explore the shortcomings of a market-based development 
model to address climate change, and I will illustrate these shortcomings through an 
analysis of the U.N. Clean Development Mechanism’s support of the San José del Tambo 
project.  In this Chapter, I draw heavily from the work of Larry Lohmann, researcher for 
the Cornerhouse, a British organization that aims to support democratic and community 
movements for environmental and social justice. He provides a critique of the incursion 
of the Western development model in the international climate change regime. Lohmann 
worked with Alberto Acosta and Esperanza Martinez to publish a book called, “Carbon 
Markets: The Neoliberalization of the Climate,” which has contributed greatly to 
literature on the shortcomings of addressing environmental issues within a Western-
dominated market-based system. Lohmann critiques the commodification of Nature 
through carbon markets, which has so often been justified in the name of “sustainable” 
development. He asserts that such commodification of carbon is encouraging business as 
usual emissions in the global North, while devastating rural communities in the global 
South through industrial development projects that appropriate natural resources. Carbon 
markets have supported extractive hydroelectric projects in Ecuador, including the San 
José del Tambo project.   
In the conclusion, I will reinforce the importance of Ecuador’s ‘refounding’ at the 
turn of the century. I will point out that the progressive and inclusive ideals articulated in 
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the 2008 Constitution have yet to be fully implemented, and that social movements are 
acting to reverse the perversion of their originally revolutionary ideals, and to implement 
a post-extractive model informed by those revolutionary ideals. I will tie together the 
efforts being made on local, national, and international levels to realize a post-extractive 
future. I will tie together the solutions laid out by leftist intellectuals and social 
movements in Ecuador, with actions taken by local community members in the 
Dulcepamba watershed, and global efforts to critique market-based solutions to climate 
change that support such extractive activities, and I will conclude with the hope that, 
despite increasing state repression, these growing networks of resistance will pave the 
way to a true realization of the ideals embodies in the Ecuadorian Constitution.  
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Chapter 1: The Political Economy of 
the ‘Neo-Extractivist’ Model in Ecuador 
 
Protests and the fall of strident neoliberalism 
Ecuador's colonial and postcolonial history is marked by inequality and resource 
exploitation. Since colonial times, Ecuador’s natural resources have been extracted, and 
to various degrees, utilized as primary materials for exports to the global North with low 
added value. The export of cacao, bananas, coffee, and sugarcane beginning during the 
colonial era and continuing to this day, and the extraction of petroleum, minerals, and 
timber during the post-colonial era, has resulted in the destruction of land and water and a 
dependence on imports of industrialized goods. These processes have sustained a 
characteristic enclave economy in Ecuador for much of 500 years. Wealthy and powerful 
colonists, nationals, and foreign businesses have concentrated and controlled vast swaths 
of land and accompanying water and minerals, and have often stripped the land to grow 
massive quantities of export cash crops. The wealth and power gap between those whose 
resources are appropriated and the appropriators has prevailed beyond the colonial 
period.15 The petroleum industry became a primary agent responsible for appropriating 
wealth and destroying land and water in the 1970s, and open-pit mining as well as 
hydroelectric projects have recently become significant threats as well. The plunder of 
land and water has often left surrounding small-scale campesino agriculture unviable, 
caused the displacement of many communities, and additionally has grave implications 
for cultural identity and community cohesion.  
Between the mid-1970s and the 1990s, Latin America was considered the 
                                                        
15 Alberto Acosta y Esperanza Martínez (Comp.), Plurinacionalidad Democracia en la diversidad, 
(Editorial Universidad Bolivariana, Santiago, Chile: 2009), p. 208. 
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laboratory of the “Neoliberal Experiment,”16 run by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) at the behest of the United States and Western Europe. 
Ecuador was no exception. In close adherence with the Washington Consensus, the 
nation made a shift from, “…inward-oriented development strategies promoting national 
self-sufficiency to outward-oriented free trade aimed at total integration into the world 
market,”17 coupled with limited government intervention to ensure “smooth functioning 
of markets.”18 Immense social inequalities and environmental harm stemmed from these 
neoliberal policies. IMF structural adjustment policies and government austerity 
measures worsened working conditions, increased labor flexibilization, reduced wages, 
deregulated across the board, and aggressively forwarded the commodification and 
extraction of natural resources. Public services deteriorated, as did the provision of state 
welfare. Wealth was concentrated, and a dependence on transnational institutions resulted 
in a crippling foreign debt which reached U.S. $8.4 billion in 1984.19 
Neoliberal policies and Ecuador’s 1998 constitution reflected a dedication to 
economic growth (above broader social considerations) as a means to achieve Western- 
style construction-centered development. As a result, global capital was extended into, 
“new social and socio-environmental spaces and relations in the interest of capitalist 
accumulation.”20 Water services were commodified, corporatized, and privatized, notably 
in Ecuador’s largest city, Guayaquil, by a subsidiary of the Bechtel Corporation called 
                                                        
16 Patricio Escobar, “The New Labor Market: The Effects of the Neoliberal Experiment in Chile” (Latin 
American Perspectives: April 2013) http://lap.sagepub.com/content/30/5/70.extract  
17 Lynne Phillips, The Third Wave of Modernization in Latin America: Cultural 
Perspectives on Neoliberalism. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield) 1998, p. xi. 
18 Thomas Leonard, “Encyclopedia of the Developing World,” (London: Taylor & Francis: 2006), p. 1211. 
19 Edmundo Flores and Tim Merrill, "Recent Economic Performance," Ecuador: A country study, 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1989). 
20 Adrienne Roberts, “Privatizing Social Reproduction: The Primitive Accumulation of Water in an Era of 
Neoliberalism” Antipode Vol. 40 No. 4 (Canada: Antipode, 2008), p. 535. 
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Interagua. While water had previously been managed and supplied at reasonable prices 
by the local government, it became inaccessible to thousands when it fell into the hands 
of a profit-minded corporation. According to ECAPAG, Guayaquil’s state-owned agency 
that is charged with monitoring and regulating Interagua, the company cut off water 
service to 32,204 families in Guayaquil who could not pay Bechtel’s high rates, and 
98,585 families still had not been able to pay water debts to the company in 2009.21  
The 1998 Constitution as well as global neoliberal pressures had opened the doors 
for mass water privatization, and privatizations occurred not only for potable water 
services, but also for hydroelectric projects. In 2003, in San José del Tambo, Bolívar, the 
private company Hidrotambo S.A. privatized most of the waters of a watershed inhabited 
by 45,000 farmers. Other rivers in Ecuador have been privatized and then dried or 
flooded out by diversions or large reservoirs for hydroelectric projects (the Apaquí 
project, the Angamarca project, and numerous others), leaving local campesinos without 
water for themselves, their crops and their animals.22 
 The capitalist view of neoliberal modernization continued to hold sway through 
much of the 1990s in Ecuador, but began to falter by 2000. Prolonged political instability 
and economic crises that marked the neoliberal era weakened traditional political parties 
and created space for previously excluded political actors. New actors were, not 
traditional leftists or from traditional political parties, but instead from movements of 
campesinos, women, and indigenous peoples. Frustrations felt by these groups reached a 
boiling point in the early 1990s and sparked massive protests led by several increasingly                                                         
21 Max Mader and André Rothenbuler, Editors, How to Challenge Illegitimate Debt: Theory and Legal 
Case Studies, (Aktion Finanzplatz Schweis, Basel, Switzerland: 2009), p. 288 
22 “Salta en Ecuador el conflicto del agua,” (Quito: Ecuador Inmediato, Febrero de 2007),  
http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=54981&u
mt=salta_en_ecuador_conflicto_del_agua   
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political indigenous organizations. One of the most prominent actors that took the stage at 
this time was the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), a 
convergence of the two largest highlands and lowlands indigenous confederations.23 The 
CONAIE-led protests paralyzed the economy with nationwide roadblocks that inhibited 
the flow of goods into cities. The uprisings forced political elites to begin to address the 
concentration of wealth by industrialists and the landed class; long-standing and 
unresolved issues of land ownership, education and economic development; the 
appropriation, commodification, and privatization of land and water; and other neoliberal 
structural adjustments.24  
The protests led to the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad in January of 2000, 
signifying the demise of the U.S. backed neo-liberal regime that had governed in Ecuador 
since the mid 1970s. After the 2000 coup, Lucio Gutierrez was elected president on a 
platform that promised inclusive and anti-neoliberal governance. While he did bring 
indigenous representation into his government, it was only a symbolic move, as he was 
also accused of purposefully fractionalizing the indigenous movement. Gutierrez applied 
many of the same market-oriented policies, and was thus impeached in 2005. 25  The 
social movements sought out political leaders who would bring about the changes 
promised at the culmination of the 1990s protests, and in 2006 found a charismatic U.S. 
trained economist, Rafael Correa Delgado, who promised to implement these changes 
through a direct, participatory democratic system with indigenous influences. However,                                                         
23 Amy Kennemore and Gregory Weeks. “Twenty-First Century Socialism? The Elusive Search for a Post-
Neoliberal Development Model in Bolivia and Ecuador,” Bulletin of Latin American Research. Vol. 30, 
No. 3, (North Carolina: University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 2011), p. 8   
24 Marc Becker, Indians and Leftists in the Making of Ecuador’s Modern Indigenous Movement (North: 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2008) p. 6 
25 Mijeski and Beck, Patchakutik and the Rise and Decline of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement (Ohio, 
U.S.: Ohio University, 2011), p.32. 
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these changes were only minimally realized. 
In the place of pure neoliberalism, president Correa and his Alianza PAIS party 
created what the Ecuadorian government and the governments of Venezuela and Bolivia 
are calling a “Twenty-first century socialist regime.” Correa’s twenty-first century 
socialism has been characterized as a moderate leftist regime that is nationalist and anti-
U.S, but does not reject capitalism like 20th century socialism tended to do. At the outset, 
Correa’s government promised to forward social equality, human rights, alternatives to 
Western development, regional integration, and a rejection of the neoliberal oligarchy. 
Correa and Alianza PAIS promised to “refound” the country by formulating a new 
constitution through participatory democracy, whose content would espouse the political 
and social ideals supported by the popular protests at the turn of the century. Correa 
established a “Citizen’s Revolution” through which he promised that all citizens could 
participate in the construction of their common future, which would be laid out in the 
new constitution.  
Women, indigenous peoples, environmentalists, labor unions, and other social 
groups participated in the writing of the 2008 Constitution, and it was approved by a 
popular vote. It was designed to direct the dismantling of neoliberal exclusionary policies 
and a restoration of the regulatory functions of the state, to bring about processes of 
decolonization and the recovery of many forms of sovereignty, and to recognize and 
incorporate indigenous ways of knowing and progressive concepts that fundamentally 
challenged the doctrine of Western neoliberal development. Indigenous sensibilities26 and 
progressive ideals were translated into demands such as a right to food sovereignty,                                                         
26 Gottinger, Paul, “Correa and Ecuador’s Left: An Interview with Marc Becker” (New Left Review, 
February, 2013), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/4123-correa-and-ecuadors-left-
an-interview-with-marc-becker  
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collective rights, the Rights of Nature to exist and maintain its vital cycles,27 and the right 
to the Good Way of Living. The Constitution also established the human right to water 
and explicitly disallowed the privatization of water.  
 
The “refounding” “plurinational” constitution 
 
“Good living for humans is only possible if the survival and integrity of the whole of the 
web of life is ensured.” 
Eduardo Gudynas, researcher at the Latin American Center of Social Ecology, 2009 
 
As a way to incorporate Indigenous cosmologies into the governing of the 
country, Ecuador was defined as a plurinational State in the 2008 Constitution. As a 
plurinational state, the indigenous notion of nationality, as a community with historical 
ties,28 was recognized and protected. Indigenous peoples, Afro-Ecuadorians and 
montubios were recognized as distinct nationalities and endowed with distinct collective 
rights and status. Not only was plurinationality recognized, but indigenous and Andean 
knowledge, beliefs, and values was incorporated throughout the Constitution, in its laws 
and rights. 
Sumak Kawsay 
One of the most revolutionary additions to values, laws, and rights found in the 
2008 Constitution is the Andean indigenous way of living called Sumak Kawsay, a 
Kichwa word which is translated to Buen Vivir in Spanish and the Good Way of Living in 
English. Its inclusion in the constitution applies to all Ecuadorians. Sumak Kawsay is an 
Andean concept of living well rather than living better. A more full definition of the word 
is, “to live in harmony and balance; in harmony with the cycles of Mother Earth, of the 
                                                        
27 “El agua, un derecho humano fundamental,” (Quito, Ecuador: CEDHU, Agosto del 2009), p. 3, site 
accessed March 25, 2013, http://www.rebelion.org/docs/113450.pdf  
28 Plurinacionalidad. Democracia en la diversidad, p. 208 
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cosmos, of life and of history, and in balance with all forms of existence.”29 In Sumak 
Kawsay, the conception of a linear and progressive process does not exist, nor does the 
conception of poverty as a lack of material goods. Sumak Kawsay therefore favors 
sustainability over material accumulation and the commodification of resources which 
would advance the Western linear path to development. Sumak Kawsay is diametrically 
opposed to the western dualism where nature opposes society and the individual opposes 
the community. According to Sumak Kawsay, humans are part of and not contrary to 
nature, and community is valued over the individual. Thus, Sumak Kawsay can only exist 
when all of Nature is respected and individuals act for the good of community.30  
The 2008 constitution uses Sumak Kawsay’s ideals as a basis for its fundamental 
laws and principles. It establishes Buen Vivir (Sumak Kawsay) as a right, and its values 
are woven throughout the Constitution to secure the full exercise of the right. The 
preamble establishes the values and knowledge inherent in Sumak Kawsay as the 
ideological base of Ecuador’s Constitution. “We, women and men, the sovereign people 
of Ecuador…” it says, “hereby decide to build a new form of public coexistence, in 
diversity and in harmony with nature, to achieve the good way of living, the sumak 
kawsay; A society that respects, in all its dimensions, the dignity of individuals and 
community groups…”31 Politically and legally, Sumak Kawsay was presented as a 
comprehensive challenge to Western developmentalism, by stressing the primacy of use 
value over exchange value, and by rejecting the concept of a linear progression from 
                                                        
29 “Buen Vivir / Vivir Bien Filosofía, políticas, estrategias y experiencias regionales andinas,” 2010. 
30 Ivonne Farah y Luciano Vasapollo, “Vivir Bien: Paradigma o No Capitalista?” (Italy: Universitá di 
Roma Sapienza CIDES-UMSA, 2011) 
http://www.dhl.hegoa.ehu.es/ficheros/0000/0694/25.Vivir_bien_Paradigma_no_capitalista.pdf  
31 “Constitution of 2008 in English: The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador,” Political Database of the 
Americas, (USA: Georgetown University), Last Updated: January 31, 2011. 
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underdevelopment and poverty to development and wealth. To counter the plunder 
brought about by extractive Western development, food, water, nature, and humanity 
must be respected as interconnected parts of a whole. Sumak Kawsay was thus presented 
as the essential ideological framework to ensure the food sovereignty, Rights of Nature, 
and collective rights and Human Rights also established in the 2008 Constitution.  
Food Sovereignty  
One of the “rights of Buen Vivir” conferred in the Ecuadorean Constitution is to 
Soberanía Alimentaria (food sovereignty): the right of each nation to maintain and 
develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, respecting cultural diversity. The 
idea of food sovereignty was accepted as an alternative to food security at the Food and 
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) World Food Summit in 1996 after prolonged pressure 
from the Vía Campesina, an international movement that coordinates peasant 
organizations of small and middle-scale producers, agricultural workers, rural women, 
and indigenous communities.32 Food security as defined by the FAO looks to generate 
enough food for the planet, but does not address who produces the food and how it is 
produced. For this reason, social movements advocate for food sovereignty as a more just 
goal than food security.  
Ecuador particularized food sovereignty to the country’s diverse cultures and 
ways of knowing by defining it as a part of the rights of Buen Vivir, (Art.13) and as “a 
strategic objective and an obligation of the State in order to ensure that persons, 
communities, peoples and nations achieve self-sufficiency with respect to healthy and 
culturally appropriate food on a permanent basis.” (Art. 281) Article 281 lays out 14                                                         
32 Laurel E. Phoenix, Lynn Walter, Critical Food Issues: Problems and State-of-the-Art Solutions 
Worldwide, (ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA: 2009) p. 53. 
32  
directives to implement food sovereignty. The state must promote and financially support 
small and medium-scale farmers, their organizations and networks, and their access to 
land and water. It must foster independence from food imports by supporting local 
agriculture and through fiscal, tax, and tariff policies. It also must bolster crop 
diversification and agricultural biodiversity. It must introduce ecological and organic 
technologies, and forward the humane treatment of animals, ancestral wisdom around 
agriculture, and seed sharing, among other efforts. Food sovereignty is also referred to 
and supported in articles 13, 15, 282, 284, 304, and 318.33 The Constitutional Assembly’s 
hope was that the strong emphasis on Food Sovereignty in constitutional law would 
promote distributive and just agrarian policies favoring the country’s wealth of small-
scale sustainable farming over agro-industry.  
Rights of Nature 
“Man can not survive at the margins of nature… The human being is a part of nature, 
and cannot treat nature as if it were a ceremony to which he is a spectator.” 
--Alberto Acosta, president of the 2008 Constituent Assembly 
Also, within the logic of Sumak Kawsay, the constitution established inalienable 
and enforceable Rights of Nature (Articles 71-74).  Ecuador was the first country in the 
world to do so. Alberto Acosta, president of the 2008 Constitutional Assembly, 
elucidated the logic behind the Rights of Nature: “Nature as a social construction should 
be re-interpreted and integrally examined if we do not want to risk human life on Earth. 
Humanity is not apart from nature, and nature has limits.”34 Nature was given value in 
                                                        
33 “Constitution of 2008 in English: The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador,” Last Updated: 2011 
34 “Entrevista a Alberto Acosta: “La ‘revolución ciudadana,’ el modelo extractivista y las izquierdas 
críticas,” por Franck Gaudichaud, (Upsidedown World. Febrero, 2013), 
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/en-espatopmenu-81/4110-entrevista-a-alberto-acosta-la-revolucion-
33  
and of itself in the constitution, independent of its utility to humans. The rights of Nature 
are not merely hortatory; they are enforceable rights. Each “person, community, people, 
or nationality” has public authority to enforce the rights of Nature, according to normal 
constitutional processes (Art. 71).35 The state committed to restricting extractive practices 
by stating that, “The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures on activities 
that might lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the 
permanent alteration of natural cycles” (Art. 73). In recognition that extractive practices 
have desecrated Nature for centuries, the constitution also gave Nature the right to be 
restored, especially “in cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including 
those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources” (Art.72). The 
constitution gave people the right to “benefit from the environment and the natural 
wealth, enabling them to enjoy the good way of living,” (Art.74) which inherently means 
that humans, who are part of Nature, cannot destroy Nature in order to benefit from it.  
Water 
Water in Ecuador has long been a, “national good for public use,” which means 
that the state owns the water resources and gives out use rights in the form of 
concessions. The 1998 Constitution recognized “the right to a quality of life that ensures 
health, feeding and nutrition, and potable water…” among other things (Art. 42) 
(emphasis added).36 The country’s Water Law, written in 1972, also set out a hierarchy of 
priority water use rights, with human use receiving first priority, and productive uses last 
priority. Despite these recognitions of the importance of human access to water above                                                                                                                                                                      
ciudadana-el-modelo-extractivista-y-las-izquierdas-criticas  
35 Professor Erin Daly, H. “Ecuadorian Court Recognizes Constitutional Right to Nature,” (Wilmington, 
DE: Widener Environmental Law Center, Widener University, July 2011) . 
36 “Constituciones de 1998” (Washington D.C.: Political Database of the Americas) 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html#mozTocId771894  
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industrial uses, the 1998 Constitution cleared the way for growing private industrial 
control of hydraulic resources. It held that the state can, “grant water use to public-private 
partnerships or private companies, either directly or through devolution, in the form of a 
concession, association, capitalization, conveyance of shareholder property, or in any 
other contractual manner.” (Art. 249) As discussed above, water privatization has greatly 
harmed rural communities. 
A long history of uprisings from the indigenous movement and campesino sectors 
surrounding water rights resulted in a step forward, at least on paper, for water justice in 
2008. The human right to water gained more encompassing legal protection in the 2008 
Constitution in which water was protected within the rights of Nature, and the Human 
Right to Water was established. Water use rights prioritized food sovereignty, and the 
privatization of water was explicitly forbidden. The 2008 Human Right to Water was 
recognized as a fundamental human right that is, “essential and cannot be waived.” (Art. 
12). Article 12 goes on to say that, “Water constitutes a national strategic asset for use by 
the public and it is unalienable, not subject to a statute of limitations, immune from 
seizure and essential for life.” Several clauses were also established to guarantee the 
fulfillment of this human right. For example, the State must, “Guarantee without any 
discrimination whatsoever the true possession of the rights set forth in the Constitution 
and in international instruments, especially the rights to education, health, food, social 
security and water for its inhabitants” (Art. 3.1) (emphasis added).37 
 The Human Right to Water expanded on the priority use rights already in place in 
the 1998 constitution, by specifying a priority use right for irrigators contributing to food 
sovereignty above irrigators not contributing to food sovereignty, like agro-industrial                                                         
37 “Constitution of 2008 in English: The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador” 2011 
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exporters. The order of the priorities is: first for human consumption, second for 
irrigation to guarantee food sovereignty, third for ecological wealth (known in the United 
States as environmental flows), and fourth for productive activities (Art. 318). (emphasis 
added) The constitution reinforced the priority given to human use, food sovereignty, and 
ecosystem sustainability over industrial uses in Article 411, which states that the state 
must, “regulate the use and management of irrigation water for food production, abiding 
by the principles of equity, efficiency and environmental sustainability.” The Human 
Right to Water was further protected by the inclusion of the mandate that Energy 
Sovereignty (the promotion of in-country energy production that is preferably clean 
technology) cannot be forwarded at the expense of Food Sovereignty: Article 15 states 
that, “…Energy sovereignty shall not be achieved to the detriment of food sovereignty 
nor shall it affect the right to water.”38 In sum, water became a resource reserved for all 
people, and its right to exist and maintain its vital cycles promised the long-term 
sustainability of the resource in Ecuador.  
Privatization 
The Ecuadorian people, authors and ratifiers of the 2008 Constitution, overcame 
the market-oriented view of water as a commodity to be purchased by customers who can 
afford it, and restored its value as a resource to be used and respected by all citizens. In 
this vein, Article 282 of the constitution establishes that, “the monopolizing or privatizing 
of water and sources thereof” is forbidden. The privatization of water is again forbidden 
in Article 318, which states that, “water is part of the country’s strategic heritage for 
public use; it is the unalienable property of the State and is not subject to a statute of 
                                                        
38 Ibid., 2011 
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limitations. It is a vital element for nature and human existence. Any form of water 
privatization is forbidden.”39  
To reverse existing water privatization, the 2008 constitution lays out specific 
state responsibilities to promote redistributive policies. In Article 281 on Food 
Sovereignty, the state is obligated in numeral 4 to, “Promote policies of redistribution 
that will enable small farmers to have access to land, water and other production 
resources.” Article 282 forbids large estate farming and land concentration, along with 
the monopolizing or privatizing of water and its sources.40 The re-conceptualization of 
water, together with the re-conceptualization of the wellbeing of humans as part of 
Nature, represents a strong denunciation of 500 years of extractive practices. 
Failure to “refound” the country 
 The constitution laid out extensive measures to implement all of these new or 
strengthened rights, and provided stronger and more accessible pathways for citizens to 
defend their rights if violated. A concrete course of action, the National Plan for Good 
Living 2009-2013, was drawn up by Correa’s government for the first five years of 
implementation of the Sumak Kawsay in Ecuador. The Plan fundamentally challenges the 
Western development model by quoting Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Portuguese 
professor of Economics:  
The hegemonic ideas of progress and development have generated a monoculture 
that invisibilizes the historic experience of the diverse peoples that compose our 
societies. A linear vision of time supports the concept of progress, modernization 
and development in which history has only one purpose and one direction: 
developed countries are ahead and are the "model" all societies should follow. 
Whatever falls outside these ideas is considered savage, primitive, obsolete, pre-
modern.                                                         
39 Ibid., 2011 
40 Ibid., 2011 
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 (Sousa Santos, 2006: 24)41 
It certainly appeared that the state’s “refounding” with increased participation and 
progressive and inclusive ideals would allow for a departure from the neoliberal 
extractivist development model. However, the Alianza PAIS government has fallen short 
in implementing the post-extractivist and post-developmentalist agenda within the 
National Plan for Good Living and the 2008 Constitution. Although president Correa was 
instrumental in the ideological and legal “refounding of the nation,” it appears that, as 
Latin American indigenous movement scholar Marc Becker says, the president “wants to 
see those [radical changes] exclusively on the levels of symbolic statements rather than 
something that will be operationalized.”42  
The processes of transformation associated with Alianza PAIS’ 21st Century 
Socialism represent a decided divergence from the neoliberal period in South America, in 
that the government has reclaimed the role of the state, reduced the wealth gap, 
encouraged regional integration, and has made symbolic moves to reclaim sovereignty 
from the U.S. and transnational institutions.43 However, fundamental changes promised 
in the 2008 Constitution have been left to gather dust upon the pages of a document 
largely formulated by a revolutionary and hopeful conglomeration of social movements.  
The president, who, after its ratification called the Constitution “the best in the 
world” and pronounced that it would last for “300 years,” quickly weakened his stance 
only a year into his presidency, saying that the Constitution has “too many rights,” and                                                         
41 “El Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir,” (Ecuador: Un esfuerzo colectivo: Sitio acedido el 19 de abril, 
2013), http://plan.senplades.gob.ec/un-cambio-de-paradigma  
42 “Correa and Ecuador’s Left: An Interview with Marc Becker,” February 12, 2013.  
43 In opposition to U.S. hegemony, the President refused to sign a free trade agreement with the U.S.; 
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that it therefore must be changed.44 While the president has yet to fundamentally change 
the constitution, his government has gone ahead and violated it to move forward with 
their extractivist-populist agenda.  
Limited poverty reduction and development at the expense of people and nature   
The Alianza PAIS government is popular for some redistribution of monetary 
wealth and for claiming sovereignty from transnational corporations and regimes. Under 
a continued developmentalist mindset, poverty reduction is being realized mainly as a 
consequence of economic growth ‘at all costs,’ based on extractive activities that are 
often dependent on foreign capital. Social welfare programs are much less a consequence 
of redistribution of wealth, much of which has stayed in the hands of a select number of 
wealthy capitalist families. The cost of mostly urban poverty reduction and industrial 
development is instead shouldered mainly by indigenous peoples and campesinos who 
share a disproportionate and life-threatening burden of harm from the neo-extractive 
development ventures that finance poverty reduction and development. The way in which 
Alianza PAIS has addressed wellbeing is narrow, exclusive, and marginalizing.  
 To redistribute monetary wealth more equitably, Alianza PAIS instituted a more 
progressive income taxation system and has channeled tax revenues towards education, 
health, and infrastructure. President Correa doubled the human development bond, which 
is poverty assistance payments, from $35 to $50 dollars per month.45 This payment goes 
to the poorest 1.2 million homes out of a 14.5 million total population.46 The Alianza                                                         
44 “Entrevista a Alberto Acosta: La ‘revolución ciudadana,’ el modelo extractivista y las izquierdas 
críticas,” Franck Gaudichaud, (Upsidedown World: 2013) 
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=163177  
45 “The man with the mighty microphone: Having mixed the good, the bad and the ugly during six years in 
power, Rafael Correa is heading for another term.” 2013 
46 “Bono de Desarrollo Humano y Pensiones,” (Ecuador: Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social), 
http://www.pps.gob.ec/PPS/PPS/BDH/INF/InformacionyServicios.aspx, sitio acedido 5 de Abril, 2013 
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PAIS government also made credits available for housing loans, subsidized electricity 
rates for low-income consumers, introduced a government stipend for the disabled, and 
re-channeled millions of dollars into other social programs.47 Many schools, hospitals, 
and infrastructures have been built. While the economic and social policies led to 
significant reductions in poverty and inequality, these gains were largely limited to urban 
areas that provide the base of Correa’s electoral support.48  
The government has funded a small part of its social welfare programs through 
the new progressive income tax structure, and with capital saved by alleging their 
sovereign debt was illegal and not paying said debt. President Correa renegotiated illegal 
foreign debt accrued during the neoliberal period, with a favorable agreement that would 
save the government approximately U.S. $300 million per year in interest payments.49 
However, the largest portion by far of the state’s social welfare budget is increasingly 
found in petroleum deep below the soils of the Amazon, minerals under the towering 
Andean mountains, and electricity in Ecuador’s rushing and abundant rivers, where 
campesino, montubio, and indigenous peoples, live and depend on these very rivers and 
soils for their sustenance and wellbeing. Social programs are primarily funded by 
increased resource extraction, rising global oil prices, and revenues made by royalties 
imposed upon transnational extraction companies.  
The funding of poverty reduction and infrastructure with capital acquired from 
natural resource extraction leads to a vicious cycle of displacement and urban poverty. 
Those who are affected by extraction are often displaced and are forced to move to urban                                                         
47 “Twenty-First Century Socialism? The Elusive Search for a Post-Neoliberal Development Model in 
Bolivia and Ecuador,” 2011 
48Marc Becker, “Building a Plurinational Ecuador: Complications and Contradictions,” (Socialism and 
Democracy: August, 2012) http://www.yachana.org/research/ulcuango.pdf, p.4  
49 “Correa and Ecuador’s Left: An Interview with Marc Becker” 2013 
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centers where they become ‘poor’ without the natural resources that sustained their 
wellbeing in a rural lifestyle. Those people are then more dependent on Correa’s poverty 
reduction funds than they were originally. This can bee seen through the following 
characteristics of the petroleum extraction sector: The government significantly increased 
federal funding for new social programs through a 2010 law that increased government’s 
share of petroleum profits from 13 to 87%. The law increased state revenues by almost a 
billion dollars.50 Ecuador currently exports 500,000 barrels of crude oil every day, which 
finances 35 percent of the state’s budget.51 Oil drilling is harming the wellbeing of 
Amazonian indigenous peoples by poisoning the water and soils they depend on, and 
contributing to rampant deforestation. Many of those harmed by petroleum extraction are 
moving to urban centers. Once new extraction begins, on lands opened up by the eleventh 
round of petroleum bids, which will occur in 2013, it is expected that overall petroleum 
production will increase. With an increase in petroleum extraction, several indigenous 
nationalities in Pastaza and Morona-Santiago provinces will be severely affected, as will 
an additional 3.8 million hectares of primary forest.52 Alberto Acosta explained that 
increased extractivism and high global oil prices “has allowed [Alianza PAIS] to sustain 
a ‘politics of subsidies’ --not of transformation-- that makes certain social sectors fall into 
the clientelistic webs of the government,” while others are greatly harmed by extractive 
practices, and the wealth gap continues to be enormous.53   
                                                        
50“Building a Plurinational Ecuador: Complications and Contradictions,” p.3 
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52Ibid 
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  Alianza PAIS is currently promoting new extractive sectors. The president 
recently announced that, “the era of mining has begun.”54 The Economist magazine 
reported that the potential of large-scale mining in Ecuador, estimated with figures 
provided by the mining companies themselves -- is, “more than 50 million tons of refined 
copper, more than 100 million ounces of gold and more than 300,000 tons of refined 
silver.”55 Several massive open pit mines have opened or will soon open in Ecuador. 
Open pit mines devastate land, water and the people that depend on those resources. 
Immense pits cover vast swaths of land, stripping them of their plants, soil, and entire 
ecosystems. The mining process releases contaminating particulate matter, which can 
lead to negative health outcomes. Toxic ammonium nitrate mixed with diesel (ANFO) is 
used as an explosive to extract the minerals. ANFO, along with heavy metals and 
radioactive substances that are released from the earth in the extraction process, seep into 
local waterways and compound health problems and ecosystem destruction. Roads built 
to transport minerals cause deforestation and general ecosystem disruption.56 
Displacement of local communities and resulting growth in urban poverty is 
characteristic of the open pit-mining sector, just like it is with the petroleum sector.  
What is being called ‘neo-extractive’57 capital destined for Alianza PAIS’ poverty 
reduction and economic growth programs has in this way marginalized rural campesino 
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Internacional, 12 de enero, 2012) 
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56 “Impactos de la Minería en el País,” Boletín Verde No. 67, (Quito, Acción Ecológica: 1999) 
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and indigenous populations. A plethora of Constitutional and originally revolutionary 
values have been thrown by the wayside to satisfy a singular goal of poverty reduction 
and development, which is realized more and more at the expense of the well-being of 
rural indigenous and campesino communities.  
Rapid economic growth dependent on extractivism  
To achieve rapid economic growth and in doing so satisfy objectives of Western 
economic development, compliance with the demands of the global capitalist 
marketplace is almost a necessity for Ecuador. Without a strong local production sector, 
Ecuador continues to depend on raw material extraction to generate income and satisfy 
global demand. Ecuador’s dependence on the global marketplace is exacerbated by the 
fact that the country dollarized in 2000. Without a large industrial sector, the only way 
that dollars can enter Ecuador is if the country takes out loans and accrues debt, or profits 
from foreign-run natural resource extraction. The country’s economic destiny, says 
president Correa, “depends to a great extent on whether the monetary policy of the U.S. 
coincides with our needs.”58 However, dependence on capital from extractive practices 
would be greatly reduced if the end goal were not Western-style industrialization. It is 
possible to achieve greater wellbeing for Ecuadorians while reducing extractivism, if 
policies truly take an alternative path to industrial growth and consumption.  
Instead of following the alternative path to development that he advocated on the 
campaign trail, Rafael Correa presents extractivism as a transition tool that will allow the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
leaning government using revenues from resource extraction to finance social programs for the poor and 
middle classes…” constantly accompanied by cripplingly negative effects such as environmental 
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58 Rafael Correa, interview, “Rafael Correa: Ecuador’s Path” (The New Left Review 77, September-
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country to rapidly develop, and to then ultimately leave extraction behind. Correa said to 
his Assembly in 2012,  
To depart from an extractivist economy and achieve development, we cannot 
simply close mines and oil wells. That would be social suicide that would 
probably turn us into a collection economy…we must mobilize these non-
renewable resources, like we are doing…to develop other sectors of the economy. 
Without our natural resources, we will not overcome poverty. Or, it will take us a 
lot more time. And a lot more suffering. Remember. Overcoming poverty is the 
exclusive priority...In the middle of this abundance of hidden treasures, 
inhabitants…are dying…we will not be beggars, sitting on sacks of gold.59   
 
Correa also said in an interview with the New Left Review, 
It is said that on final balance, extractivism will prove to be positive; while it may 
be admitted that it could have negative social and environmental impacts,…[but] 
they have to be accepted in light of the general benefit for the whole nation. We 
govern for all Ecuadoreans, and we can’t yield to the pressure of minorities, 
however justified their demands might seem. 60  
 
President Correa appears to justify the detrimental effects of extractive activities on 
nature and on local communities as necessary for the good of development. Correa 
ignores the cycle of poverty that extractivism propels.  
Hydroelectric’s role in the model 
President Correa’s logic is that revenues from extractive activities will pay for 
industrial development, poverty reduction, and clean energy development. ‘Clean’ 
hydroelectric energy production is a centerpiece of this plan for an eventual departure 
from extractivism. According to his government’s long-term plan, hydroelectric 
production will become a lucrative export industry: a large increase in hydroelectric 
production will allow Ecuador to sell hydroelectricity to neighboring countries. Correa 
said to his Assembly in 2012,  
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In 2016, one of the most important structural changes in the history of our 
country’s economy will be achieved. We will become exporters of clean energy. 
Thanks to the new hydroelectric projects, for the first time we will become an 
exporter of services, not just primary goods, thanks to the millions invested in 
hydroelectric projects, investments we can make from the surplus generated from 
the extractivist economy. That is how to depart from an extractivist economy. Not 
closing mines, not closing petroleum wells, not stopping natural gas extraction.61 
  
Hydroelectric energy, he says, will also increase electricity production in Ecuador, 
allowing for industrial growth. The hydroelectric export industry, itself and the industrial 
development that increased hydroelectricity production will spur, will lessen Ecuador’s 
economic dependence on oil drilling and mining. 
President Correa does not recognize or address the fact that the ‘clean’ 
hydroelectric energy projects that he proposes to be the key to a post-extractive future are 
in reality neither socially nor environmentally sustainable, and will actually be utilized in 
part to sustain an intensified mining industry in the years to come. In essence, his solution 
to extractivism is extractive. Hydroelectric extractivism is given less attention than 
mining and petroleum drilling in academic scholarship and media coverage of 
extractivism in Ecuador. Hydroelectric projects do not often literally extract water from a 
specific location, so why do these types of projects fit into the extractivist model? They 
are extractivist because of the water privatization that accompanies hydroelectric 
development, which concentrates water and hydroelectric power in the hands of large 
often-extractive industries. Hydro projects are also extractive because they cause 
environmental and social harm from damming, flooding, or drying out vast areas, and 
because they are increasingly funded by predatory international capital. 
While water is not removed per se, from a river, access to that water is extracted 
from local communities through concessions (privatization) with pernicious disregard for                                                         
61 “Ecuador lucha por los pueblo ancestrales: Correa,” 2012 
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their survival. Via blatant violations of the laws that ban water privatization and 
guarantee the Human Right to Water for all Ecuadorians, more and more water is falling 
into the hands of large hydroelectric industries, while campesinos and indigenous 
populations suffer from loss of access to their lifeblood. Of the total water volume 
distributed through concessions by 2010 in Ecuador, 74.28 percent was given to the 
electric sector, through 147 concessions, while irrigation has received 19.65 percent of 
the water volume through 31,519 concessions (with the majority of volume conceded to 
agro-industrial exporters)62, and concessions for domestic use received only 1.22 percent 
of the water in the form of 21,281 concessions.63 According to the law, every rural 
inhabitant of Ecuador must receive a concession to use water. Countless small farmers 
are denied concessions for irrigation and basic survival, while hydro projects and other 
large agricultural and industrial consumers rake in the water. The irrigation concessions 
that small farmers do receive are often considerably more expensive than irrigation 
concessions given to large-scale agro-exporters. In the Daule-Peripa watershed, for 
instance, large-scale agro-exporters pay $1.84/hectare/year while small farmers pay 
$120/hectare/year.64   
Privatization commonly harms subsistence-based communities the most, as their 
livelihoods are highly intertwined with and dependent upon natural resources, and their 
work does not generate enough disposable income to purchase the water resource taken 
from them. Hydroelectric companies often locate dams at the base of watersheds, because 
this is where the principal river in a watershed has the largest concentration of water. 
They deny local residents who live above their dam access to any water, so as to ensure                                                         
62 El agua, un derecho humano fundamental, p. 8 
63Ibid., p. 8 
64Ibid., p. 8 
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that the largest amount possible reaches their turbines at the base of the watershed.65 The 
viability of farming for campesino and indigenous communities has diminished as a 
result of water privatization, and because their small farms are a major component of the 
national food market, Ecuador’s in-country food production has also weakened 
significantly. The country has even begun to import some basic foods.66 Clearly, neither 
the Human Right to Water nor Food Sovereignty is prioritized over industrial and agro-
industrial concessions in Ecuador, as the constitution demands. 
The cozy relationship of hydroelectric and mining 
Where is this hydroelectricity going today, and who will the hydroelectricity 
plants of the future serve? A significant portion of generated hydroelectric energy 
produced is not being delivered to Ecuadorian citizens in need of electricity, but instead 
is going, and will go, to power extractive industries like mining. For example, in Macas, 
the Hidroabánico hydroelectric project is supplying electricity for copper mines in Alto 
Cenepa.67 In Zamora-Chinchipe province, the Zamora hydroelectric project will generate 
4,000 megawatts (MW) for mines owned by Corriente mining company.68 A leader at 
Acción Ecológica explained that, “…the mining companies pay in advance for the energy 
that will be produced by dams.”69 David Bakter, chief economist and executive director 
of Earth Economics and advisor to the 2008 Constitutional Assembly explained that, 
“Ecuador cannot proceed with large-scale mining without implementing massive 
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hydroelectric development….”70 Batker has worked as a geologist in a mine, and 
understands the energy inputs needed for open pit mines. He explained that to remove the 
overburden (earth) in a mine in order to reach the ore beneath, a massive amount of 
energy input is needed. It would be prohibitively expensive and slow to remove the 
overburden with scoops and trucks powered by diesel or liquid fuels. Therefore, open pit 
mines utilize large equipment powered by electricity.71 Due to the need for electricity, a 
new era of large-scale mining in Ecuador necessitates a massive amount of cheap 
electricity, hence, the massive development of cheap hydroelectricity. As Gloria Chicaiza 
of Acción Ecológica explains in her paper on mining in Ecuador, “indigenous and 
campesino communities understand this relationship very well, and that is why they 
oppose open-pit mining and hydroelectric projects, which monopolize water and will 
increasingly be used mainly for mining extraction on the campesino and indigenous lands 
and territories.”72 It is no coincidence that president Correa has announced a ‘new era of 
mining’ while simultaneously supporting a major boom in hydroelectricity production.  
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Figure 3: shows the proximity of hydroelectric projects and conceded mining areas in Ecuador. The red 
areas are conceded mining areas, and the dots are all planned or constructed hydroelectric projects. 
More hydroelectric plants and mining operations have been planned since the creation of this map in 
2010. Source: http://mapas.accionecologica.org/Agua/   
Environmental Harm  
Besides concentrating water resources in the hands of large extractive industries 
and denying access to millions of campesinos and indigenous peoples, many 
hydroelectric projects in Ecuador are extractive to the environments in which they are 
built. Hydroelectric projects fundamentally disrupt riparian and surrounding ecosystems 
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and the lives of people who depend on these ecosystems. ‘Run of the river’ hydroelectric 
projects, which divert water from a river, run it through tightly enclosed pipelines and 
then through turbines, and return it to the river, are common in Ecuador. They regularly 
leave one to 20 kilometer stretches of river between the point of diversion and point of 
return nearly or completely dry, which greatly reduces or annihilates aquatic productivity 
and biodiversity not only in the dewatered section but often throughout the entire river. 
Migratory fish populations decline or disappear, and at many dam sites in Ecuador, local 
communities depend on that fish as a primary source of protein.73  
Risky business: climate change and foreign investment 
While hydroelectric energy production is cheap in Ecuador in the short run, its 
production is structurally and financially risky and thus may not be lucrative for the 
country in the long run. The risk lies partly in the fact that projects are financed with 
expectations of positive financial returns, but they may turn out to be less lucrative than 
predicted due to the changing hydrologic cycle. Hydroelectric projects are 
environmentally unreliable given the predicted effects of climate changes on the 
hydrologic cycle. According to INAMHI, the Ecuadorian National Institute of 
Meteorology and Hydrology, “the energy sector in Ecuador is highly vulnerable to 
changes in the distribution of precipitation, due to its total dependence on the availability 
of water to supply reservoirs and energy production.”74 INHAMI reported in 2007 that 
Ecuador would completely lose at least four of its eight most important glaciers in the 
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next 10 to 20 years.75 All of the country’s glaciers have shrunk significantly and continue 
to shrink rapidly.76 Glacial melt temporarily increases stream flows but then decreases 
flows immensely and for the long term. Glaciers also serve as a form of water storage.77 
However, with climate warming and shrinking glaciers this ‘natural’ storage dissipates. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes’ 2007 Fourth Assessment Report 
Synthesis states that changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers in 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Perú will notably affect the availability of water for human 
consumption, for farming, and for hydroelectric projects.78 The risk in developing such a 
hydro-dominated energy portfolio is that there will not be enough water to generate the 
amount of electricity and revenues expected due to glacial melt and changes in 
precipitation. 
Hydroelectric projects in Ecuador are also financially risky because they are 
mainly financed by foreign companies that provide foreign loans with high interest rates, 
which are likely to saddle the country with greater debt, especially if and when climate 
change renders projects less lucrative. The Coca Codo Sinclair dam, for example, is 
owned by the state of Ecuador, but will be constructed by the Chinese company 
Sinohydro, and its financing is provided in the form of a $1.68 billion loan to Ecuador 
from the Chinese Eximbank. Matthew Terry of the Napo River Foundation warns that the 
Coca Codo project has hugely overestimated its energy producing capacity, and it will 
not be as lucrative as is touted. Thus, Coca-Codo will “ultimately saddle Ecuador with                                                         
75 “Los glaciares en Ecuador se encogen: Riesgo para la soberanía alimentaria,” Noticias del Cambio 
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huge debts and unforeseen commitments to China” when it cannot produce the amount of 
energy its promoters have promised, and has to pay back a 15-year loan that carries a 
steep 6.9 percent interest rate.79  
China’s Eximbank also agreed to finance two other large hydroelectric projects 
called Minas-San Francisco (270MW), and Sopladora (488MW) the second of which is 
burdened by a nine percent interest rate. Chinese financing is supporting three other 
projects as well.80 Russia’s Inter Rao UES is currently building the Toachi Pilatón 
project. Loans from Brazilian banks have supported several other hydroelectric projects. 
Others receive direct financing from international companies such as Coca Cola, KFC, La 
Fabril, Pronaca, and Oderbrecht while yet others are owned and funded by national 
companies with loans from international financial institutions like the United Nations 
Clean Development Mechanism.81 United States financing may join the pool soon. It is 
not unlikely that new foreign investments will culminate in the same path to debt that the 
Coca Codo Sinclair project now appears to be treading given many of the same factors. 
 Risks that climate change poses to the viability of hydroelectric energy 
production are exacerbated by the financial risks associated with predatory foreign 
capital. Combined with a consideration of the socially harmful nature of hydroelectric 
production, a strong case can be made that investments in a hydroelectric-dominated grid 
may become an undesired costly burden to all related parties in the near future.   
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Hydroelectric: a growing extractive industry 
It is especially important to analyze the extractive character of hydroelectric 
generation in Ecuador because it continues to grow as an industry, and therefore negative 
effects felt today by many rural communities will likely be felt by thousands more in 
years ahead. Hydroelectric development, as mentioned above, is integral to the Alianza 
PAIS government’s national electricity and development strategies. As of February, 
2013, Ecuador was using 30 percent of its hydroelectric potential with around 60 
hydroelectric plants, which is double the amount of capacity used six years before in 
2007.82 The government has plans for rapid hydroelectric development in the next 
decade, as well. As of January, 2013, 62.7 percent of Ecuador’s generated electricity 
came from hydropower and 37.3 percent came from fossil-fuel sources. By 2016, the 
Electric Corporation of Ecuador (CELEC) predicts that 93 percent of the country’s 
electricity will be hydroelectric.83 This means that the state will shut down the vast 
majority of its expensive fossil fuel generation plants and replace them with the new 
hydroelectric plants. It also means that Ecuador will be able to achieve their strategic goal 
of energy sovereignty by halting electricity imports from Colombia and Perú.  
Hydroelectricity production will not stop when energy sovereignty is achieved. 
The Ecuadorian National Electricity Council (CONELEC), which is the regulator, 
planner, and controller of the electric sector, has included in their National Master Plan 
for Electrification, the construction of, “226 hydropower projects from 2012 to 2020,” 
requiring an investment of approximately $10.9 billion. These projects, they say, have the                                                         
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53  
potential to produce 11,818 MW. With national demand currently at only 3,768 MW,84 
this enormous electricity surplus will serve national industrial growth and allow Ecuador 
to become a significant regional energy exporter to Perú, Chile, and Bolívia.  
Such aggressive hydroelectric sector growth in Ecuador has been justified time 
and time again in the name of development. The technical manager of Hidrotambo S.A., 
a multinational hydroelectric company based in Ecuador, told me, “Without energy there 
is no development! A country that wants to develop has to continually produce more and 
more energy.”85 Thus far, hydroelectric development has occurred at the expense of 
thousands of rural Ecuadorian communities and national food sovereignty, and the 
industry has principally benefitted large extractive industries. Couldn’t Ecuador instead 
earnestly pursue the alternatives to industrial development that have been presented in the 
country’s Magna Carta?   
Extractivism becoming less populist 
Extractivism is growing and Correa’s policies offer no clear way out. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how much of the income from extraction will continue to 
finance poverty reduction. The president has increasingly opened the doors to foreign 
countries and transnational companies that have the capital and technologies to extract 
petroleum, minerals, and water resources. Loan conditions from these countries and 
companies have been notably poor for Ecuador, but Correa has complied in his fervor to 
expand the extraction sector. Despite stating in 2009 that, “negotiating with China was 
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85 Interview with Ramiro Gordillo, Technical Manager, Hidrotambo S.A., Rachel Conrad, (Cumbayá, 
Ecuador: May 18, 2012) 
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worse than negotiating with the IMF”86 and claiming that contracts and loans from China 
would threaten Ecuador’s sovereignty,87 Correa has begun an aggressive process of 
accruing debt, above all to China. In the last months of 2010, Ecuador wrote bilateral 
agreements with China to receive large-scale low interest loans of around five billion 
dollars, and they have designated petroleum as a guarantee of debt payment.”88 Will this 
reoccurring neoliberal pattern allow world powers to benefit and leave Ecuador in the 
lurch once again? 
Conflicts and resistance over extractive projects 
The future of hydroelectric extractivism is not set in stone, however, because 
affected communities are organizing on a national scale to defend the wellbeing of the 
natural world to which humans belong. Affected communities and their allies have 
challenged 23 hydroelectric projects that are in some stage of being built or are 
finished,89 and new challenges continue to arise. Protests have been met with rights 
violations, intimidation, violence, and criminalization. The Baba dam was met with mass 
protests from locals who were angry that the project’s proponents had defied “almost all 
of the required procedures, including prior consultation of the local communities, all in 
the ‘national interest.’90 The project was built despite the protest, and many of the locals’ 
homes and lands were flooded. Other highly contested projects whose protesters are 
experiencing repression are the Angamarca, Abánico, Chone, San José del Tambo and                                                         
86 “Correa bewails China negotiations,” (China: Taipei Times, December 7, 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/worldbiz/archives/2009/12/07/2003460330 
87 Pablo Davalos, Entrevista Por Verónica Gago y Diego Sztulwark, Pablo Dávalos: “El centro del 
problema no es el neoliberalismo, es el capitalismo.” 29 de junio, 2011, 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/dialogos/21-165993-2011-04-11.html  
88Ibid., 2011 
89 “Las represas como mecanismo de privatización del agua, apropiación de las tierras y venta del aire,” p. 
212 
89 El agua, un derecho humano fundamental, p. 8 
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Apaquí projects.91 To implement projects in the face of mounting resistance, the 
government and private companies have utilized repression and criminalization of social 
protest to quell the voices of angry communities. Those affected by hydroelectric 
extractivism are joining together with communities affected by petroleum extraction and 
mining, to challenge Alianza PAIS’ extractivist agenda with greater force than can be 
mustered with challenges to single projects.   
 
Figure 4: “Dams+Repression=Correa in Action.—signed, Río Grande”                               
Photo by Rachel Conrad 
Criminalization of dissidents, censorship, and violence  
Leftist dissidents including communities affected by extractive projects, 
CONAIE, the indigenous Patchakutic political party which is tied to CONAIE, the 
Democratic People’s Movement (MDP), the principle public sector teachers unions, 
environmental NGOs, women’s organizations, and numerous radical intellectuals, 
students, and trade union activists92 are increasingly distancing themselves from president 
Correa, due to his neo-extractivist policies, growing authoritarianism and general betrayal 
of the historical process driven by the popular social forces that elected him. These                                                         
91Alvarado Moreno, Paola Margarita, “Afectación Ambiental y Socioeconómica de la Construcción 
de una Central Hidroeléctrica en la Zona de Impacto: El Caso 
del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Angamarca”, (Universidad San Francisco de Quito: Quito) Mayo de 2009, p. 
61-62, http://repositorio.usfq.edu.ec/bitstream/23000/702/1/91109.pdf   
92 James Petras, “Ecuador: Left-Center Political Regimes versus Radical Social Movements.” (Global 
Research: Center for Research on Globalization) February 12, 2013. 
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groups have been protesting for recognition of their rights to water, the Good Way of 
Living, Food Sovereignty, and more. The Alianza PAIS government has responded by 
censoring, injuring, and criminalizing the social and political movements while belittling 
their plight and calling them ‘childish’ and ‘extremists’ who are getting in the way of the 
greater good. Correa and Alianza PAIS remain popular with a majority of the population 
and at this time it seems that Correa feels that he can discount those affected by extractive 
projects as an ‘insignificant minority’ that he does not need to “bring into his coalition as 
an electoral calculation to gain power.”93 Impelled by developmentalist populist desires 
that can only be easily realized by feeding the global supply chain with primary 
resources, the Ecuadorian government is increasingly using violent means to enforce the 
plunder of indigenous, campesino, and montubio lands. As a Salon exposé put it,  
In recent years, the quickening arrival of drills and trenchers from China and 
Canada has provoked a militant resistance that unites the local indigenous and 
campesino populations. The stakes declared and the violence endured by the battle-
scarred coalition is little known -- even in Ecuador, where Correa has made 
muscular use of state security forces in arresting activists and intimidating 
journalists who threaten his image as an ecologically minded man-of-the-people.94  
 
The criminalization of protest came close to home when, during my time at Acción 
Ecológica, several of the founders of the organization were dragged, hit, and detained for 
protesting an open pit gold mining contract with a Chinese company, outside of the 
Chinese Embassy. Alberto Acosta, 2013 presidential candidate, explained that, in an 
authoritarian manner, Correa has “proscribed the right to resistance.” “Today,” he said, 
“there are more than 200 popular leaders on court benches, accused of as much as 
‘sabotage’ and ‘terrorism,’ under laws used in the times of oligarchic governments, in a                                                         
93 “Correa and Ecuador’s Left: An Interview with Marc Becker” 2013 
94 Zaitchik, Alexander, “To Get to the Gold They Will Have to Kill Every One of Us: The most-storied 
warrior tribe in Ecuador prepares to fight as the government sells gold-laden land to China,” (Salon, 
February 10, 2013). 
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country where there is no terrorism.”95 A November, 2012 Ecuadorian delegation to the 
United Nations also reported over 200 cases of criminalization of social protest in the 
country.96 According to a 2012 report by Amnesty International, the government is 
increasingly, “clamping down on protests and using unfounded criminal proceedings 
against the leaders of indigenous and campesino organizations.”97  
In 2009 and 2010, the failure of the authorities to properly consult indigenous 
peoples and campesinos before passing legislation on mining and water rights sparked a 
series of nationwide protests. On 20 January 2009, around, “12,000 people from 
Indigenous, environmentalist, campesino and water movements in eight provinces”98 
took part in what is now known as the “Day of Mobilization for Life,” a national protest 
around water rights and the Water Law. One day earlier, President Correa had delivered a 
speech from the balcony of the Presidential Palace where he called those who were 
opposed to the law, “childish leftists” and tried to further delegitimize them by saying 
that only ‘small groups’ planned to demonstrate the following day.”99 Many of these 
12,000 protesters were accused of terrorism and sabotage, and later with the criminal 
offence of blocking roads. Protestors were held in ‘preventative detention,’ some for 
weeks, and some were subsequently imprisoned while others were let off, or were 
ordered to present themselves to authorities every eight or 15 days for extended 
periods.100 In September, 2009 and May, 2010, protests around the draft Water Law were 
accompanied by further criminalization of protest. Amnesty International reports that,                                                         
95 “Entrevista a Alberto Acosta: La “revolución ciudadana”, el modelo extractivista y las izquierdas 
críticas,” Febrero, 2013 
96 Zhagui, Lizardo, “Cuestionan informe official ante Naciones Unidas Sobre Criminalización a Defensores 
de la Naturaleza,” (Agencia Ecologista de Información: Tegantai. 15 de Noviembre, 2012). 
97 Ibid., p.19 
98 Ibid.,p.19 
99 Ibid., p.19 
100 Ibid.,2012 
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“Many of those who actively took part – and some who did not – subsequently faced 
charges and legal processes that appeared designed to prevent and punish legitimate 
protest and to silence those campaigning for the human rights of Indigenous and 
campesino communities.”101  
President Correa has kept a tight wrap on the media in his country, suing media 
outlets for thousands and even millions of dollars multiple times for making negative 
statements about him.102 As the Economist magazine opines, the media suppression is, 
“sure to put Mr. Correa's critics on notice that expressing their objections too forcefully 
could put them out of business or send them to jail.”103 The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights said Correa’s judicial actions against the media could produce, “self-
censorship and a notable chilling effect that impacts not only the individuals convicted 
but Ecuadorean society as a whole.”104 Where has the promised citizen participation and 
direct democracy of president Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution gone? 
Not only are protestors criminalized and self-censored, they are also victims of 
violence committed by the National Police, the Armed Forces, and private security 
forces. In 2010, tear gas and helicopters were used against water law demonstrators to 
disperse a crowd blocking the bridge of the Rio Upán, “resulting in clashes that injured 
over 40 people, police officers as well as protesters. One indigenous teacher, Bosco 
Wisuma, was shot in the head by an unidentified gunman and died instantly.”105 
Protestors against the Baba, Chone, and San José del Tambo dams106 and copper mining                                                         
101 Ibid., p.7 
102 “Freedom of Press in Ecuador: A Chill Descends,” (Quito: The Economist, July, 2011) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/07/freedom-press-ecuador  
103 Ibid., 2011 
104 Ibid.,2011 
105 “So that no one can demand anything' criminalizing the right to protest in Ecuador?” p. 22 
106 Rachel Conrad, Represados, film documentary, (Youtube: June, 2012), 
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in Intag have also been repressed by national and private police and the Armed Forces in 
the past decade. There have been many other occasions of armed repression of protest. 
Concrete alternatives 
Presently, much of the advocacy for a post-extractivist agenda is loosely tied 
together under a political coalition called the Plurinational Unity of the Lefts (UP), which 
was formed in 2011. The coalition, which encompasses 10 political parties and social 
movements, proposes to construct a state in which Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir is not 
just rhetoric to veil Western development, but rather an alternative to development and a 
challenge to the notion of sustainable development. These social groups emphasize that 
their proposals would be realized if the 2008 Constitution were respected.  
The UP has advocated concrete steps towards a post-extractivist reality, several of 
which I will outline here. To overcome dependence on extractive activities, the UP 
advocates the generation of a, “social and solidarity economy,” one that is centered on 
values of cooperation, complementarity, mutual support, human rights and democratic 
principles (Art. 283 of the Constitution). To create such an economy, they propose 
policies to further redistribute wealth, empower small producers and cooperatives, and 
encourage sustainable practices. They propose to halt any new extractive ventures and cut 
back steadily on the existing ones, while simultaneously creating a social and solidarity 
economy. Taking these steps simultaneously would allow the country to maintain 
stability and wellbeing through robust local exchange while significantly cutting back on 
the extractive practices that currently sustain the economy.  
The UP demands respect of the primacy of laws related to the functioning of 
natural systems over traditional economic objectives, and looks to support this primacy                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2DnL76BJY8&list=PLlQdGA3gyJbneIkc3ZdcCL3m_58-95X1I  
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by rejecting present-day economic indicators like GDP, and instead adopting tools to 
measure Buen Vivir.107 The UP also urgently advocates the realization of agrarian and 
water reform mandated by the Constitution in order to encourage small-scale, local, 
healthy, and culturally appropriate food production for the country (food sovereignty).  
Social movements loosely allied with the UP are pushing for the adoption of a 
new water law, which, according to the Constitution, should have been signed by the end 
of 2009. The new water law focuses on water conservation, clean-up and quality 
improvement, locating underground water sources, and the prioritization of citizen’s 
access to water for potable use as well as irrigation. This new law would even more 
explicitly ban the privatization of water. Article 3 of the draft Water Law states, “Water, 
in its transcendence for life, the economy, and the environment, cannot be an object of 
any commercial agreement involving the government, a multilateral entity, or any foreign 
company. Every form of water privatization is prohibited. No form of appropriation or 
individual or collective possession of water is permitted.” (emphasis added) With the 
passage of the new Water Law, many hydroelectric ventures would become even more 
explicitly illegal, given that hydroelectric companies have appropriated water from 
existing human and irrigation use, and many of them are foreign companies. 
To move towards independence from resource extraction and toward a solidarity 
economy, the UP is advocating a more progressive tax system, and stricter tax payment 
enforcement mechanisms so that the progressive taxation system can truly bear fruit. 
Currently, there is 40% tax-evasion in Ecuador.108 With better enforcement, and therefore 
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greater tax revenue, natural resource extraction would become less of a necessary 
contributor to the state’s budget. Small-scale local businesses would receive significant 
tax breaks as an additional support for a solidarity economy.  
The UP proposes an overhaul of the banking sector, which would limit private 
banks’ investments in the financial sector, instate lower interest rates, and strengthen 
small savings and credit cooperatives and community banks. They also advocate 
establishing government credit mechanisms for small and medium-farmers. Growth is not 
the ultimate goal for a social and solidarity economy: the goal is to live well, not to live 
better. The UP therefore looks to address the globalized consumerist culture by reducing 
imports of consumer goods, which will simultaneously increase demand for local low-
impact production.109  
To incentivize citizen support of small-scale producers, the UP also advocates 
increasing the purchasing power of the Human Development Bond with an increased 
payment whenever its beneficiaries purchase products from campesinos, local fishermen 
who use traditional methods, and traditional craft makers. As another way to support 
small-scale production, rural communities, and environmental sustainability, the UP 
advocates for state policies to foment the “rational and best use” of the country’s cultural 
and biological wealth, for tourism. Tourism has the potential to grow significantly given 
the country’s stunning ecosystems and cultural wealth. Tourism would be managed under 
principles of social equity and environmental sustainability, favoring small and medium 
tourist endeavors, and operations that benefit local communities and distance themselves 
from large oligopolistic tourism conglomerates. The UP points out that the country’s                                                         
109 “Programa de gobierno de la unidad plurinacional de las izquierdas,” (esfuerzo colectivo: 14 de enero, 
2013) http://albertoacosta2013.com/plan/  
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most promising alternative to extractive practices is a strong tourism industry that “can 
generate more employment and foreign currency gains than mining, or any other 
extractivist activity.”110 As these concrete alternatives suggest, extractivism is not a 
necessity, a transition tool, or a justifiable evil ‘for the greater good’ as Correa and 
Alianza PAIS assert. There is a way to provide for and increase overall wellbeing in 
Ecuador without high-interest and “dirty” money and investments from extractivist 
endeavors.   
Conclusion 
President Correa continues to employ rhetoric from the progressive socio-
environmental ideals in the 2008 Constitution, while, as outlined above, in practice his 
politics have veered away from many of these ideals, instead centering on the very 
Western economic development paradigm that was challenged and rejected in the 
country’s turn-of-the century ‘refounding.’ Eduardo Gudynas writes that, “the 
government has appropriated concepts that arose as concepts of radical change from civil 
society, and then has redefined those concepts in order to serve conventional 
development. The most striking case of this in Ecuador is with the Good Way of Living, 
which, in its original meanings was as much a criticism of conventional development as it 
was an articulation of post-socialist and post-capitalist alternative proposals.”111 When 
referring to gold and copper mining as well as petroleum extraction, president Correa 
said, “The country needs diamonds [a metaphor for all minable minerals] not as unusable 
necklaces, but to transform them into tractors, roads, high schools, hospitals…to achieve 
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111 Eduardo Gudnyas, “Alternativas al Desarrollo Después de la Elecciones en Ecuador” (Acción y 
Reacción: Marzo, 2013) http://accionyreaccion.com/?p=565 
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el Buen Vivir…”112(emphasis added) . As ex-Constitutional Assemblywoman, Fernanda 
Vega put it, “Good Life (Buen Vivir) has been emptied of its content. It is being re-
westernized in a ‘lite edition,’ which works to provide what is necessary for a 
modernization of ‘national capitalism.’”113 President Correa may wonder, how long will 
it be until the ‘insignificant minority’ opposing his extractive practices becomes too 
angry and too big to handle? How long until the state will be forced to sacrifice rapid 
economic development in order to truly effectuate the values, laws, and rights presented 
in the 2008 Constitution? 
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Chapter 2: Water is Life for Us: 
The San José del Tambo Hydroelectric Project 
 
Water is primordial in our lives. Water is life for us.  
--Farmer, San Pablo de Amalí, Bolívar, Ecuador, 2012 
 
Seventy-two communities with a current population of 40 to 45 thousand 
people114 have for generations made their homes on the nutrient-rich Andean slopes in 
the Dulcepamba micro watershed in Ecuador. This bountiful land lies on the mid-western 
flanks of the Andes mountains, within the administrative districts (cantons) of Chillanes 
and San Miguel, in Ecuador’s Bolívar Province. The vast majority of the local people 
dedicate themselves to small-scale agriculture, and an abundance of their fresh and 
mostly pesticide-free produce supplies both local and national markets in Ecuador.115 The 
mayor of Chillanes told me, “the region is known as the breadbasket of Ecuador. It is the 
paradise of Bolívar.”116 Campesino families grow an amazing diversity of crops, 
including corn, beans, peas, wheat, barley, cabbage, cane sugar, tree tomatoes, 
blackberries, and much more in the upper elevations of the watershed, and organic cacao, 
oranges, tangerines, bananas, yuccas, papayas, noni, and many other fruits and vegetables 
as well as grasses for cattle in the lower elevations of the watershed. Crops are inter-
mingled with each other and with the forest, forming a complex agro-ecosystem. The 
watershed that these campesinos inhabit spans several ecological zones: subtropical, 
cloud forest, and páramo (highlands) (from lowest to highest in elevation), so one will 
encounter different crops depending on the elevation. Most families have pigs, chickens, 
and ducks roaming freely about their lands, and some have sheep. Some of the land in the 
watershed is managed communally and has been for generations.                                                          
114 OFICIO Nro. 160 MV-0603, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos-INEC, 6 de junio, 2006  
115 David Reyes, interview, Rachel Conrad, electronic correspondence, November, 2012 
116 Interview with Ramiro Trujillo, mayor of Cantón Chillanes, Bolívar, Rachel Conrad, April, 2012   
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The local farmers depend entirely on the watershed’s rivers and tributaries for 
every aspect of their survival and wellbeing: for daily human use and to nurture the crops 
and animals that they depend on both for nourishment and for sale to Ecuadorian 
markets, providing them with a small income. Farmers in the lower part of the watershed 
use gravity and hoses to divert water from the many tributaries above their properties for 
everyday uses and for their animals. Farmers in the higher part regularly irrigate their 
crops through gravity-based irrigation systems. Everyone depends on the rivers’ plentiful 
fish populations, which are one of their principal sources of protein.117 A local farmer 
told me, “…the children take their bait, catch their breakfast, their lunch…the river 
provides for our families here… The river is our sustenance. When we don’t have money, 
we grab our nets. We cast them for a half an hour, and we have food to eat.”118  
The watershed’s many streams and waterfalls empty into several principal 
rivers—the Dulcepamba River (28 miles long)119 and the Salunguirí river, which then 
leave the watershed and empty into the Babahoyo River. The Babahoyo River in turn 
feeds the Guayas River, the recipient of the majority of rivers in the western part of 
Ecuador,120 and finally the accumulated water heads to the sea via the Gulf of Guayaquil. 
Water is abundant in the region, but deceivingly so. The water in the small waterfalls 
found around every bend in the dirt roads, the winding crystalline streams, and the 
torrential summertime flows racing downwards within the principal riverbeds are now 
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coveted by hungry eyes from around the world, and the magnificent liquid abundance 
that breathes life into plants, animals, and farmers alike may become a dream of the past. 
 
The Hidrotambo Project 
 
“There is no reason to wipe out a community with the army to support the livelihood of 
four greedy investors that are coming to take our wealth!” 
--Community member, San Pablo de Amalí, Ecuador, 2007  
 
The seeds of what would become a profoundly destructive and extractive 
hydroelectric project were sown in 2002 by the Corporation for Energy Research (CIE). 
CIE is an Ecuadorian company dedicated to “basic and applied scientific research in the 
field of energy.”121 The company invests in, plans, and develops (mostly renewable) 
energy projects. To obtain a guaranteed supply of water for the hydroelectric project they 
had envisioned, CIE solicited the Agency of Waters of Guaranda, part of what is now the 
National Secretariat of Water (SENAGUA), for a hydraulic concession for the waters of 
the Dulcepamba micro watershed (395km2), which encompasses the farming 
communities described above. The hydroelectric project would be built at the base of the 
Dulcepamba watershed where water flow is greatest, just below the confluence of the 
watershed’s largest rivers—the Salunguiré and the Dulcepamba—so that the highest 
volume of water possible will pass through the company’s turbines.  
Project Design 
CIE designed the project to be a “run-of-the river” dam. This type of dam 
involves a barrier built across the whole river that diverts water to one side, where it 
flows through a canal and enters a holding tank. Water then flows from the holding tank 
into tubing that heads downhill, and it reaches the turbines at a high velocity and in high                                                         
121 “Concesión Hidráulico para Hidrotambo S.A. para la Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo,” 
(Agencia de Aguas de Guaranda: 20 de noviembre, 2003)  
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volume. After running through the turbines, the water is returned to the river in the same 
quantity as it measured at the diversion point. Between the diversion and the point where 
water is returned to the river, a small ecological flow will be left in the riverbed, but that 
flow is not sufficient to serve the riparian ecosystem, nor is it accessible for human use. 
This type of dam does not require a reservoir. The distance between the diversion point 
and the point where water returns to the river is 2.7km122 according to Hidrotambo’s 
Environmental Impact Study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
  Figure 5: Model of a “run­of­the­river” hydro project (CIE’s project does not have a 
 desilting tank) Source: Energypedia 
                                                        
122 “Ficha técnica: Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” p. 1 
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                    Figure 6: Location of the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project.  Map by Rachel Conrad 
Cantón San Miguel Dulcepamba Watershed     
   
  Guayas Water System  Cantón Chillanes        
 
 
The project is situated between the small town of San Pablo de Amalí and the 
larger town of San José del Tambo. The watershed it draws from is part of two cantons 
(similar to counties), Chillanes and San Miguel. By road, the project site is 40km east of 
Babahoyo City. See figure 2 for details.  
A water grab 
The National Secretariat of water, SENAGUA, provided CIE with the non-
consumptive right to a large portion of the Dulcepamba River’s waters in November of 
2003123 with the understanding that the water would serve CIE for their hydroelectric 
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project, and that their concession would last for 50 years. SENAGUA provided CIE with 
1.196m3 per second of water between July and November, the dry season, and 5.40m3 per 
second between December and June, the wet season. CIE soon found three investment 
partners with whom to form a joint venture to forward their $19,801,805.00124 
hydroelectric dream. Hidrotambo S.A. is the name given to this joint venture. The name 
honors their sole project--the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project. The company 
was formed with the idea that they might invest in similar projects in the future if the San 
José del Tambo project was a success. The investors quickly applied to transfer CIE’s 
hydraulic concession from CIE to Hidrotambo S.A., and their application was granted in 
2005.125 At this time, they asked for and received an increase in the concession’s wet 
season volume from 5.40m3 per second to 6.50m3 per second.126 At this time it was also 
established that Hidrotambo would pay $3,681.22 dollars per year127 for the hydraulic 
concession, an almost negligible cost for Hidrotambo in comparison with the financial 
potential that ownership of much of the water of a small watershed implies, and an 
indication of SENAGUA’s and Alianza PAIS’ priority to advance hydroelectric 
development above supporting small-scale agriculture. Hidrotambo appropriated the 
water and solidified their concession without any prior informed consultation of the 
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communities of the watershed— violating the communities’ constitutional right128 to be 
consulted on any decision that could impact their environment. 
There are three principal issues with the project. The first is that Hidrotambo will 
use their hydraulic concession to block farmers’ access to water, the second is that 
diversion of water from the Dulcepamba river will decimate fish populations, and the 
third is that the project’s construction has and will continue to disrupt private property. 
Resistance to the project has arisen as a result of these issues, and has been answered 
with military and police repression, widespread intimidation, and criminalization of 
protest. All of these issues will be discussed in depth below. 
Concession will block farmers from water use 
The hydraulic concession received will allow Hidrotambo S.A. to use, and block 
non-company use of, effectively all of the watershed’s waters at certain times of the year. 
The company wants the largest amount of water possible to pass through their turbines 
located at the base of the watershed. It is important to understand that all of the tributaries 
in the Dulcepamba watershed are under concession, not only the principal river, because 
the tributaries feed the main river, guaranteeing its flow volume. To ensure that their 
guaranteed flow volume reaches the turbines, Hidrotambo will use their ownership rights 
to ban diversion of water (from tributaries that feed the main river or from the main river 
itself) by the 45,000 campesinos who live in communities that are positioned mostly at 
points above the dam. While some of the waters that farmers divert for irrigation and 
daily consumption and use would drain back to the Dulcepamba River after being 
utilized, a significant portion would evaporate or transpirate. Therefore, Hidrotambo will 
block farmers from diverting water to ensure maximum electricity production.                                                           
128 Art. 398 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, Art. 57 Num. 7 of the 2008 Constitution 
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How did Hidrotambo gain control over so much water? They did so through a 
series of shady measurements. To ensure that the quantity of cubic meters assigned to the 
company does not exceed 100 percent of the Dulcepamba river’s total flow volume, the 
National Secretariat of Water, SENAGUA, had needed to find out the whole river’s flow 
volume and then decide on a percentage to give to Hidrotambo. The data and 
measurements used to determine the river’s flow volume are completely unreliable, as 
will be shown below. While concrete data on the true flow volume of the river is 
unavailable, there are many reasons to believe that Hidrotambo used unreliable data to 
hugely over-estimate the whole river’s flow volume. The reasons that an over-estimation 
is likely will also be discussed below. If the river’s flow volume is, as is likely the case, 
much less than the company has stated, then the quantity of water that Hidrotambo has 
been assigned is a larger percentage of the river’s flow volume than it appears to be—
perhaps even greater than the total river’s flow volume (more than 100 percent).  
The overestimation of the flow was due to manipulation of both historical 
hydrologic data and an on-site flow volume measurement that are of questionable 
validity. The on-site measurement to determine the whole flow volume of the 
Dulcepamba River was taken by the writers of the project’s Environmental Impact Study 
(EIS) in 2006. The measurement was not a measurement at all, but instead was based on 
several almost blind guesses. The EIS itself admits that, “it was not possible to realize the 
flow volume calculation for the Dulcepamba River in the site where the dike (barrier) 
will be constructed, nor in any location upriver or downriver, due to the following 
difficulties: a torrential flow due to the river’s approximately six percent gradient, [the 
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river’s] depth, and inaccessibility to the site, etc.”129 The flow volume was, therefore, 
only visually estimated. The estimated flow volume on the day of inspection (a day in the 
wet season) was “between 16 and/or 18m3/second, more or less.”130  
One-time on-site measurements are not representative of a river’s flow volume 
across seasons and over decades. Therefore, this non- technical ‘guestimation’ was 
combined with historical data to determine an approximate flow volume of the river. 
Historical measurements were averaged from historical data from limnigraphic and 
limnimetric stations, otherwise known as water level gauge stations, which measure the 
flow volume of a river at regular intervals over time.  
 
Figure 7: Location of water level gauge stations used to determine the Dulcepamba River’s flow volume. 
Map by Rachel Conrad. Source: Google Maps. Imagery: USGS, 2013 (white area is cloud cover) 
Dulcepamba Watershed                                                         
129 Del Pozo, Tge H., Ing., “Informe Técnico No. AG.G-2003-33” del Informe del Perito y Notificación de 
Adjudicación de Agua,” (Agencia de Aguas de Guaranda: 17 de febrero, 2003)  
130 “Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” (CONELEC: Septiembre, 
2004)  
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As can be observed in Figure 3, all except for two of the water level gauge 
stations listed in the company’s EIS as the data sources for the Dulcepamba River’s flow 
volume are not even located in the same watershed as the Dulcepamba, much less located 
on the river in question. SENAGUA insists that by considering the flow volume of rivers 
in similar watersheds, they can estimate the flow volume of the Dulcepamba River. This 
is an extremely inaccurate way to measure a river’s flow volume. Data from other rivers 
in far away watersheds cannot accurately determine the Dulcepamba River’s flow 
volume. Even if data from the other watersheds could be used to determine the 
Dulcepamba watershed’s flow volume, the data supplied is all outdated,131 and much of it 
does not cover long periods of time needed to understand longterm patterns of water 
levels. Why such a lack in data? Across Ecuador, up-to-date river flow volume data is 
lacking because when the Ecuadorian Institute of Electrification shut down in 1996, 
giving way to the establishment of CONELEC, gauge stations were abandoned, and the 
hydrometric network has still not been fully reestablished.132 
The only water level gauge station that is on the Dulcepamba River, the Chima 
limnigraphic station, has been out of commission since 1981. The data used for the 
Dulcepamba River’s flow volume from the defunct Chima gauge station is from between 
December of 1968 and November of 1973.133 The company’s EIS states that data from 
the period 1965-1994 was compiled from these different (mostly distant) stations to 
determine the Dulcepamba River’s flow volume. As Acción Ecológica affirms in their 
rejection of Hidrotambo’s EIS, “it is well known that in the twelve years between 1994                                                         
131 David Reyes, “Fundamentos de rechazo, objeción y desconocimiento al: Estudio de Impacto Ambiental 
Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” (Acción Ecológica: Quito, Abril, 2007) p.5 
132 Alfredo Mena Pachano, “La investigación y desarrollo de energías renovables en el Ecuador, análisis 
crítico,” (Quito, Corporación para la Investigación Energética, 2006) p.1 
133 “Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” 2004 
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and 2006 [when the EIS was written], the [Dulcepamba] river’s flow volume has 
drastically changed, with a definite decrease in water level.”134 The decrease in water 
level since 1973 when the Chima station closed is even greater.  
From the on-site guestimation and the out-of date and out-of-site gauge station 
data, the EIS writers decided that the official average flow volume for the Dulcepamba 
River would be 14.3 meters cubed per second.135 A flow volume average of 14m3/sec is 
actually irrelevant, because an average of the wet and dry season does not provide a 
picture of flow volumes in either season. What is important to discover is the wet season 
and the dry season flow volumes so as be sure not to over-allocate the river in either 
season. Wet and dry season flow volumes were not listed. Farmers in this region plant 
year-round, and therefore they depend on irrigation in the upper elevations year-round, 
but especially during the dry season. 
Many farmers from the region, who know the river’s patterns well as their daily 
lives are intertwined with it, have affirmed that the water level in the river and its many 
tributaries has decreased significantly in the past couple of decades136 and is nowhere 
near 14.3m3 per second. Farmers as well as engineer David Reyes who has regularly 
traveled to the Dulcepamba watershed for several years, say that the flow volume in the 
wet season is between four to six cubic meters per second much of the time.137 When 
Hidrotambo takes 6.50 cubic meters per second in the wet season and leaves 0.196 meters 
cubed per second as a required ecological flow, considering there is often four to six 
                                                        
134 “Fundamentos de rechazo, objeción y desconocimiento al: Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de 
la Central San José del Tambo,” p.5 
135 “Ficha tecnica, Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” p. 1 
136 Interviews and discussions with many local farmers, meeting with the mayor of Chillanes and his staff, 
community meetings in San Pablo de Amalí, donated archival footage from 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
137 Email communications with Sr. David Reyes, Rachel Conrad, April, 2013 
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cubic meters per second in the river, the hydroelectric will have tied all of the 
watershed’s waters, leaving nothing for 45,000 farmers, and Hidrotambo will likely not 
even have access to their 6.50 cubic meters/second concession. Acción Ecológica’s report 
affirms that Hidrotambo’s concession to 6.50 cubic meters per second of water in the wet 
season is “a quantity that existed in the river more than thirty years ago,” but currently 
often does not exist.138 
The four to six cubic meters per second estimate is for an average wet season 
flow, and therefore there are times when the flow is higher that this range, and times 
when it is lower. Hidrotambo’s dam does not have a storage reservoir to smooth out high 
and low flows, so in times of drought during the dry season, their dam will receive much 
less water than their intended 6.50 cubic meter flow volume. The concession does not 
stipulate a lower flow volume for the company during times of drought, thus in order to 
meet electricity generation goals, Hidrotambo will not cut back during droughts to allow 
for farmers to use needed water.  
The same logic just outlined can likely apply to the company’s dry season flow 
volume of 1.196 cubic meters per second as well. This quantity was considered to be a 
percentage of the dry season flow volume (that was not listed in the EIS), and it is likely 
to be the majority or even more than 100 percent of the dry season’s flow volume, in part 
because Hidrotambo, whose project lacks a regulating reservoir, would likely have asked 
for the most water possible in the dry season in order to ensure that their turbines can 
continue to move, although at a much slower rate. 
                                                        
138 Reyes, David. “Informe sobre el proyecto de la central hidroeléctrica en San José del Tambo Canton 
Chillanes Provincia Bolívar.” (Quito: Acción Ecológica, June, 2012), bullet point 1 
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Hidrotambo will block thousands of farmers from water that is essential to their 
livelihoods. The quantity of a private concession that affects the livelihoods of 45,000 
residents, was decided through speculation, that was likely influenced by a vested interest 
in determining high river flow volumes so as to obtain as much water as possible.  
…Once they…build this dam, everything will dry out, even the plants will die…the 
fish…because water won’t flow through the riverbed any longer.   
--Farmer from the region, Recinto Vainillas, April, 2012 
 
Dismal Ecological Flow  
The ecological flow that SENAGUA will require Hidrotambo to leave in the river 
after the diversion point is 196 liters/second. The ecological flow is reserved to provide 
for the ecological health of the waterway. Although it is not accessible for farmers to 
divert and directly use, the ecological flow, if it were sufficient, would have an important 
indirect effect on farmland located by the riverbanks. Water does not stay within the 
confines of the river’s channel and banks; it spreads through capillary action into the 
earth surrounding the river, providing essential moisture for farming activities. The 
section of the river between the diversion point and the point where water is returned to 
the river is lined with farmer’s crops that thrive in the moist soils. Even if the full 
ecological flow remains in the river, the amount of water is not enough to serve the local 
ecosystem or to moisten surrounding soils for farmers. 
The 196 liters per second ecological flow is a miniscule amount of water to cover 
the Dulcepamba’s riverbed and moisten surrounding soils. As engineer and 
environmentalist David Reyes stated, the ecological flow will equal, “mere centimeters 
on the riverbed at certain times of year.”139 Hidrotambo’s EIS cites a study that found that 
22.08 liters per second is an acceptable minimum flow to maintain fish and invertebrate                                                         
139 David Reyes, Interview, Acción Ecológica offices, Quito, Ecuador, Rachel Conrad, December, 2012.  
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species. As a great favor, Hidrotambo goes above and beyond the supposedly acceptable 
minimal flow, and sets aside an environmental flow of 196 liters per second for the 
Dulcepamba River. When closely examined, this quantity is not such a great favor. In the 
Dulcepamba River, which is 130 feet wide, 22.08 liters would leave a barely visible 0.05 
cm layer of moisture on the riverbed.140 The 196-liter per second ecological flow 
provided by Hidrotambo will leave a similarly tiny 0.35cm layer on the riverbed.141 We 
can only imagine a fish trying to swim in water that does not even reach its belly. 
As mentioned above, locals rely on the Dulcepamba River for protein-rich food. 
Fish stocks will be severely affected by the project. Fish may get stuck behind the 8.2 
foot high142 wall that stretches 131.2 feet across the entire river, and even if they do get 
over the wall, they will not be able to survive in the almost dry riverbed that will stretch 
2.7 kilometers143 between the point of water diversion and the point of return.  
Irrigation today, and future needs for water 
For the communities in the watershed, a loss of access to water for irrigation, 
animals, and everyday use has dire consequences today, and likely intensified 
consequences in the next 50 plus years. As described in CONELEC’s report on the 
agency’s visit to San Pablo de Amalí and the surrounding area, “the [inhabitants of the] 
involved areas are clearly agriculturalists, cattle raisers and fish farmers, which means 
that local water supply is fundamental for these activities and for their subsistence…there 
is widespread fear [in the watershed] about access to water, as it is a fundamental element 
needed for the growth and production of crops. The crops are consumed and also sold,                                                         
140 “Fundamentos de rechazo, objeción y desconocimiento al: Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de 
la Central San José del Tambo,” p. 9 
141 Ibid., p. 9 
142 “Ficha tecnica, Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” p. 1 
143 Ibid., p.1 
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providing economic resources that permit [the locals] to subsist….”144 Inhabitants of the 
upper watershed receive much less rainfall than inhabitants of the lower watershed. The 
San Pablo de Atenas meteorlogical station, located at the highest elevation in the 
watershed, receives only 1,280 mm/year of rainfall compared to the San José del Tambo 
meteorological station at the base of the watershed, which receives 2,415 mm of rain per 
year, almost twice as much.145 The low rainfall levels in the upper part of the watershed 
means that farmers have to irrigate, especially in the dry season.146 Farmers near the 
stretch of river that will be dried out by the project’s water diversion will likely need to 
irrigate as well when the project is complete, due to the desiccation of their soils. 
Farmers in the lower part of the watershed whose land is removed from the stretch 
of river that will be dried out will likely not need to irrigate right away when the dam is 
complete, because sufficient moisture from condensation is available in present day 
conditions. It is likely, though, that within the 50 plus years of the concession’s duration, 
irrigation will become a necessity in the lower elevations of the watershed as well. This is 
because of climate change’s effect on the hydrologic cycle. According to the Territorial 
Zoning Plan (PDOT) of Cantón Chillanes for the period 2012 to 2022, “alarming climatic 
phenomena like: frosts, droughts, winds, harsh rain patterns, washouts and large 
landslides, are becoming more and more evident, frequent, and damaging to local 
agriculture, the local economy and even to local survival.”147 Patterns of climate change 
already at play will likely advance in the next 50 years, making the hydrologic cycle 
                                                        
144 Walter Alecón, “Informe Visita San Pablo de Amalí y Sectores Aledaños,” Oficio No. DE-07-0613, 
(CONELEC: 4 de marzo, 2007) 
145 “Estudio de Impacto Ambiental Definitivo de la Central San José del Tambo,” 2004  
146 Visit to the upper part of the watershed, interviews with local farmers, Rachel Conrad, January, 2013.  
147 Esteban Cevallos, “Plan de Desarrollo y Ordenamiento Territorial (PDOT),” (Chillanes, Gobierno 
Autónomo Descentralizado Municipal del Cantón Chillanes, 2012) 
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increasingly unpredictable, and making irrigation necessary as a reliable water source for 
the farming sector. Irrigation will thus likely become a necessity for those who formerly 
relied on cloud/mist condensation and moist soils, and the widespread water privatization 
for Hidrotambo’s dam will render this necessity unrealizable.  
A beguiling tale 
The technical manager of Hidrotambo wove a deceiving and contradictory tale for 
me about the effect of the concession on farmers’ water use and the extent that farmers in 
the region irrigate. He began by denying that there will be any negative effect on farmers’ 
water use due to their hydroelectric project. He tried to distract from the privatization 
with a somewhat logical sounding but deceiving argument: He said,  
Electricity generation doesn’t mean consumption of water. It simply means the 
use of water to generate electricity. The water is taken at one point in the river, 
and it returns to the river some distance down from the point where it was taken, 
with the same volume that was taken. The consumption of water for the 
hydroelectric project is, thus, zero. As there is no consumption, there is no effect 
on the water the people can use.148  
 
Mr. Gordillo was apparently using a lie that many hydroelectric developers in Ecuador 
use in justifying their projects.149 He steered me to the idea that the project does not take 
net water away from the river and is therefore not consumption, while hiding the fact that 
most of the water above the project site will be off limits due to Hidrotambo’s 
privatization. Later in our discussions, Mr. Gordillo contradicted himself and admitted 
that the water in their concession would be off limits to locals, though he falsely claimed 
that some of the water had also been assigned to agriculture.  
 
                                                        
148 Ramiro Gordillo,Technical Manager of Hidrotambo S.A., interview, Rachel Conrad, Cumbaya, 
Ecuador, May 18th, 2012 
149 David Reyes, interview, Rachel Conrad, Quito, Ecuador, December, 2012. 
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When I asked Mr. Gordillo whether people in the watershed irrigate, he denied 
that people irrigate and further stated, once again, that there would be no negative effects 
for agriculture. He explained that, 
[The Dulcepamba] is a river that comes down through a canyon in the 
mountain… to irrigate, [the local farmers] need pump systems, because the water 
is positioned at the bottom of the canyon. The people there don’t use pump 
systems. So, [the river’s] use for irrigation for agriculture is pretty limited…so we 
think that negative effects on this kind of agricultural activities is practically null 
with this hydroelectric project.150  
 
Mr. Gordillo conveniently avoided mentioning that even if not many people use the main 
river for irrigation, they use tributaries to irrigate by way of gravity. Every property I 
visited diverted water from tributaries above them through hoses to supply them for 
cooking, cleaning, showering, drinking water for themselves and their livestock, and in 
the upper part of the watershed, for irrigation. The company will block most of this.  
I asked Mr. Gordillo how it could be that so many farmers live in the watershed 
and none of them irrigate, and only then did he admit that the farmers do irrigate. He said, 
“…the only way that they irrigate is from gravity, without using pumps…they use the 
water from tributaries that are higher in elevation than the riverbed.”151 Knowing full well 
from research and visits to the watershed that Mr. Gordillo’s company would block 
farmers above their dam in the watershed from diverting water from the tributaries, I 
asked Mr. Gordillo, “would there be less water for your hydroelectric project if farmers 
continue to use water from the tributaries?” He said, “probably this would happen.” I 
asked him what his company would do about farmers’ water use, and he then finally 
admitted in part that the watershed’s water is indeed off limits to locals due to 
Hidrotambo’s concession. He said, “There is a national water authority that regulates                                                         
150 Ramiro Gordillo, interview, May 18th, 2012 
151 Ibid., May, 2012 
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water use concessions. So, the hydroelectric has a specific volume of water that this 
authority will allow it to utilize. Thus, it is guaranteed that, that, they [the farmers] won’t 
dry out the river and leave the hydroelectric without water….”152 
There it was. He finally admitted that his company has appropriated local 
farmers’ needed water resources. However, he then went on to warp the picture once 
again by making it appear that SENAGUA (the water authority he mentioned) has 
assigned’ a volume of water to community members, too, in some sort of ‘compromise.’ 
He said, “…There has to be a compromise between agriculture and hydroelectricity 
generation… each one of us has to stick to the volume of water that the authorities have 
assigned us.”153 There are a few farmers who have received concessions to water in the 
watershed, but they add up to less than 500 liters (half of a cubic meter)154, which equals 
about 2.6 standard sized bathtubs, filled to the brim. There is no compromise here 
between agriculture and hydroelectricity. 
Finally, I asked Mr. Gordillo if there is enough water to share between farmers 
and the hydroelectric, and he replied confidently, “At the moment, of course! There is 
excess.” Then, with much less confidence the second time, “At the moment, yes.”155 In 
2007, at a community meeting with the provincial governor, a farmer expressed her anger 
at the true implications of Hidrotambo’s concession. She said, “they’ve awarded 
[Hidrotambo] the waters, all the way from the headwaters. They’re the owners of our 
water, Mrs. Governor! And what do our people live from in the highlands? Irrigating 
their crops during the summer! And what will the famous Hidrotambo do? During the                                                         
152Ibid., May, 2012 
153Ibid., May, 2012 
154 “Inventario participativo de recursos hídricos” (Quito: SENAGUA) http://www.agua.gob.ec/inventario-
participativo-de-los-recursos-hidricos/ 
155 Ramiro Gordillo, interview, May 18th, 2012 
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dry season, they’re going to say: Don’t touch even a drop of my water! Because I need 
water to move my turbines! And, where will the displaced go? Will they be cast to the 
four winds?”156 There is not enough water to share. 
To redeem his project’s beneficial nature after admitting that it would deny 
thousands of farmers water, Hidrotambo’s manager perverted the idea of food 
sovereignty to mean growth in agro-industry, and thereby claimed that the hydro project 
was a necessity for “food sovereignty” and development. He said, “…to achieve food 
sovereignty, we need to generate a strong agricultural/animal production industry. This 
industry needs energy. If there is no energy, this industry cannot develop…in [the San 
José del Tambo] region, agro-industry doesn’t exist. There are small landowners, and 
small pieces of land that produce what they can.” I asked him, “but isn’t that more 
sustainable than large production?” and he replied, “No. In the industrialized countries, 
agriculture is an industry…if it’s not industry, it doesn’t work…that industry needs 
energy…without energy there is no development…a country that cannot increase its 
energy consumption will not develop….”157  
“Food sovereignty” as it is defined in the Ecuadorian Constitution supports small-
scale farming that is not energy intensive, and supports the very communities hurt by the 
logic of industrial development at all costs. Much of the agro-industry in Ecuador 
produces crops for export (bananas, coffee, etc) and therefore does not contribute 
whatsoever to food sovereignty. Mr. Gordillo perverted the concept of food sovereignty 
to justify an assault on the viability of true food sovereignty in the breadbasket of the 
country, all in the name of western-style industrial development.                                                         
156 Local farmer, meeting with the governor of Bolívar, archival footage, February 28, 2007. 
157 Interview with Ramiro Gordillo, May 18th, 2012 
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Farmers already blocked from water use  
Even though the dam is not yet operating and thus the company does not need any 
water yet, Hidrotambo and their government backers are exercising their power by 
blocking access to the Dulcepamba River. As early as 2008, people from both the upper 
and lower parts of the watershed complained of being blocked from water use by 
“Hidrotambo and their representatives.”158 A local farmer told the Universo newspaper in 
November 2012, “We can’t even go to the river anymore to collect water, to fish, to bathe 
ourselves, because the policemen pursue us from the other side of the river.”159 Other 
testimonies revealed that company officials and SENAGUA officials have also blocked 
farmers’ access to the water recently.160  
In a further illustration of SENAGUA’s disregard for local farmers, local 
individuals and groups have applied for small water use concessions since Hidrotambo 
received their concession, and have either been denied or left waiting. A small primary 
school on the southern side of the river located below the dam applied for a concession 
from SENAGUA for a small quantity of water for their school’s basic needs. The school 
would not take any water away from Hidrotambo’s turbines, as it is located below the 
point where water is returned to the river, but even so they were denied access to water. 
Another local farmer applied for a concession to water and has not yet heard back from 
SENAGUA.161 We can only hope that he will be granted his basic right. 
 
                                                         
158 “Amparo constitucional, proyecto San José del Tambo,” (esfuerzo colectivo: 2007), p. 4 
159 “Construcción de hidroeléctrica enfrenta a comuneros y empresa,” (San Pablo de Amalí, Bolivar: El 
Universo, 25 de noviembre, 2012), http://www.eluniverso.com/2012/11/25/1/1447/construccion-
hidroelectrica-enfrenta-comuneros-empresa.html 
160 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación  
de los Derechos Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p.17 
161 Interview with local farmer, San Pablo de Amalí, Bolívar, Ecuador, Rachel Conrad, January, 2013 
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Water is not a ‘resource.’ Water is not a ‘commodity.’  
Water is the universal source of life. 
--Campesinos struggling to protect their land and water from plunder by transnational 
mining companies in Intag, Ecuador  
 
A local farmer exclaimed to me when I asked him about the concession, “…they 
tell us that nothing will happen, that the water is going to stay right where it is, that 
they’re not going to take anything, but this is bogus propaganda. They don’t even want to 
give us… the adjudications of water for irrigation. And…to benefit a handful of 
investors, thousands of people will suffer.”162 The deeply intertwined social and 
environmental impacts of this hydraulic concession are far-reaching, long lasting, and 
glaringly unjust. An environmental psychologist from Acción Ecológica commented, 
“The scarcity of water provoked by this type of project can make a community’s farming 
activities unviable, and it can even cause a community to be forced to leave their lands. It 
is not a surprise then, that the defense of water is implicitly tied to defense of land, 
territory, cultural identity, and life itself.”163 The locals, whose uses legally trump 
hydroelectric water use, have been denied water concessions for themselves, and virtually 
all of the water has been given to a last priority user.  
A trend of displacement and urban poverty 
The Dulcepamba farmers operate mainly outside of the monetary system, and thus 
even if Hidrotambo’s privatized water were made available to them through sale from the 
company, farmers could not pay for it. As a community leader said in a meeting with the 
Ministry of Defense, “We need the water to survive! If we don’t work the land, what will 
we eat? We don’t have any other lifeline. We don’t earn a salary, we don’t have 
                                                        
162 Interview with a farmer from the region, San Pablo de Amalí, Bolívar, Rachel Conrad, April, 2012.  
163 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p. 14 
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insurance…what will we live off of if and when they build this stupid project?”164 The 
mayor of Chillanes expanded on the vicious cycle created by water privatization. He said, 
“the businessmen, they’ll keep benefitting from the water free of cost, for many years, 
and we will have to cross our arms and…let Hidrotambo utilize the water and-and see 
how they create hydroelectric energy and sell it back to us. In this cycle, how are we 
going to pay for energy if our fields don’t produce anymore? How can we pay for 
electricity service if our families won’t even be able to live here anymore?”165  
Hidrotambo and their government supporters have set the Dulcepamba watershed 
communities on a path towards urbanization that many rural campesino and indigenous 
communities are treading due to the commodification of nature in the name of 
development. The Permanent Working Group on Alternatives to Development pointed 
out in a 2012 report that, “The consequences of this capitalist assault on the last lands on 
Earth where people still subsist outside of the logic of unlimited accumulation, is felt the 
most in the peripheral regions of the world. It is there where the campesinos that have 
been expelled from their lands, now destined for more “profitable” uses, pass directly to 
urban poverty or indigence. And it is there where an increase in the price of basic foods 
translates immediately to hunger.”166 A rural lifestyle in which basic needs are satisfied 
becomes an urban lifestyle where the water and land that provides for those basic needs is 
nowhere to be found.  
Millionaire business people 
Who is behind this water grab, and do they need the water as much as the 
Dulcepamba watershed’s farmers? A local farmer exclaimed to the governor of Bolívar in                                                         
164 Farmer from the region, meeting with the Ministry of Defense, archival footage, 2007 
165 Interview with Ramiro Trujillo, mayor of Cantón Chillanes, Rachel Conrad, Bolívar, April, 2012 
166 “Más Allá del Desarrollo,” Noviembre, 2011 
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a meeting, “Unfortunately, we are in a world where the small farmers, just because they 
are farmers, have always been stepped on. And all for money… for these millionaire 
businessmen. To the disadvantage of-of thousands of farmers.”167 The first of 
Hidrotambo’s so-called millionaire investors is a multinational company based in Spain 
called Ingehydro S.L., subsidiary to Ingeteam Corporation S.A. Ingeteam S.A. is an 
electrical components company that specializes in electrical engineering and the 
development of electrical equipment, motors, generators and frequency converters, 
serving the energy, industrial, marine, and rail traction sectors across the globe. 
Ingehydro contributes ten percent to the group’s hydroelectric investment.168 The second 
investor is Ecoluz Canada Inc., a Canadian electric services company that provides 
investment services to an abundance of ventures. At the time when Hidrotambo formed, 
Ecoluz Canada Inc. was actually Electrogen S.A., an Ecuadorian owner and operator of 
multiple hydroelectric plants. Ecoluz Canada Inc. gained a majority interest in Electrogen 
S.A., on August 15, 2012.169 Ecoluz Canada contributes 30 percent of Hidrotambo’s 
hydroelectric investment. Interestingly, in an April 2012 interview, Hidrotambo’s 
technical manager did not include Electrogen when he listed the investors, but he did say 
that one of the investors is, “an importer of General Motors cars….”170 It is still a mystery 
who this car importer is, and what their share is in the company. The third known 
investor in this joint venture is Plasticaucho Industrial S.A., a large, private Ecuadorian 
rubber and plastics footwear manufacturing company, the largest company in Ecuador in                                                         
167 Local farmer, meeting with the governor of Bolívar, donated archival footage, February 28, 2007. 
168 Reyes, David. “Informe sobre el proyecto de la central hidroeléctrica en San José del Tambo Canton 
Chillanes Provincia Bolívar.” (Quito: Acción Ecológica, June, 2012), p. 9 
169 “Electrogen S.A., Ecoluz Canada Inc., Deal No. 2447609040,” Securities Data Company Worldwide 
Mergers & Acquisitions - Comprehensive Transaction Report, (Thomson Information Services Inc. 
August 15, 2012) 
170 Interview with Ramiro Gordillo, May 18th, 2012 
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their field and an exporter of footwear to Colombia and Peru.171 Plasticaucho contributes 
30 percent of the joint venture’s investments. These ‘millionaires’ all have established 
businesses with diverse investments and ventures. None of the companies or their 
executives will put their very survival and wellbeing at risk if they lose access to the 
Dulcepamba watershed’s waters, so why should they profit from the water while 
thousands who truly depend on the water struggle to avoid misery given the loss of their 
lifeblood?  
Violations of procedures and rights 
A project which is so fundamentally unfair and abhorrent to the basic values of 
the Ecuadorean constitution could only gain approval and proceed through a host of 
violations of law, the Ecuadorean Constitution, and basic human rights, and that certainly 
has been the case here. Helped along by government officials who are thoroughly 
supportive of hydroelectric energy projects, Hidrotambo has run crashing through the 
procedural process for their project, cutting corners all the way without even a finger 
wagging from the responsible agencies. The company’s hydroelectric contract, their EIS 
and environmental license, and their prior consultation process are replete with 
procedural violations and illegalities, and they have violated many laws and rights.  
To start with, in the hydroelectric contract, Hidrotambo and CONELEC used 
population data on the Dulcepamba watershed from the 1990 census instead of the most 
updated census (2006), and in doing so the watershed’s true population and therefore the 
extent of human impacts from the San José del Tambo project were minimized. The 
contract states that the watershed has a population density of approximately 35 
                                                        
171 Information from company website, and interview with Ramiro Gordillo, May 18th, 2012.   
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inhabitants per square kilometer, which translates to a total of 13,825 inhabitants.172 As 
cited above, the true population as confirmed by the National Institute of Statistics and 
the Census (INEC)173, is approximately 45,000. By omitting 31,000 people from 
consideration as affected residents, Hidrotambo and CONELEC minimized the serious 
human impact of their project. 
Illegal EIS and Environmental License  
Hidrotambo received their environmental license174 on September 30th, 2005, 
signaling the approval of their Environmental Impact Study and the go-ahead to construct 
and operate their project. They received a second environmental license on February 8th 
of 2006175 for the transmission line that will interconnect the San José del Tambo project 
with the CEDEGE electric substation, owned by EMELRIOS S. A. Hidrotambo’s 
environmental impact study seems to describe an entirely different project from what is 
actually being constructed. But despite countless discrepancies, the document was 
welcomed into the fold of shady Environmental Impact Studies with open arms.  
To highlight a few of the inaccuracies, the EIS talks about the company doing, “a 
light clipping of the groundcover” but they have already left a much more violent mark 
on the landscape. They have deforested large areas and butchered other trees. Also, they 
have entered private property with heavy machinery, flattening crops. They have left 
behind cement pillars and holes made by dynamite that was exploded on these properties                                                         
172 “Amparo constitucional, proyecto San José del Tambo,” (comuneros de  San Pablo de Amalí) 2007, p. 4 
173 OFICIO Nro. 160 MV-0603, (Quito: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos-INEC, 6 de junio, 
2006) 
174 Espinoza Díaz et al, “Registro oficial 4 de noviembre, 2005,” Aprobación de la Licensia Ambiental No. 
004/005 del hidroeléctrico San josé del Tambo, (Tribunal Constitucional: 4 de noviembre, 2005) 
http://www.derechoecuador.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1598#anchor243382  
175 Javier Astudillo Farah, “Aprobación de la Licensia Ambiental No. 001/06, para la construcción y 
operación del Proyecto de L/T que interconectará la futura Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo 
con la S/E CEDEGE en operación de EMELRIOS S. A.,” (Tribunal Constitucional: 2006) 
http://www.derechoecuador.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=480#anchor406363  
89  
without permission from the property owners or related authorities, and without the 
necessary transit easement and other legal documents.176Additionally, the Study affirms 
that it will use the flows of the Dulcepamba River, but it does not recognize that the 
Dulcepamba is formed by the waters of the Salungiri and Limón del Carmen rivers, 
which in turn collect water from all of the tributaries in the upper watershed. This 
convenient omission steers the reader away from the company’s appropriation of an 
entire watershed’s waters. Regarding wildlife, the EIS is similarly ridiculous in its 
assertions. As mentioned above in the discussion of the ecological flow, fish will not 
survive the almost dry riverbed past the diversion. These are just some of the EIS’s 
convenient omissions and inaccuracies.  
Prior consultation process violated  
 As part of the Environmental Impact Study, Hidrotambo is obligated to consult 
the local community, and then to report on the citizen participation that occurred. 
Hidrotambo advertised meetings with the affected communities in the newspapers, as the 
law demands, but instead of advertising in newspapers that locals might read (La Tribuna 
of San José del Tambo, El Vocero de Bolívar, el Amigo del Hogar)177, they put their 
announcements in newspapers178 that locals had never heard of179—which belong to other 
provinces. Therefore, very few people got word of the prior consultation meeting, and 
those who did attend were residents of distant communities that will not be affected by 
the dam.180 A local community member who did attend alleges that these non-local                                                         
176 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p.9 
177 Farmers from the region, meeting with the Ministry of Defense, archival footage, 2007 
178 The Bugle of Los Ríos province, the Andes newspaper of Riobamba province.  
179 “Amparo constitucional, proyecto San José del Tambo, 2007,” p. 11 
180 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p. 5 
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attendees were brought in by the company to create the appearance of citizen 
participation.181  
Overall, in this meeting and at other times, Hidrotambo received signatures 
approving the project from less that half a percent the population of the area.182 
Signatures at the meeting were obtained underhandedly by Hidrotambo officials telling 
attendees that they were “just taking attendance,”183 not that they were asking for 
approval for their project. None of the signatures came from the most affected 
community, San Pablo de Amalí. Additionally, neither representatives from CONELEC 
nor the Ministry of the Environment attended the prior consultation meeting, as the law 
requires.184 A frustrated farmer from San Pablo de Amalí laid out the problem at a 
meeting with the Ministry of Defense: “They want to build the dam here without anyone 
even realizing what’s happening! If there isn’t citizen participation, this project will be a 
failure. I’m telling you. This [lack of citizen participation] is the worst error, what costs 
us so much suffering, so much fighting, and even the lives of many people.”185 Prior 
consultation is a right in the Ecuadorian Constitution, one that has been repeatedly 
violated by the Alianza PAIS government as they fervently implement their extractivist 
agenda on campesino and indigenous lands.  
Land expropriation and private property violations  
Many families’ properties and crops have been and/or will be damaged by actual 
incursion on their land by the San José del Tambo project. Machinery has gone 164 feet                                                         
181 Local farmer, community meeting with Ministry of Defense, donated footage, San Pablo de Amalí,  
2007 
182 “Represados documentary with English subtitles,” Acción Ecológica, (Quito: Youtube, minute 00:43 of 
part 3, donated archival footage, 2007) 
183 Amparo constitucional, proyecto San José del Tambo, 2007, p. 10 
184 Ibid., p. 10 
185 Farmer from the region, meeting with the Ministry of Defense, archival footage, 2007 
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into one resident’s land to dig a canal that will bring water from the river to the holding 
tank.186 The tubing for the project will pass directly through the houses of two other 
individuals, and as such their houses will likely be razed. Neither of these two residents 
have even been included in legal expropriation proceedings, and another individual 
whose land has been affected is not included either.187 There has been no fair process for 
any of the affected individuals. Hidrotambo has applied for the expropriation of some of 
these properties in court. If the land is indeed expropriated by the court, it will be 
declared land for “public utility” to benefit the project.188 To date none of the judicial 
proceedings have been concluded. Despite not having any authority to enter property that 
still belongs to the local farmers, Hidrotambo’s construction crews have trespassed many 
times with heavy machinery and caused significant damage to farmers’ crops and lands.  
As with other aspects of the project, the company has spread misinformation- in 
this case, in order to advance the expropriations. Hidrotambo offered $50,000 in 
compensation to a man who, after accepting, found out the offer referred to sucres rather 
than dollars.189 Sucres became obsolete in Ecuador in 2000 when dollarization occurred, 
as described in Chapter 1. They have no value. A community member expressed his 
anger at such injustice: “We haven’t sold anything to them…and they haven’t even paid 
us a cent, and…they come through with their machines, breaking-toppling, plots of 
cacao, orange and plantain groves, everything, to the ground.”190  
 
                                                        
186 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p. 9 
187 Ibid., p. 9 
188 Ibid., p. 9 
189 Interview with farmer from the region, Rachel Conrad, January 17th, 2013. 
190 Interview with farmer from the region, Recinto Vainillas, Rachel Conrad, April, 2012. 
92  
Army incursion, Human Rights violations 
The most visible and cruel manifestations of the San José del Tambo project are 
violent human rights violations perpetrated by the Ecuadorian Army and the National 
Police. In October 2006, Hidrotambo contracted the Army Corps of Engineers of 
Ecuador, a government agency, which is part of the army, to construct their hydroelectric 
project, for $4,383,730.52.191 Little did the locals know that the army part of this 
institution would be expressed to a much greater extent than the engineer part. From late 
2006 until 2008, people living in and around San Pablo de Amalí experienced multiple 
forms of military repression on a regular basis, experiences that left them with deep 
physical and psychological scars. When the Army Corps of Engineers found that locals 
would not simply stand there and let their livelihoods slip away, they called in their 
colleagues in the Armed Forces to strong-arm the peaceful protestors. The soldiers 
violated private property rights and other basic human rights as they barged into houses, 
tear-gassed, shot, physically violated, and robbed the locals.  
A community leader expressed, “They certainly came in with all of the necessary 
force, including bombarding the houses of the community leaders, the school, everyone 
here…they would come here to the community every other afternoon.”192 Another 
individual said at a meeting in 2007, “They even enter into our houses!...they enter into 
the houses to assault us … They assaulted me!”193 Another man explained to a Ministry 
of Defense official in 2007, “…50 soldiers, they entered my brother’s house. I have the 
police report here…then, they start to-to intimidate my brother, to put the gun right here 
                                                        
191 “Contrato de construcción: Hidrotambo S.A. y el Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Ejército,” (Quito: 16 de 
octubre, 2006) 
192 Interview with farmer from the region, San Pablo de Amalí, Rachel Conrad, April, 2012 
193 Community member, donated archival footage, San Pablo de Amalí, 2007 
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[pointing to his neck]…. And they even throw tear gas cans inside the house. And, they 
take $7,000.194 They take this money, and also, they grab an 18-month-old child, also in 
the police report, and they hit him. They scratch his face, and then they go and throw him 
in a mud puddle in front of my other brother’s house.”195 
The Armed Forces used tear gas and rubber bullets multiple times when 
confronted by community members who demanded that they leave the area. Two men 
were shot in the face and they each lost vision in one eye. One of those men also lost a 
kidney. Others suffered serious bullet wounds as well. The Ecuadorian Institute for 
Children and Families (INNFA) came to San Pablo de Amalí to investigate the military 
aggression and reported that the Armed Forces would set up checkpoints where local 
children picked up a bus to school, and they would search the children for weapons. The 
report stated that the children are, “blocked by the soldiers who search all of the people 
there, including the little girls, and they touch all parts of their bodies…”196 Alfredo 
Palacio was president at the time the Armed Forces were present in the Dulcepamba 
watershed, and as commander-in chief, he is complicit in the repressive acts. 
 
                                                        
194 “Agresión en la propiedad privada,” Informe de la policiá nacional del Ecuador, servicio rural, Bolívar 
no. 11, (Bolívar: Policía Nacional, 23 de enero, 2006) 
195 Community member, donated archival footage, San Pablo de Amalí, 2007 
196 “Represados documentary with English subtitles” (Quito: Acción Ecológica, Youtube, part 3, donated 
archival footage, 2007) 
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Figure 4­“Campesinos organized in defense of our lands­NO to extractivism! San Pablo de Amalí, 
Photo source: el Universo, 2012 
Resistance period 1: 2003 to 2008  
 From the beginning, when residents of the watershed learned that a hydroelectric 
dam would block their water use and dry out part of their river, they worked tirelessly to 
organize peaceful resistance to the project. Resistance has been primarily carried out by 
the community of San Pablo de Amalí, although people from other communities in the 
watershed are actively involved in direct action, court cases, and political advocacy as 
well. This is partly because the effects of the project are the most visually and physically 
obvious to people living in or around San Pablo de Amalí. The project construction is 
either constantly visible or actually on their land, and the majority of project-related 
violence has been committed against community members from San Pablo. While 
residents of the watershed have been blocked from water use, this is not a common 
occasion (as there is no reason for Hidrotambo to block use before completing their 
project) and therefore the effects of water privatization are not yet widespread. Thus, 
although many people in the rest of the watershed know that their water is at risk, they do 
not feel as much urgency to act as San Pablo residents feel.   
Direct action  
Direct action, combined with political advocacy, resulted in temporary successes 
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for the Dulcepamba campesinos, although only after several years of periodic physical 
and psychological assault. Resistance at every step of the way prevented the project 
construction from advancing. In February of 2006, the first company contracted by 
Hidrotambo to build the project, Coandes, tried to start construction, and was blocked by 
one hundred campesinos who prevented their machinery from entering the project site.197 
One amazingly inspiring woman has been instrumental in spreading information to the 
rest of the watershed about the issue, and due to her organizing efforts, a determined 
group of women from throughout the watershed created a network of communication to 
organize road blockages whenever the construction company tried to enter their lands.198 
She told me with tears in her eyes, “I was the person who united these 72 communities. I 
am proud to have done so…. [This situation] definitely saddens me…because they have 
really made us suffer…”199 Numerous community members were subjected to judicial 
proceedings for their peaceful resistance.200  
After continued opposition from the communities, construction activities were 
suspended in April of the same year.201 Hopes that threats to their lands and water access 
were over were dashed in October of 2006 when, as described above, Hidrotambo 
employed an intimidating and violent contractor, the Army Corps of Engineers, to push 
the project through in the face of opposition. Continued participation in direct action took 
immense bravery on the part of local campesinos, because, after the Army Corps became 
involved, protest was answered with aggression (described above) and further judicial                                                         
197 “Afectación Ambiental y Socioeconómica de la Construcción de una Central Hidroeléctrica en la Zona 
de Impacto:El Caso del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico Angamarca” p. 62 
198 Interview with farmer from the region, Recinto Vainillas, Rachel Conrad, April, 2012 
199 Interview with local farmer, San José del Tambo, Rachel Conrad, video recording, April 2013 
200 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza”, p. 6 
201 Ibid., p. 4 
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actions. Several leaders were temporarily detained for “rebellion and other crimes.202” 
With hopes of greater success in court than they had had through direct action, 
community members brought several cases against the company. In November of 2004, 
they brought the first case to Court 20 in Quito against the project. The case was lost. 
Those affected next took their case to the Constitutional Court in 2007, where they used 
the writ of amparo203 (a remedy for the protection of constitutional rights) to address 
rights violated by the project proponents. They lost in Constitutional court as well. 
After repeated losses in Court, community members filed complaints with 
government ministries, and met with many public officials—including the mayor of 
Bolívar, representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Public Defender, the 
Ecuadorian Institute for Children and Families (INNFA), and others, to advocated for 
recognition of their violated rights.  
A long-awaited victory? 
Despite losses in court, the affected communities’ constant opposition and 
political advocacy was finally heard and acted upon, just around the time that president 
Correa came into office and the country was ‘re-founded’ with Constitutionally expressed 
values of greater community participation in local resource management. It seemed that 
the new articulation of values, rights, and participation in Ecuador would pave the way to 
a more peaceful future in the Dulcepamba watershed. The Armed Forces were expelled 
from the region, by the Ministry of Defense in 2008204 and the San José del Tambo 
project was suspended that same year. Hidrotambo asked CONELEC to end their 
                                                        
202 Ibid., p. 6 
203 Art. 95 of the 1998 Constitution, in agreement with article 46 of the Organic Law of Constitutional 
Control 
204 “Construcción de hidroeléctrica enfrenta a comuneros y empresa,” 2012 
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hydroelectric generation contract, as they were not going to continue construction. The 
Chamber of Commerce of Quito carried out an arbitration and mediation process, which 
finally resulted in the annulment of the contract in 2011.205 The National Constituent 
Assembly granted general amnesty in March and July of 2008 to those people in the 
watershed who had been criminalized,206 in order “…to rectify judicial errors and unjust 
sanctions faced by innocent and politically persecuted people…” who had protested 
against projects and state policies that affect natural resources.207 Peace returned to the 
quiet towns that dot the Dulcepamba watershed. For several years, farmers, animals, 
rivers, crops, and the forest coexisted once again in an ancestral equilibrium. Annual 
Carnaval celebrations during those years were celebrated with extra spirit and unity, and 
a CD was released that featured songs of resistance to Hidrotambo, placing the 
Dulcepamba communities’ struggles in the annals of history to inspire others to resist. 
Back with no shame 
However, a land with so much flowing water could not just be left alone by a 
company blind to the ultimate importance of human dignity. Hidrotambo’s proponents in 
Quito pulled themselves up once again, motivated by visions of income, progress, 
development, and success borne on the wind from the distant Dulcepamba watershed. 
They returned to their friendly government compadres in 2012 to ask for another chance 
to exploit the watershed. The newly articulated values of the Ecuadorian state were 
fundamentally betrayed when, on March 8, 2012,208 Hidrotambo’s hydroelectric contract 
                                                        
205 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza” p.6 
206 Ibid., p. 6 
207 “So that no one can demand anything' criminalizing the right to protest in Ecuador?,” 2012 
208 Trujillo, Manuel et al. “Petición al Sr. presidente constitucional de la república Rafael Correa Delgado. 
(Quito: 9 de Julio, 2012).  
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was renewed by CONELEC, and the company wasted no time in hiring a new 
construction company and finding new men with guns to play the repressive role that the 
Army had played before. Their new constructor is Daimi Ecuador, S.A., and their new 
men with guns are the National Police. The new timeline for operation, laid out in the 
contract, leaves a year for construction of the civil works (between June, 2012 and July, 
2013), designates July 1st, 2013 for the start of electromechanical equipment tests, and 
October 1st, 2013 as the initiation of commercial operation.209  
Paradoxically, President Correa actually campaigned on the promise that local 
communities must be the ultimate decisionmakers when it comes to the San José del 
Tambo project. In a visit to San Pablo de Amalí in 2006 while on the campaign trail, he 
planted hope in the hearts of worried community members. 
I just want to say to you all one final thing…” he said, “…about this 
Hidrotambo issue. About the problem of hydraulic concessions. First, 
water will not be privatized! Water is a public resource, for all 
Ecuadorians, above all for the poorest people: the campesinos. Our 
government will never allow water to be privatized! And with respect to 
the Hidrotambo dam, we believe, ladies and gentlemen, that those who 
should approve these kinds of projects are you, the affected communities. 
Because it is you who have the right to approve a hydroelectric plant, on 
your land, affecting your environment. If you say NO! to this project, the 
project will not be built! If you give it your approval because you are the 
ones in control, well, in that case it’ll be built.210 
 
But since his time on the campaign trail, President Correa’s views on water privatization 
and his openness to true citizen participation have diminished greatly. 
Illegal contract renewal and prior consultation 
 As stated in a report written by the Ecuadorian NGO Acción Ecológica in June of 
2012, the new contract is, in fact, illegal. A new and different contract like the one that                                                         
209 “Contrato de Permiso de Generación para la Construcción, Instalación y Operación del Proyecto 
Hidroeléctrico San José del Tambo”, (CONELEC: 8 de marzo del 2012) 
210 Campaign speech, president Rafael Correa, archived footage, 2006 
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Hidrotambo has received is not permitted unless accompanied by an updated 
environmental impact study and a new environmental license. Neither of these documents 
have been updated or revised.211 Also, the company requested that their 50-year 
hydroelectric generation contract be extended to “the duration of the useful life of the 
project.”212 The law clearly states that a contract of this length is illegal, and even so their 
request was granted by CONELEC. Regulation number 003-11, issued by CONELEC 
and approved on April 14th, 2011, states that 5 to 10 MW private hydroelectric generation 
projects can receive a generation contract for anywhere between 23 and 40 years, but no 
longer.213 Furthermore, all of the illegalities and inaccuracies related with the previous 
contract still apply.  
In addition to acquiring an illegal contract, Hidrotambo once again violated the 
prior consultation process. The company returned to the watershed on March 24th, 2012 
to carry out a required community consultation in which they would present their new 
contract. The director of CONELEC, other public institutions, as well as representatives 
from Hidrotambo,214 arrived with police protection and a group of approximately 30 
individuals from far away communities. Just as was done years before, the individuals 
from distant communities participated in the meeting to create an appearance of 
‘socialization’ and citizen participation. No residents of San Pablo de Amalí participated. 
                                                        
211 David Reyes, “Informe sobre el proyecto de la central hidroeléctrica en San José del Tambo Canton 
Chillanes Provincia Bolívar,” Junio, 2012, bullet point 3 y “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central 
Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p. 8 
212 “Informe sobre el proyecto de la central hidroeléctrica en San José del Tambo Canton Chillanes 
Provincia Bolívar,” p.15 
213 “Contrato de Permiso de Generación para la Construcción, Instalación y Operación del Proyecto 
Hidroeléctrico San José del Tambo,” 2012 
214 Besides representatives from CONELEC and Hidrotambo, Paola Marola Andino Alarcón, Head of the 
Environmental Unit, Ángel Olivio Bayas Durán, Governor of Bolívar province, Javier Horacio Valencia 
Zambrano, Community Subsecretary of Water, and Daniel Orlando Villacís Chávez, Leader of CZ-
Guaranda Senagua (source: Comisión de Paz y Verificación para el caso San Pablo de Amalí, 2013) 
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The people from other communities began to yell offensive words at the San Pablo de 
Amalí locals, accompanied by cheers in favor of the company.215 President Correa has 
not responded to letters explaining these blatant violations of prior consultation.   
 
Violations of the Constitution and international human rights over nine years 
 At every step of the way, Hidrotambo has taken national and international Human 
Rights as well as the Rights of Nature to be akin to recommendations which they can 
chose not to follow, and their resulting misconduct has for the most part been allowed or 
even rewarded by an increasingly extractivist-minded government. Beyond the Right to 
Prior Consultation, the company has allegedly violated Property Rights, the Human Right 
to Water, the Rights of Nature, and the Right to Soberanía Alimentaria and Sumak 
Kawsay, among others.    
Water law  
Hidrotambo has violated Ecuadorian water law in several ways over the past nine 
years. When the project was initiated (in 2003), water law in Ecuador was decidedly 
different than it is today, as is described in Chapter 1. The privatization of water was not 
explicitly banned as it is today, and the pursuit Food Sovereignty was not included in 
water use priorities. At that time, the project proponents should have complied with the 
priorities set out by the Water Law (established in 1972), which gives first priority to 
human use.216 They were also obligated to comply with requirements related to the water 
concession, including prior consultation. As outlined above, neither were priority use                                                         
215 Letter sent on May 4th, 2012 by the San Pablo de Amalí community organization to president Rafael 
Correa. 
216 “Título IV: De los Usos de Aguas y Prelación, Artículo 34,” Ley de Aguas: Número 369, General 
Guillermo Rodrigo Lara, Presidente de la República,  
http://www.oas.org/usde/environmentlaw/waterlaw/documents/Ecuador-Ley_de_Agua_(1972).pdf p. 49 
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rights for water respected nor was prior consultation carried out.  
New contract, new laws 
Parties involved in the newly initiated San José del Tambo project (Hidrotambo 
S.A., CONELEC, SENAGUA, and the Ministry of the Environment), must conform to 
the new laws, rights, and procedures established with the ‘refounding’ of Ecuador in 
2008. By signing a new contract in 2012, both Hidrotambo and CONELEC have the 
responsibility to comply with the new water laws in which the privatization of water is 
explicitly banned and communities like those in the Dulcepamba watershed, part of “the 
bread basket of Ecuador,” are especially prioritized for water use rights because they 
contribute significantly to the country’s Food Sovereignty.  
The San José del Tambo hydroelectric project has been justified as essential on 
the path to energy sovereignty—a strategic goal laid out in the 2008 constitution that is 
seen as a building block for development. However, the idea inherent in this justification, 
that energy sovereignty somehow trumps the human right to water, is fundamentally 
flawed when the constitution is viewed as a whole. Article 15 of the 2008 Constitution 
states, after discussing clean energy projects, that, “Energy sovereignty shall not be 
achieved to the detriment of food sovereignty nor shall it affect the right to water.”217An 
industrial project that will block access to water for 72 farming communities in my 
opinion infringes upon both food sovereignty and the right to water. 
 Sumak Kawsay 
Hidrotambo must also now respect the right to Sumak Kawsay and the Rights of 
Nature, something the company has utterly failed to go given the extractive nature of 
their project. Have residents of San Pablo de Amalí been able to live the Good Way of                                                         
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Living, in harmony with Nature, in the face of repression, community division, and the 
appropriation of their life-sustaining resources? And what about the many other 
communities in the watershed, especially those located in the upper watershed who will 
lose access to water for drinking, cooking, cleaning, animals, and irrigation that is all 
essential to their wellbeing? Will Nature be respected in a dried out river where aquatic 
creatures will meet their graves, or on lands deforested for the construction of a canal, 
tubing, a machine house, access roads, and more? Hidrotambo has ignored the re-
articulation of values and laws held in the new Constitution, as have their government 
supporters, in the Dulcepamba watershed and across the country. 
Police Bullying, Criminalization, and Intimidation 
 Since the 2012 renewal of Hidrotambo’s contract, the marriage between company 
and state has become more pronounced, in contrast to the earlier period immediately 
following the new Constitution when the government expelled the Army, supported the 
cancellation of the project, and granted amnesty to those who had participated in protests. 
Now, while the project is still officially a private venture, National Police and 
government officials have actively supported the project through violence, intimidation 
and the use of divisive tactics. Since March of 2012, the National Police have 
accompanied constructors, company employees, and government officials onto 
community lands as they attempt to advance the building process. The police have 
arbitrarily detained farmers, committed physical aggression, and made threats to locals, 
all in order to protect the company’s aspirations. The judiciary has also upheld the 
company/state interests in hydroelectric power by supporting the illegitimate 
criminalization of even more project opponents than were criminalized in the years of the 
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Army Corps and the first contract. Government officials have intimidated locals and 
spread rumors and discord among the communities. Effective protest has been stifled by 
this tightening and perverse public-private alliance: anyone who speaks their mind is 
either ignored, injured, criminalized, or a combination of the three.  
On July 11th, 2012, Hidrotambo’s machinery together with dozens of police 
entered the construction areas, destroying several families’ crops and threatening locals. 
The machinery approached a 72-year-old woman’s house with the intention of flattening 
her home in order to clear the way for tubing. The woman stood in front of the machinery 
to save her home. A group of police surrounded her and her handicapped son, and began 
to hurt them both, physically and with verbal intimidation.218 Several community 
members ran to help them, which led to confrontations with the police that left several 
people injured. One 14-year old boy filmed the incident on his cell phone, and was 
injured and yelled at by the policemen for doing so.219 Heavy machinery destroyed part 
of the elderly woman’s crops on this day as well.220  
The community reported this and other police aggressions to the Inspector 
General of the National Police,221 and the Ministry of the Interior ordered the National 
Police headquarters to send a commission to investigate. Hours before the commission 
arrived, a group of police and company workers traversed the watershed and physically 
and verbally attacked its residents. When people defended themselves, the police used 
tear gas on them, and continued on to destroy a bridge that the community uses to cross 
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the Dulcepamba River.222 When the investigative commission finally arrived, community 
members from the whole watershed were gathered to describe the aggressions, but the 
commission only interviewed Hidrotambo’s personnel. Locals were instead asked to give 
their testimonies to a policeman of all people, and to an assemblyman who is part of the 
Alianza PAIS party. The Mayor of Chillanes wanted to provide testimony as well, as he 
had observed some of the police aggression, but was not given the chance at this time 
either.223 No redress for police brutality has resulted from the commission’s investigation. 
On October 29th, 2012, “people associated with the company” beat up and 
threatened the 24-year old son of a community leader.224 Anger and fear mounted from 
such hostile encounters and the incursion of construction machinery. In response, on 
October 30th 2012, 200 locals and allies from social movements joined together, a result 
of weeks of planning, in San Pablo de Amalí to realize a symbolic takeover of the 
machine camp. Their protest boasted an unprecedented amount of participants, but in the 
end, no concrete advances were made against this powerful public-private alliance. Not 
only did the company refuse to comply with community requests, but they also responded 
to the protest with violence, intimidation, and detentions.   
During the protest, the Universo national newspaper reported that, “One of the 
inhabitants affirms that at the most recent protest, they were dragged along the ground by 
a group of five policemen. ‘My parents, who are seniors, tried to help me, but the police 
just hit them, too,’ they said.”225 On the day after the machine camp occupation, FECAB-
BRUNARI, the Federation of Campesino Organizations of Bolívar, reports that the police 
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continued to exhibit arrogance and to abuse the locals.226 At 8:00am that next morning, 
approximately 200 police, together with Hidrotambo employees, invaded the house of the 
president of the San Pablo de Amalí community as well as other houses in the 
community. A police lieutenant began to intimidate and frighten children, women, and 
elders, and he then invaded the house of a community member (without any kind of 
warrant) and stole a cartridge clip from the resident that is used for hunting. This same 
lieutenant had agreed the day before, in front of the entire community occupying the 
machine camp, that he would not commit any act of repression against the community.227  
Exposed in the same report by FECAB-BRUNARI, around 9:30am that morning, 
the Teleamazonas TV channel arrived (a rare occurrence for a news outlet to make the 
long trek to San Pablo de Amalí), and community members were eager to expose the 
blatant injustices that had just occurred. When community members arrived to give 
interviews, two policemen dragged and hit one woman, and detained two senior citizens 
on orders given by the same unscrupulous police lieutenant. The two were handcuffed, 
and forced to lie face down for three hours before they were released.228 To add insult to 
injury, Hidrotambo employees and policemen went on to invade another community 
member’s property on the same day, without any legal permission. 
Since October, the company has entered the watershed many times, accompanied 
by police, to aggressively advance their project.229 In mid-April of 2013, the machinery 
entered the property of the same elderly woman (discussed above) and toppled her crops,                                                         
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as well her outhouse and chicken coop.230 Conversations with this woman’s daughter-in-
law revealed that Hidrotambo continues to work in near to the elderly woman’s home, 
and they were expected to topple her entire house sometime in late April or early May.   
 
Criminalization of social protest 
As part of a nation-wide increase in the criminalization of social protest spurred 
by the Alianza PAIS government’s extractivist agenda, allegedly false accusations of 
violence, sabotage, and terrorism have been registered against 20 people from San Pablo 
de Amalí since June 29th, 2012.231 Two community leaders, who are some of the most 
vocal and instrumental individuals in organizing resistance against this extractive project, 
have unsurprisingly been the most actively criminalized thus far since the company re-
entered in 2012. On November 12th, 2012, in the 5th district court of criminal trials in 
Chillanes, an order for ‘preventative imprisonment’ was issued against these two leaders 
of the San Pablo de Amalí community. They received this order for allegedly having 
committed acts of ‘sabotage’ and ‘terrorism.’ The two have only protested peacefully, 
and this judicial order is therefore a violation of the Constitutional Right to Resistance, 
the Right to Organization and Protest, and protection against political persecution.232 The 
two leaders were forced to go into hiding to protect their lives.233  
In a powerful move of solidarity, 200 people traveled from San Pablo and other 
communities on December 5th, 2012, to gather outside of the criminal tribunal in                                                         
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Guaranda, Bolívar, in protest of the criminalization of these two leaders. The protestors, 
“…with strength in their voices, demanded freedom for their companions."234 To 
everyone’s delight, the ‘preventative imprisonment’ orders were revoked.235 It seemed for 
a moment that the community’s complaints were being listened to. But soon enough, the 
State responded with full force, slapping charges on the solidarity protestors themselves, 
and re-trying the leaders. Fifteen individuals who protested the two leaders’ 
imprisonment received judicial accusations and have been ordered to pay $200,000 
conjointly.236 The court called a new trial, which resulted in renewed charges for the two 
campesinos, once again for ‘terrorism’ and ‘sabotage.’ One of the two leaders expressed 
to a reporter, “What we feel is indignation, because justice is not just for us.”237  
The new charges against the two community leaders were followed up on 
February 26th, 2013 in Cantón Chillanes by a preparatory hearing and a formulation of 
the final ruling.238 It was ruled that the two individuals must be imprisoned. According to 
their lawyer, they would face four to eight years in prison. The lawyer expounded, “this is 
a contradiction of the Right to Resistance consecrated in our Constitution and yet another 
example of the criminalization of defenders of water.”239 These two leaders requested 
alternate measures to imprisonment from the court, and fortunately their request was 
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granted.240 I have not found out what these measures will be, but when examining other 
cases, common alternative measures are banning individuals from participation in any 
form of protest, and mandating regular check-ups with the court. One of the criminalized 
leaders commented on their sentencing, “What happened yesterday is revenge from the 
prosecutors and members of the police force, accusing us without any proof of crimes 
that we have not committed.”241 Since Hidrotambo’s contract renewal, many other 
Dulcepamba watershed inhabitants have been criminalized as well. In June of 2012, 
several landowners tried to peacefully impede Hidrotambo’s invasion of their property, 
and as a result they were illegally detained for over 24 hours, and hit by the policemen. 
One of those individuals is handicapped.242  
 Criminalization of social protest, as shown in Chapter 1, is currently widespread 
in Ecuador, and the judiciary has often been complicit with efforts to criminalize 
dissidents. According to a Peace and Verification Commission that investigated the San 
José del Tambo case, “The majority of administrators of justice involved have not 
showed signs of acting independently. This is verified by their agility in resolving cases 
brought by the State or individuals related to the company, against community leaders 
and local policymakers, in which they favor criminalizing people who have mobilized in 
defense of their right to water. They accuse these people of terrorism, sabotage, and other 
crimes. [The judge’s lack of independence] is also verified in that they discard cases 
brought by community members without sufficient justification, and the judges majorly 
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delay in processing the community member’s cases.”243      
 The lack of judicial independence in court cases related to the San José del Tambo 
project may be related to the fact that president Correa gained increased control over the 
judiciary in 2011. Human Rights Watch reports that president Correa obtained a popular 
mandate in 2011 “for constitutional reforms that significantly increased government 
powers to influence the appointment and dismissal of judges.”244 The mandate allowed 
Correa to dissolve the Judicial Council, a body composed of independent jurists 
responsible for the selection, promotion, and dismissal of judges. The president, the 
legislature (in which Correa has majority support), and the Transparency and Social 
Control Function, which is a citizens’ branch established in the 2008 Constitution, came 
together to appoint a “tripartite transitional council,” who would select judges over a 
period of 18 months. This transitional council dismissed scores of judges in August and 
September of 2011, which may have intimidated the remaining judges into supporting 
Correa in their judicial decisions. In September, 2011, “at the request of the transitional 
council, Correa declared a ‘state of emergency in the judicial branch,’ to resolve the 
‘critical situation’ of the justice system.”245 Correa’s decree created “a ‘national 
mobilization, especially of all the personnel of the judicial branch.’ Human Rights Watch 
suggests that a lack of “clarity about the meaning of ‘mobilization’ could threaten judge’s 
independence by suggesting they must get behind government goals or risk dismissal.”246 
Correa had the power to choose one of the five members of the judicial council that 
replaced the one that was dissolved, and two of the other members on the new council are                                                         
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the Correa’s attorney general and public defender. In such an intimidating climate, it is 
likely that judges would think twice about supporting the protestors of the San José del 
Tambo hydroelectric project, which president Correa so ardently supports. 
Intimidation 
Besides outright violations of human rights and unjust criminalization, the public-
private alliance working to forward the San José del Tambo project has diversified their 
tactics by intimidating key members of the opposition and by deliberately sowing seeds 
of division among community members. The mayor of Chillanes, Ramiro Trujillo, is a 
victim of this intimidation. For years, he has stood against the hydroelectric project and 
the human rights violations experienced by San Pablo de Amalí community members. In 
two visits with the mayor, I observed the time and care he took to talk with anyone and 
everyone, and the sincerity with which he listened and responded. People told me that he 
barely ever takes time off and that his health has suffered from such long hours. Mayor 
Trujillo has made multiple visits to San Pablo de Amalí and on those visits he has 
observed firsthand the police intimidation and aggression experienced by community 
members. Mr. Trujillo decried to me the highway robbery of his constituents’ water: “As 
farmers in the breadbasket of Ecuador,” he said, “without water, we cannot produce food. 
Without water, we wouldn’t be anything, the earth wouldn’t produce, and we’d all have 
to go to enlarge the belts of…misery that surround the big cities.”247 As a reward for his 
humanity and hard work, Mayor Trujillo has been subject to court proceedings 
concerning his support for the communities.248  
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In addition to being criminalized, the mayor has been scared into submission to 
Alianza PAIS by several actions taken by the proponents of the hydro project. In late 
2012, Mayor Trujillo was invited to a dinner with members of Rafael Correa’s political 
party, Alianza PAIS, which was also attended by key government officials including the 
vice president of Ecuador, Lenín Moreno Garcés. At the dinner, the Alianza PAIS 
politicians began to pressure Mayor Trujillo to “wear the shirt of Hidrotambo.”249 Mayor 
Trujillo stood up for the communities at the dinner, responding that he had seen for 
himself the injustices of the project, and would not support these human rights abuses.250 
Several days after I met with the mayor and other community members in January of 
2013, word arrived that two armed men had allegedly entered the city hall in Chillanes 
and sought the mayor out. They were arrested before any violence occurred. While the 
evidence is unclear as to who hired these men, community members have speculated that 
they were hired either by Hidrotambo or the Alianza PAIS proponents of the dam.251  
In late January of 2013, word arrived that the intimidation had become too much 
for the mayor to withstand. To avoid further confrontation and to protect himself, Mayor 
Trujillo had left his indigenous political party (Patchakutic) and joined the Alianza PAIS 
party. The mayor commented that he would not betray the communities, but the most he 
would do is to ask that they not be criminalized for their protest anymore.252 He would 
not actively defend the communities anymore in their overall fight against the 
hydroelectric project and for their rights to water and Sumak Kawsay.  
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 A man from San Pablo de Amalí recounted another frightening instance of 
intimidation to me. As I listened to his story, I was hit once again by the gravity of the 
repression that has become a constant specter in the lives of people who resist simply 
because they want to live peaceful lives. Sometime in late 2012, people from the local 
Campesino Social Security Center made 200 copies of the film documentary Represados, 
which outlines the injustices surrounding the San José del Tambo project. They began to 
hand the documentary out to locals who came by, asking them to watch it to see what is 
threatening their region. Soon, an unidentified individual came around and announced 
that if they did not stop distributing the documentary, they would be killed.253 In a 
political and judicial climate that does not support victims of extractive projects, 
recipients of such intimidation cannot look to the state for protection or legal support.  
Media suppression and community division 
 What role has the media played in publicizing this case? As outlined in Chapter 
1, the Ecuadorian media has been increasingly censored and controlled in recent years—
part and parcel of a trend towards social exclusion of rural and indigenous peoples to 
maintain the extractivist model. The Hidrotambo case is no exception, and hence very 
little has been revealed about the injustices in Ecuadorian media. Two articles on the 
project have been published in mainstream media,254 and one mainstream television 
channel carried a two-minute clip on the issue.255 The rest of the media generated has 
been from small environmental and social justice oriented online-only publications or 
                                                        
253 San Pablo de Amalí community member, San José del Tambo parish, January, 2013 
254 “Construcción de hidroeléctrica enfrenta a comuneros y empresa,” 2012 y “Orden de prisión a dos 
opositores de proyecto,” (El Universo: Noviembre, 2012) 
http://www.eluniverso.com/2012/11/14/1/1447/orden-prision-dos-opositores-proyecto.html    
255 “Hidro tambo enfrentamientos,” Teleamazonas Guaranda, November 1, 2012, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqnc8CaqFlY  
113  
blogs, obviously with limited readership. Part of the reason for lack of coverage is 
outright physical prevention from carrying out interviews, as described above with the 
handcuffing and detention and of two elderly individuals looking to carry out interviews 
with Teleamazonas. Other explanations for this gap in media coverage are less obvious.  
One less visible reason for the vast information gap about the San José del Tambo 
project’s transgressions is that news outlets are increasingly afraid to take on 
controversial stories—especially to reveal government-supported suppression—because 
of the ever more common criminalization of reporters and media institutions (discussed 
in Chapter 1). Another important factor in the lack of media coverage is that San Pablo de 
Amalí is not very accessible. It is several hours away from large cities where mainstream 
media is based, and getting there necessitates long trips on dirt roads. Television stations 
and newspapers might decide to ignore requests to cover the story due to a combination 
of mounting fears of criminalization and consideration of the time, resources, and 
inconveniences involved in traveling to San Pablo de Amalí.      
Efforts to divide the communities 
 What better way is there to overcome community resistance than to spread 
misinformation and foment division? Hidrotambo and government officials have done 
just that in recent years, in concert with other tactics of outright violence and 
intimidation. They have told lie after lie, making it confusing for locals to pick through 
all of the information coming at them, to verify the truth, and unite around that truth.  
The aforementioned human rights commission reported that San Pablo community 
members have alleged that “the Executive Director of CONELEC and Mr. Eduardo 
Speck Andrade, the manager of Hidrotambo S.A., threaten and deceive the community, 
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going from house to house.” 256 One San Pablo resident explained what these two men 
tell community members regarding their violated private property: 
 The project is going to continue. Look, [sir or ma’am], you are the only person 
left to solve this problem. Let’s make a deal, how much do you want us to pay 
you, because the rest of the affected land owners, like for example [community 
members names], have already accepted, and we have even already paid them 
their money [to use their land]. You don’t want to be alone by not making a deal 
with us. If you do [want to be alone in this], we are going to continue with the 
expropriation proceedings.257 
 
In addition to spreading lies and threats about land expropriation, representatives of 
CONELEC have reportedly made trips to the watershed to disseminate the message that 
Hidrotambo’s hydroelectric generation contract is actually less than a 50-year contract, 
and that anyone who has told them it lasts for 50 years or longer is lying.258  All official 
documents confirm that the contract does indeed do not just last for 50 years; they last for 
the durable life of the project.259 Various government and company officials have spread 
the word that everyone in the region will receive 50 years of free electricity from the 
company, and that Hidrotambo would implement a community sustainable development 
plan that would involve several projects including a health clinic.260 Nowhere in official 
documents does it say that community members will receive free electricity, and when I 
asked technical manager Ramiro Gordillo, “If you generate electricity and [try to] sell it 
to these people, are they going to have enough money to buy the electricity?,” he made 
no mention of free electricity and replied,  “I don’t know…I don’t know…I don’t 
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know…”261 The promised community development programs have been conspicuously 
absent for years since the first promises were made both in writing262 and orally to 
community members about seven years ago. The utter lack of any reality to the promises 
of community development is symptomatic of the greater alienation of Hidrotambo’s 
economic goals from the lives of those its project will directly affect.  
 Hidrotambo’s efforts to divide the community have been fruitful, for formerly 
strong and united friends and families have been fractured due to disagreements about the 
dam. In 2012, a leader of San Pablo de Amalí said, “In recent times, the company has 
returned…but they have come this time with other forms of….fighting… of discussing 
things here with our community. What they have started doing is to have authorities from 
the Central Government come here to divide the community. With the strategy of turning 
us against one another.”263 In my trips to the region, I encountered people in town who 
would not speak to those who are resisting the dam, and I was told that there is regular 
hostility between the supporters and the protestors. The division also cuts across family 
lines, something that has been particularly devastating for community members. The 
brother of one of the community members who I spent time with has “sold out” to 
Hidrotambo by supporting the dam and working on its construction, and the brothers’ 
relationship has suffered greatly as a result.264 
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The changing face of resistance 
In an increasingly extractivist-minded political environment, where the state 
ignores community advocacy and protest, uses divisive tactics, and criminalizes those 
who speak out against extractive activities, potential to defeat Hidrotambo today may be 
significantly lower than it was years ago. As described in Chapter 1, increasing conflict 
between socio-environmental movements and the state, spurred by the state’s use of 
extractive development to accumulate capital for its social programs, has led to a decided 
closure of political space for those struggling to maintain land, water, and wellbeing.  
Before 2012 when Hidrotambo’s contract was renewed the Alianza PAIS 
government upheld its promises to cultivate participatory democracy, at least to a certain 
extent. Persistent, brave, and well organized, the community of San Pablo de Amalí 
protested the project and repression by the Armed Forces through non-violent direct 
action and political advocacy (as well as in court, but with less success), and a year into 
Correa’s presidency, his government responded to the outcry, as described above, 
removing the Armed Forces and annulling Hidrotambo’s hydroelectric contract.265 
 Today, however, a lack of process equity—i.e., differential enforcement of laws 
and regulations—266 has become a greater issue in Ecuador. Since the rebirth of the 
Hidrotambo project in 2012, letter after letter and report after report has been sent to local 
and national officials.267 Several letters were sent directly to president Correa as well. In 
discussing their inability to stop recent police brutality, a community member                                                         
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commented, “their versions count. Our versions don’t count.”268 It seems that anyone 
who speaks out publically will not be listened to and instead is at great risk of being 
criminalized. The government has become increasingly supportive of hydroelectric 
development at all costs over the years since Hidrotambo’s dream was born, and the state 
is more and more willing to criminalize, intimidate, or otherwise incapacitate those who 
stand in the way. Today, therefore, it would be immensely difficult for community 
members to oust the police or the company in the way they ousted the Armed Forces and 
achieved the annulment of Hidrotambo’s contract in 2009.  
 
                      Figure 2: locals occupying the machine camp. Courtesy of David Reyes, Acción Ecológica, 2013 
Life and Resistance in San Pablo de Amalí 
 Can you start to imagine now, what life in San Pablo de Amalí has been like for 
the past nine years? Can you imagine what might happen to your trust in government and 
in the police? Or what it is like to feel that the law is never on your side? What would the 
knowledge that two key leaders of your community were in hiding, or in danger of going 
to prison, do to the collective psyche of a tight-knit community? What would happen to 
your nerves, to your health, to your children, to your outlook on life? An environmental 
psychologist visited the region as part of the peace commission to listen to people’s                                                         
268 Interview with local farmer, San Pablo de Amalí, Bolívar, Ecuador, Rachel Conrad, January, 2013 
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stories and to report on the psychosocial impacts of the San José del Tambo project on 
local residents. She said that, “…the need to install a permanent alert system has on one 
hand strengthened community cohesion, but on the other hand, it has caused 
psychoemotional disturbances expressed in processes of chronic stress, anxiety, distress, 
and mental suffering, directy related to uncertainty [about the future] and to the 
expressions of violence.”269 Fear of losing the water that sustains campesino agriculture 
in the region is a constant psychological weight. Imagine having to wonder where you 
and your whole community will go, and how they will find land, work, food, and 
community support when water access becomes a thing of the past. The psychologist 
concluded, unsurprisingly, that, “…at this time, the community’s mental health is 
characterized by exponentially increased levels of Depression and Anxiety in comparison 
with populations in ‘normal’ conditions.”270  
Resistance: 2012 to present 
 The communities of the Dulcepamba watershed have tried to defend their lands 
and waters with peaceful direct action since Hidrotambo’s 2012 return. But new rules of 
the game have weakened the power and viability of social protest, what with frequent 
police violence and strong backing from a government that sees ‘extremist 
environmentalist’ communities (see Chapter 1) like this one as an impediment to state 
development interests. So, after almost nine years, what keeps these people going? I 
asked this question to an elderly man who has been actively involved in the struggle since 
the beginning, and he told me with such beautiful care in his eyes and amazing strength 
for an eighty-or-so-year-old, “we will eventually die. And the children? They have just                                                         
269 “Caso San Pablo de Amalí/Central Hidroeléctrica San José del Tambo: Situación de los Derechos 
Humanos y de la Naturaleza,” p. 12 
270 Ibid., p. 12 
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arrived on this planet! They are the ones that are going to have to deal with all of the 
damage that they are going to cause with the hydroelectric project…that’s why we 
fight.”271 Another man said, “Just like our parents left us an inheritance, we also want to 
leave an inheritance for our children, so that they don’t feel cheated, or like their parents 
abandoned them.”272 With inspiring resilience, community members have outlined new 
strategies to continue the struggle in the best way possible considering increasing 
repression and decreasing citizen participation.  
New Strategies: The Strength of Coalition Building 
 
You can blow out a candle 
But you can't blow out a fire 
Once the flames begin to catch 
The wind will blow it higher 
--Peter Gabriel, singer/songwriter, “Biko,” 1980 
 
 Locals have realized that because many of the key leaders from San Pablo have 
been criminalized, their current strategy of mostly local resistance is not sustainable or 
ultimately effective. They have thus begun to look outwards, beyond their community to 
people in other parts of the watershed, and beyond their watershed to social, 
environmental, and political organizations within Ecuador and abroad. When I asked 
what their new strategies are in the face of increasing government-backed violence and 
criminalization, a community leader said, “to our friends with whom we share the same 
problems, let us join together! And we will have much more strength! For what? So that 
at least they respect our rights as human beings, and also the rights of Nature.”273 
 To spread local awareness, residents of the lower part of the watershed plan to 
make a journey from the highest elevations to the lowest elevations. During the journey,                                                         
271 Interview with community member, recinto Vainillas, April, 2012  
272 Community member, San Pablo de Amalí, donated archival footage, 2007 
273 Interview with community member, San Pablo de Amalí, April, 2012 
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they will stop at different communities throughout the watershed to discuss the issue and 
to create a solidarity network.  
Despite the setbacks in publicizing the injustice due to media suppression, 
community members and their supporters at Acción Ecológica and other organizations 
have been in communication with leaders of CONAIE and have secured a date for a large 
press conference—in Quito so as to be accessible to the media—that will be sponsored by 
CONAIE.  Community members will make the eight our trek from the San José del 
Tambo region to Quito to make their story known. The press conference will take place 
some time in May, 2013 and will hopefully receive large-scale coverage. 
 Nationally, coastal peoples-crabbers, oyster gatherers, cockle fisher people and 
clammers- are fighting the industrial shrimp farms that continue to destroy mangroves 
whose diverse ecosystems have for generations given locals sustenance and work. Other 
communities on the coast have organized to protect small farmers who are being 
threatened by large agribusiness and other industries. Many communities and coalitions 
are fighting tirelessly to hold back national and transnational mining companies from 
contaminating the waters they depend on for drinking, bathing, cleaning, small scale 
farming, and for their animals. Yet other communities are fighting against similarly 
repressive hydroelectric projects. Thousands are fighting contamination and the 
repressive activities that come with petroleum extraction on indigenous lands in the 
Amazon. The community of San Pablo de Amalí and other Dulcepamba watershed 
residents have reached out to organizations formed around these similar struggles for 
water, land, and wellbeing, and to my understanding, these budding coalitions are a 
tremendous source of hope for all parties involved.  
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The Coalition of Organizations of Autonomous Small Farmers of the Coast (also 
called “Tierra y Vida”) has expressed strong support for the people affected by the San 
José del Tambo project. In a declaration published the day after the October 30th and 31st 
police abuses in San Pablo de Amalí, Tierra y Vida proclaimed, “the Coalition ‘Tierra y 
Vida’ expresses its most energetic rejection [of the San José del Tambo project]. Acts 
like these constitute a flagrant violation of the most elemental human rights. We demand 
the immediate cessation of this harassment and the retreat of the police force.” They went 
on to say, “under no circumstances can it be justified to violate rights which are 
established in the Constitution and in international laws and agreements, especially if the 
violation is for extractive purposes.”274  
A delegation from San Pablo de Amalí went to the coastal city of Guayaquil to 
attend the Assembly of Organizations, Communities and Nationalities of the Coast, 
which occurred in late 2012. They joined more than 600 people,275 and were able to 
network, sharing their stories as well as listening to the stories of other struggles.  The 
Federation of Campesino Organizations of Bolívar, FECAB BRUNARI, has published 
several declarations against the human rights abuses and the project in general.276 
Community members are also working to form ties with CONAIE, Ecuador’s largest and 
most politically powerful indigenous organization, and Ecuarunari, the organization of 
the Kichwa people of the Andes region, which is part of CONAIE. Two community 
members from San Pablo de Amalí traveled to Quito in late 2012 to talk with the two 
most influential individuals in the indigenous movement: the president of CONAIE, 
                                                        
274 “Tierra y Vida se Solidariza con la Lucha de Camunidad de San Pablo de Amalí,” (Guayaquíl: Unión de 
Organizaciones de Pequeños Agricultores de la Costa, 1 de noviembre de 2012)  
275 Community meeting in San Pablo de Amalí, audio recording, Rachel Conrad, January 15, 2013 
276 “Otra vez prepotencia y abuso policial en San Pablo de Amalí,” 31 de Octubre, 2012 
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Humberto Cholango, and the president of Ecuarunari, Delfín Tenesaca. They asked for 
CONAIE to send a delegation to San Pablo de Amalí to learn about what is happening 
and to provide support. It remains to be seen whether support will arrive.   
San Pablo community members have also formed an organization to express their 
interests and concerns, which is called the “San Pablo de Amalí Campesino Community 
Defense Committee for the Dulcepamba River and its Tributaries.” Their organization 
has joined in solidarity with other struggles, creating strong networks of mutual support. 
Many of the above listed organizations sent representatives to support residents of the 
Dulcepamba watershed in their symbolic takeover of Hidrotambo’s machine camp. Some 
sent representatives to join in the protest of the criminalization of leaders of San Pablo de 
Amalí outside the court in Guaranda. Community leaders affected by several of the most 
damaging Ecuadorean hydroelectric projects (like the Río Grande dam and the Baba 
Dam) have traveled to San Pablo de Amalí and offered support to the affected community 
members. Representatives from San Pablo de Amalí have in turn gone to gatherings and 
meetings in a variety of affected communities, including in Chone, Manabí Province, to 
support campesinos fighting the government’s Río Grande dam.277 Hopefully San Pablo 
residents’ connection to other movements will transform the community’s mood from a 
feeling of hopelessness to one of empowerment, and ultimately generate enough powerful 
dissent to impel the Alianza PAIS government to respond to their demands. 
 With direct action and legal pathways increasingly difficult to maneuver in the 
current repressive atmosphere, one of the community’s new strategies is to appeal to 
international human rights organizations with the hope that they might see beyond the                                                         
277 The two affected groups were at the Meeting of Defenders of Water in San Luis de Pambil in April, 
2012 which I also attended. They have also visited eachother’s lands.    
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justifications for the project that have been generated within the extractivist economic 
model. On August 21, 2012, a Peace Commission, made up of eight Ecuadorian human 
rights and environmental organizations joined in solidarity with the community.278 
Representatives from these organizations visited San Pablo de Amalí to gather 
information about the situation. The Commission compiled testimonies, and out of 
sincere concern for the numerous complaints received about aggression, persecution, and 
litigation, the Commission wrote a comprehensive report that about the violations of 
Human Rights and the Rights of Nature in San Pablo de Amalí. The report has recently 
been delivered to the United Nations and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. 
  Work has also been done to spread information about the San José del Tambo 
injustice to environmental and human rights NGOs around the world. U.S. NGO Food 
and Water Watch has helped to disseminate a sign-on letter of international solidarity to 
groups fighting the same extractive practices across the globe. International Rivers, 
another U.S. NGO has offered advice and support to Acción Ecológica in Ecuador, for 
their work on the San José del Tambo hydroelectric issue. 
 My small part in this 
 I hope to contribute to the Dulcepamba community’s fight by continuing to 
network with human rights and environmental groups in the U.S. and elsewhere about the 
issue, and by working on a socio-environmental study of the Dulcepamba watershed for a 
year between July, 2013 and July, 2014. The purpose of the study is to gather information 
                                                        
278 Acción Ecológica, Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos (CEDHU), Centro de Derechos 
Económicos y Sociales (CDES), Foodfirst Information and Action Network (FIAN-Ecuador), 
Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos (INREDH), Unión de Organizaciones Tierra y 
Vida, Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (CDH Guayaquil), Red de 
Ecologistas Populares, Red Latinoamericana de Afectados por Represas y en Defensa de sus  Ríos, 
(REDLAR). 
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about the flow volume in the Dulcepamba River, farmer’s water use, their sources of 
water, irrigation management, their crop types, and more. The data will provide a 
concrete picture of the local farmer’s need for water. I will work with community 
members to gather and compile this data so that it can be utilized by farmers to challenge 
Hidrotambo’s water use rights in court or through direct complaints to SENAGUA.  
Alternative economy 
Community members are looking to start a small tourist operation and other local 
production ventures, which would strengthen their economy and their agency to stand up 
to Hidrotambo and the government. The cost of traveling to other towns or cities to 
protest the criminalization of their leaders or to join in meetings with other groups, etc., 
has been prohibitive at times. Disposable income would give the locals the ability to 
finance such things, and potentially to pay for lawyers. A community member told me 
about a waterfall with high mineral content that is known locally for its healing 
capacities, which could become a tourist attraction. An engineer from Chillanes wrote in 
the territorial zoning plan for the area, “The possibility to invest in value-added activities 
can be found within rows of cacao and corn [in the Dulcepamba watershed]. The 
Ecuadorian Institute of Popular and Solidarity Economics (IEPS-Bolívar) proposes to 
implement a cacao storage center in San José del Tambo.”279 Locals would make cacao 
paste and other products from the stored cacao to sell locally and nationally. Other efforts 
being carried out to strengthen the local economy are the creation of “agroecology 
production and commercialization networks” and local trade networks.280  
Local, regional, and international network building, media outreach, a watershed                                                         
279 “Plan de Desarrollo y Ordenamiento Territorial (PDOT),” p.10 
280 Ibid., p. 11 
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analysis, and the formation of small solidarity economy operations have the potential to 
build enough awareness and power to influence Hidrotambo and the government to drop 
their ill-fated and extractive project. President Correa and his Alianza PAIS government 
may begin to feel mounting pressure to let go of their image of San Pablo de Amalí 
residents as “childish environmentalists,” and to instead truly recognize the struggle of 
people who have stood for and articulated their rights and values for almost nine years. 
The strength of a united community that is tied to other communities locally, nationally, 
and internationally through strong coalitions is a force to be reckoned with. A farmer 
rallied communities in the watershed by saying, “They will not win against our 
communities, ladies and gentlemen. Because community is the ultimate authority! It 
surpasses all other authority, all documents, all laws…we are going to make the power of 
community prevail!” After sharing a long story of protest, a local farmer said resolutely, 
“We have always been united. And they will not sway us. They wont- because they say 
they are going to-they want to buy us off. But not even for gold or silver will we sell 
out.”281  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
281 Interview with community member, April, San Pablo de Amalí, 2012 
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              Figure 8 “Clean Energy for Everyone!” San José del Tambo hydroelectric project.                  
             Photo credit: Teleamazonas, 2012 
 
Chapter 3: the ‘Clean’ Development Mechanism: 
Carbon Reductions or Industrialization and Repression? 
 
“History has seen attempts to commodify land, food, labour, forests, water, genes and 
ideas. Carbon trading follows in the footsteps of this history and turns the earth’s 
carbon-cycling capacity into property to be bought or sold in a global market. Through 
this process of creating a new commodity – carbon – the Earth’s ability and capacity to 
support a climate conducive to life and human societies is now passing into the same 
corporate hands that are destroying the climate… Carbon trading will not contribute to 
achieving this protection of the Earth’s climate. It is a false solution which entrenches 
and magnifies social inequalities in many ways…” 
-- The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading 
There is an entity in addition to Hidrotambo S.A. and the Ecuadorian government 
that supports the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project. The United Nations Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) also supports the project under much of the same false 
logic and developmentalist rhetoric used by the Ecuadorian government and Hidrotambo. 
The CDM, a market mechanism created to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions that 
came out of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s 
Kyoto Protocol, has approved the San José del Tambo project as a clean development 
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project. In doing so, the CDM opened up the opportunity for Hidrotambo to sell credits, 
earned by purportedly reducing carbon dioxide emissions through their clean project, to 
industrialized countries and their companies in global carbon markets. Not only does 
registration as a clean development project provide Hidrotambo with extra income, it also 
gives the company social and political clout by framing their hydroelectric project as 
“clean development.”      
The Kyoto Protocol was condemned to fail by an addition that Al Gore and the 
U.S. delegation to the UNFCCC convention insisted upon in the final moments of 
negotiation. As a condition of considering the possibility of joining the Kyoto Protocol 
(which the U.S. never joined in the end), the U.S. delegation demanded that market 
mechanisms be included in the Protocol to allow “flexibilities” for the industrialized 
countries to meet their reduction commitments. The idea behind the market mechanisms 
is that because greenhouse gases are well-mixed in the atmosphere, it does not matter 
where emissions reductions come from. As it may be cheaper for a country or company 
to reduce emissions in some other place due to cheaper land values, better tax incentives, 
more lenient laws, etc, industrialized countries and their companies should be able to 
“outsource” their required emissions reductions to capitalize on efficiency and to avoid 
costs. They would fund clean, green development projects in other locations, and then 
equate the emissions avoided by these clean projects with an amount of greenhouse gases 
that they can continue to emit. Such “clean” projects can be hydropower dams, efficiency 
improvements in coal-fired power plants, wind farms, methane-reduction projects in 
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cement factories and mines, biomass power plants, etcetera. The most common project 
type by far is hydropower dams.282  
The U.S. insisted that the best way to represent the allowances for industrial 
countries to continue to emit based on the emissions reductions in the global South they 
funded was in the form of tradeable permits to emit. This means that a permit can be sold 
and traded on a global carbon market, which would mean even greater economic 
efficiency due to the permit’s high liquidity. Three "flexible mechanisms" were created 
out of the United States’ idea for market mechanisms—International Emissions Trading 
(IET), Joint Implementation (JI), and the CDM.  
While IET and JI facilitate the outsourcing of emissions reductions to mitigate 
climate change in a supposedly economically “efficient” manner within countries of the 
global North, the CDM, launched in 2005, facilitates emissions reduction outsourcing 
exclusively from countries in the global North to countries in the global South. The CDM 
has become a very significant part of compliance with Kyoto-mandated emissions 
reductions for industrialized countries. It is by far the largest global carbon offsetting 
system.283 There are 6,755 clean projects currently registered with the CDM, according to 
the UNFCCC. Between 2005, when the first CDM credits were issued, and 2012, the 
CDM generated over one billion Certified Emissions Reduction credits (CERs).284 Each 
CER is supposed to represent one ton of avoided CO2 emissions. Beyond allowing the 
global North to reach their emissions reduction targets in an economically “efficient” 
                                                        
282 “Rip Offsets: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,” (Berkeley, 
California: International Rivers, November, 2008), p. 2. 
283 Ibid., p.3   
284 “Intro to the CDM,” (Carbon Market Watch: 2013), http://carbonmarketwatch.org/learn-about-carbon-
markets/intro-to-the-cdm/  
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manner, the CDM aims to simultaneously assist “developing” countries to achieve 
“sustainable” or “clean” development.  
How can a mechanism created to address global climate change through clean 
development support harmful and extractive projects like the San José del Tambo 
project? Why does a hydroelectric project that not only perpetrates social and 
environmental injustices, but also arguably does not even reduce global greenhouse gas 
emissions, continue to be supported by the CDM? In this Chapter, I will first explain the 
ways in which the CDM fails to effectively reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, and 
I will then discuss the harmful impacts of CDM projects on local communities in the 
global South through green-washed extractive development. I will illustrate the false 
logic and perverse incentives within the mechanism that lead to these negative outcomes 
with an analysis of the CDM’s support for the San José del Tambo hydroelectric project.  
Business as usual in the global North and dirty projects in the global South  
The CDM is so clearly a failure that many of its old defenders have, “deserted the 
cause,”285 and a growing multitude of “economists and prominent climate scientists have 
joined the chorus of criticism…”286 Its market-based solutions to climate change allow 
the global North to continue “business as usual” greenhouse gas emissions, and while the 
logic is that those emissions are being offset in the global South, the projects supported in 
the global South often do not actually reduce emissions, or they reduce emissions less 
than promised. Thus, the global North continues to emit gases beyond their Kyoto 
allowances while assuring the world that they have offset those emissions, but more often                                                         
285 Tim Webb and Terry Macalister, “Carbon Trade Wrong, Says Lord Browne,” (UK: The Guardian: 
March 8, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/08/oilandgascompanies-carbon-
emissions. 
286 This group includes James Hansen, Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, William Nordhaus, Kevin Anderson 
and Gregory Mankiw among others. (Source: Lohmann, la Neoliberalización del Clima, 2012)  
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than not their supposed offsets are false. David Victor, head of Stanford’s Energy and 
Sustainable Development Program, believes that, “between a third and two thirds” of 
CDM offsets do not represent actual emission cuts.287 In this way, the CDM not only fails 
to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, it also promotes an increase in global 
emissions.  
Why don’t clean development projects in the global South reduce global 
greenhouse gas emissions? The principal reason is that the designation of projects as 
greenhouse gas reducers is based on defective logic: the logic of “additionality.” Each 
CDM project must go through a United Nations registration process that is designed to 
ensure “real, measurable and verifiable” emission reductions that are “additional” to what 
would have occurred without the project. The requirement for additionality is crucial, 
because if a project was going to be implemented anyway, without the CDM’s help, no 
real global offset is being made. However, while crucial, “additionality is [the CDMs’] 
most fundamental flaw.”288 This is because there is no sound way to show that a project 
would not have been implemented without the CDM’s help, nor is it possible to assuredly 
show that a project is actually reducing emissions and not just contributing to growth. 
Importantly, because the principal goal of the participants in a capitalist carbon market is 
to profit from the generation and trading of credits and not to mitigate climate change, 
project developers tend to make dishonest claims and hide key information in order to 
convince the CDM that they are “additional,” and therefore qualify for CDM approval.  
 
                                                        
287  “Stanford Study May Stir Debate On Limiting Costs In Climate Bills,” Carbon Control News 
(carboncontrolnews.com). Posted March, 7 2008. 
288Joanna Cabello, “The Politics of the Clean Development Mechanism: Hiding Capitalism Under the 
Green Rug.” (Steffen Böhm & Siddhartha Dabhi (eds): Chapter 18, 2009)  
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Financial Additionality 
 It is very difficult to show that a project’s proponents could not have financed 
their project without the CDM. This is because the financial transparency of the project’s 
investors is low and so there is not enough information provided in project applications 
(Project Design Documents or PDDs) to decide whether CDM funding is really make or 
break for a project. For example, Hidrotambo S.A. promises that their project would be 
impossible to implement without the CDM funding, but they provide extremely weak 
justification for their claim.  
Hidrotambo states in their PDD that one of the reasons that the project could not 
exist without CDM funding is that there is a “scarcity of financial resources for like 
hydro projects in Ecuador,” because, “national banks are not interested and do not want 
to finance long-term projects…” and because of the, “…perception of foreign investors 
that Ecuador is a risky country to invest in.” They refer to Ecuador’s low Fitch credit 
ratings to prove the disinclination of foreign investors.289 On the contrary, Hidrotambo 
itself includes two foreign investors, the company has received loans from at least two 
national banks, and the vast majority of small and large hydroelectric projects in Ecuador 
are successfully funded, or owned and funded, by foreign investors. It is hard to believe 
that the company experienced prohibitive difficulty in finding enough investment for 
their project.  
To prove that they cannot obtain sufficient loans, Hidrotambo includes a short 
email in their PDD Annex from International Bank, which had originally loaned 
Hidrotambo six million dollars for six years with an eight percent interest rate. The letter                                                         
289 “Project Design Document for the SJTHP: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Clean Development Mechanism.” (Quito, Ecuador: UNFCCC, March 21, 2007) p.10 
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states, “according to your requirements, we must inform you that, taking into account the 
deterioration of business in Ecuador, the financial conditions originally agreed upon with 
Hidrotambo S.A…have suffered an important cutback in amount and maturity.” 
“Obviously, for the same reason,” they say, “there will be an increase in the interest 
rate.”290 It is anyone’s guess whether one sub-optimal loan condition from one bank is 
representative of Hidrotambo’s non-partner investment experience overall, and it is also 
impossible to tell from the information provided whether one sub-optimal loan means 
that the 19 million dollar project is not viable without CDM funding. Hidrotambo has 
received loans from other lenders. One of those lenders is Banco Bolivariano, which 
provided two million dollars over three years.291 Whether there are other loans to support 
the four investors is unknown due to lack of transparency.  
Additionally, the Ecuadorian government actively supports hydroelectric projects 
as part of its national strategic agenda, with financial incentives such as giving 
hydroelectric generation plants priority to be dispatched into the national grid above 
fossil fuel-based electricity generations plants, and extremely cheap water concessions. 
The Ecuadorian government has been actively pursuing hydroelectric energy production 
since before the CDM was implemented, and the government’s National Electrification 
Plan makes no mention of the CDM’s support as a reason for implementing hundreds of 
hydroelectric projects. The reason for implementing hydroelectric and thus displacing 
fossil fuel generation is that hydroelectric energy production is cheaper than fossil fuel- 
based electricity production, partly due to the above-mentioned subsidies, but also overall 
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it is a cheaper form of energy production in Ecuador (See Correa’s quotes, Chapter 1). 
Considering that Hidrotambo purchased the Dulcepamba watershed’s water at an 
outrageously cheap price (see Chapter 2) compared to the benefit they will gain from its 
waters, and considering the company has several loans, four principal investors, and 
strident government support, it is hard to believe that financial conditions are prohibitive 
to the realization of the project without CDM funding. Additionality is not a claim 
Hidrotambo can make on any level. 
Baselines to prove additionality 
To qualify for the CDM, in addition to proving their need for financial support, 
CDM project proponents must prove that their project will not simply add some sort of 
clean production to the world, but it will also displace some dirty production. For each 
CDM project, the project proponents must describe a hypothetical baseline world without 
the project and then choose a number of GHG emissions associated with this world. 
Then, they must demonstrate that the project reduces emissions from the level in the 
baseline world. The number of carbon credits (CERs) that the project can sell is obtained 
by subtracting the emissions in the world with the project from the emissions in the 
baseline world. It is questionable whether this highly theoretical construct can actually 
prove that a project is causing emissions reductions.  
The San José del Tambo project claims that with the help of the CDM, it will 
reduce emissions from a baseline world by replacing fossil fuel electricity production in 
Ecuador with hydroelectricity. It has not been proven that this project would replace 
fossil fuel electricity, rather than just increase total electricity production for industrial 
growth. The Ecuadorian government has planned since before the CDM existed to 
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construct an excess of hydroelectric plants in order to facilitate industrial growth and 
profit from electricity exports (see Chapter 1). There is thus no proof that the San José del 
Tambo project will replace dirty energy, and not just serve industrial growth or the 
upcoming energy export sector. While it is possible that the project is replacing fossil 
fuels, there is no way to prove this, although such proof is a requirement of CDM 
registration.  
Non-financial additionality 
Project proponents can also list non-financial reasons that they need CDM 
support, to further prove their additionality. They must prove that the CDM can remove 
an obstacle that has impeded the implementation of their project. The obstacles or “non-
financial barriers” to their project listed by Hidrotambo in their PDD are weakly founded 
at best and insulting at worst. The two main non-financial barriers listed are “institutional 
barriers” and “interest group barriers.”  
Hidrotambo lists the following “institutional barrier” in their PDD: The, 
“…bureaucratic process to get all the necessary permits and licenses for hydroelectric 
projects takes significantly longer than it typically does for thermal [fossil fuel-based] 
projects, causing discouragement and frustration.”292 Hidrotambo provides an example of 
the year and six months that it took to obtain the interconnection agreement with Emel 
Ríos (the transmission substation that Hidrotambo’s electricity will travel to), which 
should have taken only, “a couple of months.”  
One delay in the process due to bureaucracy is no proof that the project would not 
be built without CDM support and funding. It is well known that hydro is a major                                                         
292 “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-SSC-PDD): San José del 
Tambo Hydroelectric Project, Version 03.” p.12 
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component of the Ecuadorian energy agenda, and is therefore prioritized politically and 
financially in the country. For example, the Ecuadorian National Center for Energy 
Control, CENACE, had established priority dispatch rules favoring small-scale 
hydroelectricity before Hidrotambo applied to the CDM in 2006. These rules favored 
plants that use “non-conventional renewable energies” including hydroelectric 
generation, as long as their generation did not exceed two percent of the installed 
capacity of all of the electricity generation that goes to the wholesale electricity market in 
Ecuador.293 Since April 14 of 2011, renewable energy projects can still receive this 
priority dispatch status if they constitute no more than six percent of the national grid’s 
electricity. The San José del Tambo project is small enough that it would easily receive 
this benefit. While it may have been frustrating to wait for an interconnection agreement, 
Hidrotambo did not just sit around during this time—they began construction of their 
project, and therefore did not suffer significant losses from waiting.294 On the whole, 
institutions in Ecuador prioritize hydroelectricity, and therefore Hidrotambo’s plea for 
CDM funding because of “institutional barriers” is unconvincing. 
Hidrotambo’s second non-financial barrier, “interest group barriers” is the most 
absurd of its non-financial justifications for additionality. Hidrotambo says that “interest 
groups” are impeding the construction of their project through protest, and they therefore 
are a barrier that the CDM could help them to overcome. Hidrotambo defines interest 
groups involved in the project as, “certain political parties and left-wing organizations” 
and says that these groups have, “opposed the implementation of renewable energy                                                         
293 Betancourt, Byron, “Energías renovables no convencionales,” Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, 
Cartagena, febrero de 2009. Pp. 6, 7, 8, y 14.  
294 Eduardo Speck Andrade, “Response to Request for Review for the CDM Project Number 1298,” 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/TUEV-
SUED1187627873.55/ReviewInitialComments/RRYSV8DNN9VKAIR01BJNBT1JMG8AZ0  
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projects by the private sector” in the past, and have currently been active in the San José 
del Tambo project area protesting the project. Hidrotambo defines these groups as a 
“barrier” to implementing their project, and requests CDM support to overcome them.295 
The PDD paints resistance as coming from outside groups, and does not recognize that 
the bulk of protest against the project is coming from community members in the 
watershed. It frames community organizing against this injustice as an unfounded and 
sabotaging move. Instead of addressing the social and environmental reasons for protest, 
Hidrotambo asks a United Nations body to support them in overcoming protestors, in the 
name of “clean development,” no less. 
To prove that there is resistance to the project that Hidrotambo needs the CDM to 
help overcome, the company includes in their PDD a Police Informative Report from 
January, 2006 which states that, “approximately 300 people gathered in the parish square 
[in San José del Tambo] in relation to the construction of the San José del Tambo 
Hydroelectric Project. While some people were in favor of the project implementation, 
others protested openly against it, making clear that they would continue to fight against 
the project’s implementation.”296 The article paints a picture of a community that is 
evenly divided between support and rejection of the project. Many discussions and 
interviews with community members and time spent in the region have helped me to 
understand that this is not the case—many more are in opposition. A CONELEC report 
on a visit to the region concluded that, “with the exception of the inhabitants of Piscurco, 
the rest of the inhabitants of the communities [in the watershed] oppose the construction 
of the Hidrotambo project, declaring that they would even be ready to give their lives to                                                         
295 “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-SSC-PDD): San José del 
Tambo Hydroelectric Project, Version 03,” p.12 
296 Ibid., p.12 
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achieve this objective.”297 The PDD also includes a newspaper article from January, 2006 
that refers to a political party, “opposing the hydroelectric projects being implemented in 
the province,” and another article from March, 2007 which describes a group called 
“National Coordinator for the Defense of Life and Sovereignty,” “demonstrating in full 
opposition to hydroelectric and mining projects.”298 It is difficult to understand why the 
Ecuadorian and international CDM authorities agreed with Hidrotambo that protests are 
barriers to the project that the CDM could or should help to eliminate.   
To top it all off, the technical manager of Hidrotambo told me outright that his 
company does not need funding or support from the CDM. In an interview, Ramiro 
Gordillo, technical manager of Hidrotambo S.A., revealed to me that despite the 
explanations of need and pleadings for CDM support included in their Project Design 
Document, the truth is that the company does not need CDM funding. I asked Mr. 
Gordillo, “would it be profitable to do the hydroelectric without the CDM funding?” and 
he responded, “Ehh, yes. Yes, it would be profitable…[CDM funding] helps the 
hydroelectric project, but it is a small amount of help.”299 As Barbara Haya of 
International Rivers found in her research, it is surprisingly easy to find CDM project 
developers who openly admit that they would have built their projects anyway, regardless 
of CDM subsidies and support.300 In conclusion, the San José del Tambo project was 
vague, deceptive, and outright insulting in their Project Design Document, and the project 
is not additional and therefore should not qualify for CDM funding.  
                                                         
297 “INFORME VISITA SAN PABLO DE AMALI y SECTORES ALEDAÑOS”, 2007. 
298 “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-SSC-PDD): San José del 
Tambo Hydroelectric Project, Version 03,” p.12 
299 Interview with Ramiro Gordillo, technical manager, Hidrotambo S.A. Quito, Ecuador. May 18, 2012. 
300 “Rip Offsets: The Failure of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism,” 2008. 
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Repression under the guise of sustainable development 
Hidrotambo tries to present their hydroelectric project as helpful to the local 
communities. They claim that the project is complemented by the application of a, 
“reasonable Environmental Management Plan, which will enable compliance with 
Ecuadorian environmental regulations, protect the river basin natural resources within its 
influence area, and benefit its communities.”301 The community benefits are elaborated 
upon: “Impacts are expected to be dramatically reduced by the application of a sensible 
community relations program which includes an information campaign, creation of 
sustainable community development programs…projects that can represent a benefit to 
the local population…and the application of a hiring program within the project activities 
within the communities in the area of influence. Sustainable development programs shall 
be applicable for the duration of the project, and are in fact underway at the moment of 
the development of this document.”302 Not one part of the promised “sustainable 
development programs” existed at the time of the PDD elaboration, and the only aspect 
that has been carried out in the six years since these promises were made is the hiring 
program, which has provided some community members with short-term, low wage jobs.  
In addition to promising that there was an existing community development 
program in 2006 that is still nowhere to be seen, Hidrotambo does not even mention the 
violence and plunder of campesino lands that was occurring during the PDD writing and 
approval process. The Armed Forces repression outlined in Chapter 2 was occurring at 
this time, and there is not even an allusion to the use of tear gas, injuries from bullets, 
feeling-up of children, robberies of community members by military personnel, or                                                         
301 “Clean Development Mechanism Project Design Document Form (CDM-SSC-PDD): San José del 
Tambo Hydroelectric Project, Version 03,” 2007 
302Ibid., p.13   
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unwarranted invasion of houses. There is no mention that these farmers will lose access 
to water for human use, irrigation, and for their animals once the project is built.  
Prone to corruption in a market-based system  
Market measures to address climate change like the CDM do not actually 
incentivize addressing climate change; they incentivize making a profit from the sale of 
emissions reduction credits. Countries, companies, brokers, and verifiers involved in the 
market value short-term capital accumulation much more than actual climate change 
reduction and are thus prone to corruption driven by these perverse incentives. 
Researcher Larry Lohmann states in his book on carbon markets, “buyers want to snap up 
cheap pollution rights; sellers want to make money flogging them. It doesn’t matter to 
either whether the setup actually does any good for the climate or not.”303 Hundreds of 
projects and millions of carbon credits are thus accused of being fraudulent—“swindles 
to sustain business as usual, or worse.”304  
Hidrotambo sees the opportunity to make more money from their project through 
the CDM, so they have lied their way into CDM funding.  Hidrotambo executives are not 
the only people who stand to profit from the CDM: the third party verifiers (consultants 
approved by the United Nations to decide whether the project complies with CDM 
requirements) will profit as well, especially if they approve projects, because hopeful 
CDM project proponents elsewhere will hire verifiers with a reputation for approving 
projects.  This perverse incentive shines a light on why Hidrotambo’s verifier, TUV-SUD 
of Germany, would also participate in creating and approving a deceptive PDD. 
                                                        
303 Larry Lohmann, “Six Soundbites on Climate Markets,” (The Cornerhouse, UK: 2008), p. 4, 
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/sites/thecornerhouse.org.uk/files/Soundbites2.pdf 
304 “Mercados de Carbono: La Neoliberalización del Clima,” p.211 
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 Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, wrote, “the new industry of 
verification of deceptive carbon reductions is growing with leaps and bounds. The 
quantities of money involved are immense; and, the opportunities for traps, bribes and 
corruption are unlimited. The idea of compensation has given birth to a monster.”305 This 
helps explain how even minor efficiency improvements in gaslines, fossil fuel generation 
plants,306 coal mines,307 and oil wells308 have been approved as “clean development 
projects” by the CDM.   
Funds emitting industries in the global South and harms existing sustainable 
economic activity 
The CDM not only allows countries and their industries in the global North to buy 
their way out of making real emissions reductions, it also directly or indirectly funds 
other emitting industries in the global South. The other emitting industries are the clean 
project developers themselves. The majority of these clean project developers do not 
exclusively develop clean industry; they also work in other, more polluting industries. 
The CDM is therefore channeling money to industrial developers, many of them large 
emitting industries, to build “clean” projects that would have been built anyway. Is this 
how we will overcome global climate change?  
In the case of Hidrotambo, the CDM is channeling funds to a conglomeration of 
large companies that produce emissions-intensive plastic shoes and boots (Plasticaucho), 
fund fossil-fuel electric plants (CIE, Ingeteam, and Ecoluz), and develop electrical 
equipment, motors, generators and frequency converters to serve the energy, industrial,                                                         
305 Buiter, Willem, “Carbon Offsets: Open House for Waste, Fraud, and Corruption,” (Maverecon: 2007) 
http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2007/07/carbonoffsets.html/   
306 Katherine Brahic, ‘“Green’ Funding for Coal Power Plants Criticised,” (New Scientist, February 2009).  
307 “Yanquan Coal Mine Methane (CMM) Utilization for Power Generation Project,” (Shanxi Province, 
China), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/TUEV-SUED1169658303.93 
308 Timothy Gardner, “Blue Source To Capture Kansas C02, Up Oil Output,” (Reuters, August 22, 2007), 
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/43843/story.htm  
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marine, and rail traction sectors worldwide (Ingeteam). Through the rhetoric of “clean 
development,” the CDM is supporting a project that will likely impel an increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions by channeling money to polluting industries, as well as by 
incapacitating sustainable food production. Hidrotambo’s water privatization will lead to 
an extreme reduction in local food production, which will likely hasten the already 
troubling shifts occurring in Ecuador towards carbon-intensive industrial agriculture and 
carbon intensive food importation. Why couldn’t a climate change program instead 
support small farmers like those in the Dulcepamba watershed who produce healthy food 
without huge emitting machinery and energy-intensive and polluting fertilizers and 
pesticides, and who create very few emissions from transporting food to local markets in 
comparison with large agro-industrial exporters?  
Of the approximately 60 existing and 226 planned hydroelectric projects in 
Ecuador, nine are currently registered with the CDM.309 Of these nine projects currently 
supported by the CDM in Ecuador, four that I know of, including the San José del Tambo 
project, have been marked with grave conflicts between the developer and the local 
community. Others may also be marked with conflict, but I have not yet encountered 
information about them.  
The owner of one of these projects, the Calope or “Enermax” project, generates 
electricity solely for one corporation in Ecuador: la Favorita. La Favorita is one of the 
largest corporations in Ecuador, and one of the largest landholders in the country.310 The 
corporation owns most of the supermarket chains in Ecuador (Supermaxi, Megamaxi,                                                         
309 Buri, Alexandra, Ing., “ Proyectos Registrados Ante la Junta Ejecutiva MDL. Coordinadora de la 
Autoridad Nacional MDL. (Ministerio del Ambiente. Quito, Ecuador: Marzo, 2013)  
310 Ricardo Buitron, “Reconquista del espacio latinoamericano. Corredores biológicos y corredores 
multimodales en el Ecuador” (CLACSO: 2007), p. 11 
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/becas/semi/2004/buitron.pdf  
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Akí, Gran Akí, la Favorita). They also dominate the construction materials and home 
improvement sector (Kywi, Mega Kywi, Sukasa, Todo Hogar), and they own several 
disposable consumer products chains –a Christmas store (Salón de Navidad) and several 
toy stores. They own electronics stores (TVentas, Radio Shack) baby product stores, and 
more. La Favorita also owns industrial meatpacking plants (Agropesa), industrial bread 
products factories (Maxipan), and an industrial chicken producer (Pofasa).311 The CDM 
is paying an Ecuadorian industrial market monopolizer to generate electricity for 
industrial corporate production. Is that going to mitigate climate change?    
The Calope project has privatized vast amounts of water for their dam, which 
diverts the Calope and Pilaló rivers towards their turbines, affecting water access for the 
campesino and indigenous cantons of La Maná and Pangua y Pujilí. Protesting 
community members have been unfairly criminalized for defending their land, water, and 
wellbeing.312 La Favorita would have built their hydroelectric plant without CDM 
funding, as the corporation has plenty of capital for start-up costs, and the plant is no 
sacrifice for the environment: it is cheap. The dam saves the company approximately 
19% in energy costs compared to purchasing fossil-fuel derived electricity.313 The Calope 
CDM project is therefore not additional, and thus does not contribute to global 
greenhouse gas emissions reductions above or beyond business as usual. Like the 
Hidrotambo project, it also is harming rural farming communities that live low-emissions 
lifestyles and produce low-emissions healthy food to feed the country.                                                           
311 Ana María Acosta, “La privatización de los espacios públicos, la recreación y el estómago –Nuevas 
resistencias, jóvenes e informales,” (INREDH: Quito, Enero, 2011)  
312 “Criminalización de la protesta social. Un recuento desde el retorno a la democracia” (Programa Andino 
de Derechos Humanos (PADH): Quito, Ecuador 2012), endnotes. 
http://www.uasb.edu.ec/padh_contenido.php?cd=3911&pagpath=1&swpath=infb&cd_centro=5&ug=pu
#24  
313 “La privatización de los espacios públicos, la recreación y el estómago –Nuevas resistencias, jóvenes e 
informales,” 2011 
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The campesino communities close to the Apaquí project, another CDM project, 
have organized resistance due to the fact that the project’s owner, Current Energy of 
Ecuador, has privatized an entire watershed and has denied access to water for many 
local farming communities.314 Communities surrounding the CDM Hidroabánico project 
also joined together in resistance, because the project ruined forest, aquatic, and farming 
ecosystems, and flooded several neighborhoods and an airport in the city of Macas.315 
The Hidroabánico project generates electricity for Coca Cola, KFC, and a transnational 
mining company. 316 
A mechanism that promotes further industrialization inevitably leads to greater 
global consumption and carbon emissions, which will never be fully offset by clean 
energy production. In the Dulcepamba watershed, this pattern will play out if the dam is 
not cancelled. Hidrotambo’s hydroelectric project will displace a small-scale farming 
population that currently contributes significantly to low emissions food production in the 
country. Hidrotambo’s turbines will provide electricity for mainly industrial users, whose 
activities will increase overall global industrial activity and consumption of resources. 
And, many of the displaced farmers will likely end up leaving farming behind and move 
to large cities where they will use more resources and consume more than they do in a 
campesino lifestyle.    
 
                                                         
314“Temen Quedarse Sin Agua,” (periódico La Hora, La Paz, Marzo: 2007), 
http://www.lahora.com.ec/index.php/noticias/show/547051/-
1/Temen_quedarse_sin_agua.html#.UX2sJRzOJIQ  
315“Ecuador: lucha en Jimbitono en contra de hidroeléctrica: solidaridad urgente de movimientos sociales 
de Cuenca” (Biodiversidad en Am´rica Latina y el Caribe, Macas: 2006), 
http://www.biodiversidadla.org/Principal/Secciones/Noticias/Ecuador_lucha_en_Jimbitono_en_contra_
de_hidroelectrica_solidaridad_urgente_de_movimientos_sociales_de_Cuenca  
316 Ibid., 2006 
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An irredeemable mechanism 
Who loses from the CDM scheme? And who benefits? The principal beneficiaries 
of the CDM are those industry owners, verifiers, and financial traders who profit from the 
scheme. The global public, increasingly at risk from climate change, loses, because the 
mechanism does not lead to global net carbon emission reductions. Local communities 
lose because these projects support the commodification of their resources, to be bought 
and sold by those who play the game of global capital. Farmers in the Dulcepamba 
watershed, for example, do not even know that the CDM exists, as none of the prior 
consultation required by the CDM occurred.317 All that they experience is repressive 
violence and the robbing of their resources through water privatization. A market-based 
mechanism, as shown above, does not incentivize climate change mitigation; it 
incentivizes capital accumulation from carbon offsetting and trading. A market-based 
mechanism also does not incentivize community-based solutions to climate change; it 
only incentivizes industrial solutions.  
The CDM’s role as a primary mode of climate change reduction for the Kyoto 
Protocol distracts from the systemic change that must occur. So, what to do? Lohmann 
writes, “by insisting that the Carbon Market is regulatable and that small rule or design 
changes can address its major issues, the market gains more and more territory when it 
should actually be in a decorous and tidy retirement.”318 Because the problems with the 
United Nations CDM are not owed just to bad implementation or isolated wrongdoers, 
but instead the very existence of a North-South carbon free market mechanism is counter-
                                                        
317 Interview with farmer from the region. San Pablo de Amalí, Ecuador. January, 2013. 
318 Mercados de Carbono: la Neoliberalization del Clima, p. 287. 
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productive and unjust, the problems can only be resolved by eliminating the carbon 
market itself. 
Potential to remove CDM funding from the San José del Tambo project 
 Although the CDM market has suffered from an over-supply in credits recently, 
and there has been talk of its self-destruction due to resulting decreased financial 
viability, it is unlikely that the CDM will be eliminated before Hidrotambo can benefit 
from it. Therefore, I will also recommend a way in which interested parties can challenge 
Hidrotambo’s unjust registration with the CDM.  
 One way to challenge Hidrotambo’s CDM registration is to take advantage of the 
project’s delays and resulting need for re-validation, to submit comments to the validator, 
the Ecuadorian CDM office, and the CDM Executive Board, about the many inaccuracies 
and omissions in the PDD. The San José del Tambo project has not so far avoided any of 
the C02 emissions that Hidrotambo promised to cut during its first accreditation period 
(2008-2015), because the project is not yet functioning. As a result, the Ecuadorian 
National CDM coordinator explained to me that Hidrotambo’s project will have to be re-
validated if it wishes to receive emissions reduction credits when it does begin to 
function. She told me that, “Hidrotambo must ask their validator to revise their PDD. The 
validator must report to the CDM Executive Board that the project has been delayed, and 
any changes in the project conditions.” At this time, “the validator [TUV-SUED] will do 
a field visit and a document revision.”319 Finally, she noted that her CDM office will do a 
field visit in addition to the verifier’s field visit, and they will do a document revision to 
complement the verifier’s document revision. She said, “…the Executive Board will                                                         319 Interview with Alexandra Buri, Ecuadorian National Coordinator of the UN Clean Development 
Mechanism, Rachel Conrad, Quito, Ecuador, January 2013. 
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request a ‘notification of observation’ from the Designated National Authority (DNA),” 
her office. “Usually,” she said, “we visit all projects for which the Executive Board has 
requested this observation. And we always review the Environmental Impact Study.”320  
The CDM National Coordinator, who is new to the job, did not even know at the 
time when I interviewed her about the military and police aggression, violations of 
private property, the number of farmers who will lose access to water, Hidrotambo’s new 
illegal hydroelectric generation contract, or their outdated environmental licenses.321 For 
several weeks during the re-verification process that Hidrotambo will have to go through, 
the verifiers will take public comments, 322 and they should be informed of these matters. 
Flooding the CDM with public comments may convince them that the injustices 
occurring in the Dulcepamba watershed warrant annulling the San José del Tambo 
project’s CDM registration. 
Climate change solutions from marginalized communities and the global South 
Despite possibly good intentions behind the Kyoto Protocol’s market mechanism 
and a hope that it would be a less burdensome way for industrialized countries to reduce 
their emissions, the CDM has failed to significantly reduce global net greenhouse gas 
emissions and has harmed many rural communities along the way. Any alternative to the 
Clean Development Mechanism to mitigate climate change cannot be based primarily on 
market mechanisms that incentivize growth and industrial development. Solutions must 
instead be based on lower consumption and low impact economic activity. Communities 
that are themselves contributing very little to climate change or other environmental 
problems should not bear the brunt of misguided projects that allow industry to avoid true                                                         320 Ibid, 2013 
321 Ibid., 2013. 
322 Ibid., 2013.  
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emissions reductions.  Instead, the global North must stop displacing emissions 
reductions and begin to make real structural changes. According to the United States 
Energy Information Administration, primary energy consumption in the U.S. was nearly 
19% of world total primary energy consumption in 2010.323 The climate burden should 
not be centered on the global South as it is with the CDM.  
 While the burden of reducing carbon emissions should be primarily on the global 
North, the main source of those emissions, initiatives from the global South that provide 
an alternative to carbon-intensive development should be supported. Many rural 
campesino and indigenous communities of the global South have put forward positive 
approaches to climate change, but their approaches and proposals have been undermined 
by the dominance of carbon trading, the centerpiece of global policy on climate change. 
Lohmann explains that the, “math of compensation tends to eliminate alternatives to 
addressing climate change proposed by the less powerful and less wealthy.”324 For 
instance, Food Sovereignty, a proposal from rural communities of the global South for a 
just way to mitigate climate change, has been pushed under the table in favor of industrial 
and technological market “solutions” to climate change. The same is true of the Yasuni 
ITT Initiative, a project created as an alternative to traditional carbon markets325 by 
indigenous communities of the Amazon and Ecuadorian social movements. The idea was 
that Ecuador would keep approximately 850 million barrels of oil, located in the ITT-
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petroleum blocks in the east of Yasuní National Park in the Amazon, in the ground in 
return for financial support from the international community.326  
The important aspects of the Yasuní ITT Initiative that contribute to just solutions 
to climate change are that it does not let industrialized countries off the hook in reducing 
their own emissions, and that there is no construction or commoditization of Nature 
involved that would harm local communities. The Yasuní ITT Initiative is based on the 
idea of ecological debt, that industrialized countries are indebted to the global South for 
the historical plunder of their lands and their enormous historical contribution to climate 
change. Industrialized countries have accumulated stores of capital over time from their 
polluting ways, while countries like Ecuador have not made the same kinds of monetary 
profit from polluting. Industrialized countries are therefore asked to pay to support 
biodiversity, to reduce carbon emissions, and to respect indigenous lands in the Amazon. 
They are not given any sort of offset credit in return, as this would allow business-as-
usual emitting in the global North and absolve the industrialized countries of their 
ecological debt. The Ecuadorian government adopted the indigenous community’s 
Yasuní ITT proposal in 2007, and has been advocating for contributions from the global 
North. The initiative is not on track to receive the 3.6 billion dollars that Ecuador has 
asked to be donated before 2024, and will thus likely fail as a climate change mitigation 
mechanism.   
 Lohmann writes, “…in response to the manifested failure of a perpetual race 
behind the ghost of development, Buen Vivir emerges with strength and power as an 
                                                        
326 Susan Nysingh, “The Yasuní-ITT initiative: Dreaming of Keeping Oil in the Soil,” (University of 
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http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/90914/Nysingh_Thesis_SNRE_April_17-
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alternative to development…in sum rejecting the conceptual nuclei of the idea of 
conventional development understood as linear progress, which is at the roots of the 
capitalist cult.”327 If Sumak Kawsay were truly pursued through government land reform, 
efforts to create a ‘solidarity economy,’ respect for the Rights of Nature, the Human 
Right to Water, Food Sovereignty, and initiatives like Yasuní ITT, the Ecuadorian 
government would not allow for the commodification of Nature inherent in carbon 
markets. Climate change mitigation initiatives proposed by marginalized communities of 
the global South like the prioritization of Food Sovereignty and the Yasuní-ITT Initiative 
should be valued by the Ecuadorian government and the international community as 
alternatives to failed market mechanisms and as just ways to address climate change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
327 Mercados de Carbono: La neoliberalización del clima, p.18 
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Conclusion: Pathways Forward 
 
The 2008 Constitution is an incredible achievement by Ecuador’s social 
movements. The country’s ‘refounding’ with progressive and inclusive ideals is, 
however, an unfinished project. Despite all of the severe disappointments in the 
realization of these ideals, their existence in the Constitution provides hope that they can 
still be better realized with the help of coalitions and social movements active in Ecuador 
today. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos says, as a fruit of the constitutional process in 
Ecuador, “We have today concepts and ideas that we didn’t have ten years ago and that 
cannot be wasted, like the concept of Buen Vivir, the concept of Pachamama, of the 
rights of Nature…”328 The social movements that struggled to bring about an end to 
extreme neoliberalism and to infuse progressive and inclusive ideals into the Constitution 
at the turn of the century will not settle for the perversion of their ideals.  
While there was hope that continued struggle would not be needed after 2008, 
local groups such as those I have described in the Dulcepamba watershed have continued 
a coordinated struggle out of necessity, and they have brought that struggle to new levels. 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, communities in the Dulcepamba watershed are acting to 
address extractivist development by reporting abuses to the United Nations and the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights, by creating and participating in local, national, and 
international coalitions formed around issues of extractive practices, and by starting to 
build small-scale, low-impact economic activities as an alternative economic model.  
Beyond the actions already taken to challenge the San José del Tambo project, an 
important technical tool to challenge illegal water privatization is water level gauge                                                         
328 Eduardo Gudynas, “El buen vivir más allá del extractivismo” Prólogo a: La maldición de la Abundancia, 
por Alberto Acosta. (Quito, Ecuador: SwissAid y AbyaYala, 2009). 
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stations, which could provide accurate readings of the amount of available water in a 
river in order to prevent overestimations, which serve privatizers. Gauge stations have yet 
to be built or renovated on many of the nation’s rivers. However, simple ways to measure 
flow volume that take as little as a meter stick, an orange, and some simple calculations 
can be utilized before permanent gauge stations are built, to challenge hugely inaccurate 
measurements such as those that informed Hidrotambo’s concession. Communities from 
the Dulcepamba watershed might also benefit from joining global efforts to critique 
market-based solutions to climate change such as the CDM. Groups that have actively 
criticized the CDM such as International Rivers and the Corner House may be able to 
support the Dulcepamba watershed communities in challenging the San José del Tambo 
project’s registration with the CDM.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the rapid implementation of hydroelectric energy 
production is not for the purpose of serving people and the environment as president 
Correa asserts; it is being implemented to export and to serve large-scale and high-impact 
production, including mining. Hydroelectric production, along with mining, petroleum 
extraction, and other extractive activities are highly questionable and likely unsustainable 
sources of revenue for the state. Their grave human and environmental impacts are a 
roadblock to the sustainable and widespread wellbeing that Sumak Kawsay offers.  
As has been shown in this paper, multiple means of resistance are necessary to 
address extractive practices, because these practices are impelled by powerful interests 
including private companies, state governments, international development-oriented 
bodies, and the capitalist market-based system as a whole. While it may seem impossible 
to overcome these forces, it also once seemed impossible that a country dominated by 
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foreign capitalist interests and a powerful national elite would adopt a Constitution that 
articulated progressive ideals of wellbeing and inclusivity and offered a departure from 
the long neoliberal night. This only came about because of massive popular struggle. My 
hope is that social movements that have come this far, and that are not sitting still to 
allow their great achievements to be perverted, will be able to achieve a true 
implementation of the ideals that they fought for, through renewed popular struggle. 
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